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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The investigation to follow is based on a social psychological 
approach which concentrates on the study of family interaction as it 
relates with fertility and the social and personal milieu. The review 
of literature in Chapter II of this study indicates social and economic 
factors can affect what Davis and Blake (1956) have called "intervening 
variables" so as to increase or depress fertility. In addition to that, 
such factors can also serve to affect fertility intentions, and they 
do that by altering the balance of resources, costs, and preferences 
available to and perceived by wives and husbands in different ways. 
Research efforts, however, dealing with the question of when the 
wife begins to indicate a difference in preference from her husband is 
sparse. In other words, while some wives experience no change in 
attitudes toward a large number of children, others plan as to how many 
and when to get them. Examination of the education a 1 level, occupa-
tional involvement, and other familial plus extra-familial activities 
helps one understand the various factors that affect the wife's out-
look with regard to fertility. 
The main point of this study deals with fertility planning and 
fertility preferences and the variations on the basis of interaction of 
other independent variables such as education, occupation of both 
husbands and wives, and particularly of wives. 
1 
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Organization of the Study 
Chapter I of this study introduces the general demographic at-
tributes of the Kuwaiti population. Chapter II reviews the related 
literature that contributes to the theoretical mode formulated in 
Chapter III. The theoretical framework, assumpt i.ons, and hypotheses are 
discussed. Chapter IV presents the methods and analytical techniques 
used in this research. Chapter V presents the results of the investiga-
tion by an analysis of the data. The summary and conclusions are 
presented in Chapter VI. 
Kuwaiti's Demographic Attributes 
Population growth in Kuwait has been extremely rapid in the past 
23 years. The population has increased over six-fold (657 percent, ris-
ing from 206,473 in 1957 to 1,355,827 peopll' in 1980). Density of 
people per square kilometer has risen sharply from 12.9 persons per 
square kilometer in 1957 to 73.97 in 1980 (see Table I). The total land 
area of Kuwait between 1957 and 1980 increased slightly from 15,520 
kilometers to 17,820 as a result of Neutral Zone decisions (Habib, 
1971) •. 
While b.otJ;l K4waiti and the non-Kuwaiti populations increased 
dramatically duriqg this 23-year period, the non-Kuwaiti growth rate was 
higher. Thus, the Kuwaiti population increased by 495 percent between 
1957 and 1980 while the number of non-Kuwaitis increased by 855 percent. 
Consequently, although the Kuwait population experienced a substantial 
increase, the percentage of Kuwaitis in the population of the country 
actually decreased between 1957 and 1980 from 55.0 percent of the total 
population in 1957 to 41.0 percent in 1980. 
/ 
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TABLE I 
POPULATION DENSITY IN ALL CENSUS YEARS 
Year Total Population Dens tty/Square km %, k 
1957 206,473 12.9 55.0 
1961 321,621 20.1 50.3 
1965 467,339 29.2 47.1 
1970 738,662 43.7 47.0 
1975 994,837 56.3 47.5 
1980* 1,355,827 73.9 41.0 
*The early census data tabulation results which appeared in the news-
paper. 
Source: Ministry of Planning (1979). 
Changes in the population size of a country can occur in two ways: 
the increase or decrease can occur if there j s an imbalance between the 
number of births and deaths, and change can occur if there is an im-
balance between the number of migrants into and migrants out of a 
country. A birth-death imbalance leads to natural increase or decrease 
and an out-in-migration imbalance leads to net migration increase or 
decrease. The rapid increase in the total population of Kuwait between 
1957 and 1980 has occurred due to both natural increase and net migra-
tion. 
Population growth among the Kuwaitis has been a result of natural 
increase and naturalization with the former by far the most important 
factor. In 1957, the birth rate among Kuwaitis was 45.4 per 1,000 
population while the death rate was 6.2 per 1,000 population; the dif-
ferential equals the natural increase, that is, the growth in that year 
was 39.2 per 100 Kuwaitis (see Table II). The natural increase figures 
for Kuwaitis has been stable between 1965 and 1975, never falling below 
40.0 nor rising above 50.0 in each of the 10 years (see Table II). 
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A comparison of the Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti natural increase figures 
reveals that the Kuwaiti figures are consistently higher (see Tables II 
and III). In 1975, these figures show an increase of 32.8/1,000 popula-
tion among the non-Kuwaiti; thus, the natural increase among Kuwaitis 
was 37.2 percent higher than among non-Kuwaitis in 1975. While the data 
reveal that both the Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti populations are increasing 
rapidly through natural increase, the increase among Kuwaitis is a 
consequence of this factor is at a substantially higher rate. 
A closer look at the vital statistics components of natural increase 
shown in Table II indicates that the Kuwaiti crude birth rate (CBR) 
during the period 1965-197 5 was most frequently in the low SO's (i.e., 
50/1,000 population) and the CBR was generally around six or seven per 
1,000. Among non-Kuwaitis, both of these figures are found to be con-
sistently lower; the birthrate is mostly in the low 40's and upper 30's, 
and death rate averages around 4.0. These figures reflect the nature 
of the non-Kuwaiti sex and age distribution. The 1975 Kuwaiti CBR of 
51.1/1,000 is 41 percent higher than the:; non-Kuwaiti CBR of 36.3/1,000 
non-Kuwaitis. During the same year, however, the Kuwaiti CBR is 74.0 
percent higher than the non-Kuwaiti rate (the relevent figures are 6.1 
and 3.5/1,000, see Table II). Comparatively low death rate among non-
Kuwaitis is largely a consequence of their age distribution; primarily 
young adults,. they have comparatively few pe<lple in the extreme high and 
TABLE II 
CRUDE BIRTHS, DEATHS, AND NATURAL INCREASE/1,000 FOR Ku~AITI AND NON-KUWAITI POPULATIONS 
Births Deaths Natural Increase 
Non- Non- Non-
Year Total Kuwaiti Kuwaiti Total Kuwaiti Kuwaiti Total Kuwaiti Kuwaiti 
1965 46.3 52.7 40.4 5.2 7.2 3.4 41.1 45.6 37.1 
1966 45.7 51.0 41.0 5.4 7.2 3.8 40.3 43.8 37.1 
1967 49.8 54.5 45.6 5.5 6.8 4.3 44.3 47.7 41.3 
1968 53.0 53.6 52.4 5.4 6.6 4.3 47.6 47.1 48.1 
1969 51.4 55.8 47.5 4.9 5.8 4.1 46.4 50.0 43.3 
1970 45.4 46.4 44.5 5.0 5.8 4.4 40.4 40.6 40.2 
1971 45.1 48.3 42.3 4.9 6.1 3.8 40.3 42.2 38.5 
1972 45.2 48.3 40.9 5.0 6.1 3.5 40.3 42.2 37.3 
1973 44.2 52.4 37.6 5.0 8.0 3.5 39.2 45.4 34.1 
1974 46.8 54.4 39.8 5.3 7.1 3.7 41.5 47.3 36.1 
1975 43.4 51.1 36.3 4.8 6.1 3.5 38.6 45.0 32.8 
Source: Ministry of Planning (1979). 
\JI 
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low ages at which death is most common. Overall, this combination of a 
large number of births and a low number of deaths has led to high rates 
of natural increase. Kuwaiti population between 1965 and 1975 has 
experienced almost static birth rates. death rates, and rates of natural 
increase. 
Year 
1957 
1961 
1965 
1970 
1975 
Source: 
TABLE III 
SEX RATIOS AMONG KUWAITIS AND NON-KUWAITIS IN 
1957, 1961, 1965, 1970, AND 1975 
Sex Ratio 
Total Kuwaitis 
177 109 
167 109 
158 105 
132 102 
121 100 
Ministry of Planning (1979). 
Non-Kuwait is 
365 
267 
236 
166 
142 
Having observed a much higher natural increase rate among Kuwaitis 
than non-Kuwaitis in the country, it would seem logical to expect that 
the proportion of the total population of the country which is Kuwaiti 
would also be exhibiting a marked increase. However, an examination of 
the data presented in Table I indicates that the proportion of the 
population which is Kuwaitis has been stable at slightly over 47 percent 
since 1965. The key factor which ('XI;Jalns thh; HePmlngly inconsistency 
is the fact that while the increaHe among the Kuw.Tit I population .is 
essentially a consequence of two important factors (l.e., natural in-
crease and net migration). In sum, the country's rapid population 
increase has been a consequence of an exceedingly high natural increase 
among Kuwaitis and a high natural increase plus a high net migration 
(the number of people moving in, minus the number moving out) among 
non-Kuwaitis. 
When the country experiences a significant voluntary in-migration, 
the numerical balance between the sexes in the population is frequently 
changed toward a preponderance of males. This is because migration 
tends to be selective of males since a primary motivation for voluntary 
migration is often to obtain employment and, in such situations, males 
are more common job seekers than females. Such a pattern is reflected 
in the sex ratios in Kuwait (the number of males/100 females in a 
population) which is 1975 was 121 (Table III). 
In the same year the sex ratio among Kuwaitis was 100, indicating 
the presence of an exact balance between Kuwait males and females in 
the country. Among non-Kuwaitis, however, the 1975 sex ratio indicates 
the presence of 142 non-Kuwaiti males for each 100 non-Kuwaiti females 
in the country. Despite the high differential of males relative to 
females, the sex ratio among the non-Kuwaitis has decreased over the 
years; since 1957 it was an exceedingly high 365, in 1961 it was 267, 
and in 1965 it was 236, compared to its 1975 figure of 142. This indi-
cates that males who are presently migrating to Kuwait are much more 
often bringin~ their families with them and/or sending for wives and 
other family members after they have established themselves in the 
7 
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country. This has been a growing pattern, especially since 1957, due to 
changes in Kuwait which occurred in that year. 
In addition to sex differt>ntlals, migration also differentially 
affects age group distribution. As indicated previously, for economic 
reasons, migration tends to be selective since males are more common 
job-seekers than females; similarly, employment-seekers are apt to be in 
the 20 to 60 age groups. Since males of these ages generally have least 
difficulty in obtaining employment, migration is thus selective of 
males between the ages of 20 and 60. This means the sex ratio among the 
non-Kuwaitis who are between 20 and 60 years of age would be expected to 
be very high; among Kuwaitis, whose population increase is a result of 
natural increase, this statistic should be about 100. 
Data depicting such patterns are presented in Figure 1 and Table 
IV. The approximate balance between the sexes in the Kuwaiti population 
in 1975 can be viewed by examining the top population pyramid of Figure 1 
and the first data column of Table IV; the figure is around 100, showing 
that there are as many males as females among Kuwaitis in the population. 
Among the non-Kuwaiti population (see the bottom population pyramid of 
.Figure 1 and the second data column of Table IV) the sex ratio for the 
years 20 to 60 is very high. This is depicted by the much longer bars 
which indicate numbers on the male side of the population pyramid 
(Figure 1) and the sex ratio which varie~ between 149 and 255 (Table IV). 
Such a sex distribution can have serious consequences for many of 
the significant activities of life in a population. For example, a sex 
ratio of near 200 in the marriageable age groupings means that there are 
two males for each female of marriageable age in the population; a single 
male may find it difficult to find a wife. From a social point of view, 
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Figure 1. Population Pyramids--Kuwaitis and Non-Kuwaitis, 1975 
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such data mean that various problems which affect males of marriageable 
age may be conunon. And the types of recreational, shopping, family, 
religious, iow enforcement, and educational patterns can all be affected 
by such a male-female distribution. 
Age Grouping 
Under 20 
20 to 29 
30 to 39 
40 to 49 
50 to 59 
60 and over 
TABLE IV 
SEX RATIO AMONG KUWAITIS AND NON-KUWAITIS BY 
AGE GROUPINGS, 1975 
Sex Ratios 
Kuwaitis 
101 
91 
103 
116 
108 
102 
Source: Ministry of Planning (197~). 
Non-Kuwait is 
108 
149 
198 
255 
233 
104 
There is also an employment-related consequence of the Kuwaiti and 
non-Kuwaiti age distributions that are depicted in the population 
pyramids in Figure 1. An examination of these distributions reveals 
that what may be termed the "dependent population" (i.e., those members 
of the population who are generally not in the work force and are sup-
ported by the employed members of the population--people under 15 and 
11 
over 65 years of age), are far greater in the Kuwaiti than in the non-
Kuwaiti population. The relevant data are slightly over one-half in the 
category for the Kuwaiti population and slightly over 40.0 percent in 
the non-Kuwaiti population. If this observation is coupled with the 
previous one about the preponderance of males in the non-Kuwaiti 
population, the conclusion is reached that the non-Kuwaiti population is 
basically a blue-collar work force; 
Further understanding of the type of people who are moving into 
Kuwait can be found in data on religion in the country. In 1957, 94.4 
percent of the population in Kuwait listed their religion as Moslem, 
and 4. 7 percent as Christ ian; in 197 5 the corresponding percentages were 
95.0 percent and 4.5 percent. This means that despite rapid population 
growth, the religious distribution within the country has remained 
essentially the same. These data suggest that a sizeable proportion of 
the migration into Kuwait is taking place from other Moslem countries. 
Data on the nationality of the residents of Kuwait in 1975 reveals 
that 891,275 residents (representing 89.6 percent of 994,837 people in 
the country) are from Arab countries (Table V). Of this total, 472,088 
or 47.5 percent are Kuwaitis. The largest group of people who are non-
Kuwait! come from Jordanian.and Palestinian background; they constitute 
204,178 or. 20.5 percent of the population. All other Arab countries 
constitute 215,009 or 21.6.percent of the population. People from Iran, 
India, and Pakistan total 95,963 or 9.65 percent of the population. 
Other non-Arab countries total 7,599 or 0.76 percent of the population. 
At this point, many people make the observation that Kuwaitis are 
a minority in their own country. This statement is a statistically 
valid one (472,088 compared to 522, 749), but Kuwaitis are by far the 
largest nationality grouping in the country. Thus, Kuwaitis number 
472,088 in the country and the next largest nationality grouping has 
less than one-half of that number (the 204,179 from Jordan-Palestine), 
with the next largest group making up only 6.1 percent of the popula-
tion (from Egypt). Kuwaitis are a minority in their own country, but 
they are very strong plurality. 
TABLE V 
NATIONALITY BACKGROUND OF THE RESIDENTS OF KUWAIT, 1975 
12 
Nationality Background Number Percent 
Kuwaiti 
Jordan-Palestine 
Other Arab countries 
Iran, India, Pakistan 
Other non-Arab countries 
Source: Ministry of Planning (1979). 
472,088 
204,178 
215,009 
95,963 
7,599 
47.5 
20.5 
21.6 
9.65 
0.76 
The census of 1975 reveals that among Kuwaitis 59.1 percent of the 
females and 30.0 percent of the males 10 years of age and over, together 
constituting 44.6 percent of the total Kuwaiti population in this age 
grouping, are illiterate (Table V). Among non-Kuwaitis in the same year 
and in the same age grouping, the female illiteracy figure is 31.3 
13 
percent and the male figure is 27.5 percent. For the non-Kuwaiti popula-
tion as a whole, the illiteracy percentage is 28.5 percent. 
Year 
1957 
1965 
1975 
TABLE VI 
ILLITERATE POPULATION 10 YEARS OF.AGE AND OLDER, KUWAITI AND 
NON-KUWAITI MALES AND FEMALES, 1957, 1965, AND 1975, 
BY PERCENTAGE 
Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti 
Total Males Females Total ?-1ales 
62.6 48.6 77.9 51.0 51.4 
56.3 41.5 72.0 40.9 40.8 
44.6 30.0 59.1 28.5 27.5 
Source: Ministry of Planning (1979). 
Females 
49.2 
41.5 
31.3 
Among all the groupings mentioned, the percentage of the population 
which is classified as illiterate has been decreasing over the years. 
Thus, among the Kuwaitis 10 years of age and older between 1957 and 1975, 
there was a substantial drop from 62.6 percent classified as illiterate 
to 44.6 percent; among Kuwaiti males the decline was from 48.6 percent to 
30.0 percent; and among females it was from 77.9 percent to 59.1 percent 
(Table VI). Among non-Kuwait is the decline was from 51.0 percent to 
28.5 percent, with 'illiteracy among m~les decreasing from 51.4 percent 
to 27. 5 percent and among females from 49.2 percent to 31.3 percent. 
Close inspection of the data in Table VI shows that the decline in 
14 
illiteracy was more substantial between 1965 and 1975 than between 1957 
and 1965. Such a speed-up in the decline suggests the influence of 
expanding educational opportunity in Kuwait and probably a net migration 
among non-Kuwaitis which is increasingly selective of educated people. 
CHAI'Tim ll 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
Much of the following literature on fertility has some bearing on 
the study by Westoff, Potter, Sagi, and Mishler (1961) as well as the 
presEmt research. On the whole, sociologists follow a socio-physiolog-
ical point of view in their study of fertility. This will be illustrated 
in the following review of literature. There is, however, a cautionary 
story cited from the literature which is an object lesson to the conven-
tional practice of taking a number of variables (unrelated to the actors' 
own exp_!:.gnations) apd lo<?king where the b~-~! correlation lies. 
Stycos (1962) and Heer (1964) had both noticed a positive relation 
between fertility and economic development in parts of Latin America. 
Stycos' work was on Peru and Heer's on Ecuador and Bolivia. Stycos 
suggested that the explanation might be that the greater marital in-
stability of the economically less-advanced Indians, as compared with 
the Spanish-speaking population, led to a smaller exposure to the risk 
of conception. Heer cast doubt on this hypothesis and suggested in-
stead that the difference may be due to voluntary causes, such as abor-
tion or infanticide. James (1966) re-examined their data, prompted it 
seems, by Stycos' tabulation of fertility in Peruvian "provincias" 
by altitude level and the proportion of the population speaking 
Spanish. He thus concluded that ethnic status, as indicated by 
language, was a more powerful determinant of fertility than altitude. 
15 
16 
James suggests that Stycos' results would have been rather different had 
he dichotomized a little nearer the medians of the variables, and pro-
ceeds to test his assumption against data for the larger ad-mlnistrad.ve 
units of Peru and Bolivia, and for "provincias" in Ecuador. He found 
that the product-moment correlation between fertility and altitude for 
Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia are -0.805, -0.761, and -0.726, respec-
tively. The relationship between fertility and altitude, holding 
language constant, is stronger than that between fertility and language, 
holding altitude constant. The conclusion, therefore, seems to be that 
altitude is more closely related to fertility than is economic develop-
ment (if the indicators of the latter are accepted). Heer (1967) 
accepted James' recalculations. 
These recalculations have themselves now been challenged. For 
reasons outside their control, the official birth registrations being so 
deficient, James and Heer used the ratio of children under five to women 
between 15 and 49 as their measure of fertility. Whitehead (1968) has 
taken up James' admission that such a statistic disguises the effect of 
infant mortality, and has presented scattered field evidence to show that 
such mortality is in fact very high in the high-altitude regions of 
Bolovia and Ecuador (and by implication, Peru). True crude birth rates 
may be as high as SO, well in excess of those at lower altitudes. It 
is, therefore, unlikely that there can be any significant effect of 
altitude on fecundity, either through the male or the female. What 
records there are do suggest, as James expected, that there are a large 
number of abortions; but these appear to be voluntary and not spontaneous 
and thus to have a social cause. Neither is there any suggestion that 
the high infant mortality is a direct product of living at high 
altitudes. Rather, it is explicable in terms of the social conditions 
of the depressed populations at these heights, populations that have 
yet to enjoy the substantial measures of preventive public health now 
enjoyed by the majority of developing communHies. The most recent 
contribution to this debate at the present time confirms the tendency 
suggested by Whitehead from Peruvian data (Bradshaw, 1969). Bradshaw 
considers that the under-registration in Indian Peru may have 
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disguised a fertility in excess of that in the Spanish-speaking dis-
tricts and, therefore, that the fertility differentials in Peru are much 
more consistent with the pattern to be expected from the transition 
model than was at first thought. 
This exchange of data and arguments contains three lessons. First, 
the greatest care has to be exercised in using deficient demographic 
data. The less refined the data are, the more likely they are to con-
tain hidden e.ffects that can make nonsense of one's inferences. 
Secondly, it reveals the dangers of simply taking hypotheses that fit 
one's preconceptions and not testing for factors conventionally treated 
by other workers. And third, it reveals how much more easily field 
evidence, including the direct interviewing of the childbearing popula-
tion to elucidate their intentions as well as their fertility behavior, 
can lead to more accurate causal imputations. 
There is, however, little doubt that sociological and economic 
factors are responsible for the demographic transition in fertility and 
mortality over the past 200 years. The problem is not that of mistaking 
a non-sociological process for a sociological one, but rather that of 
deciding which sociological factors have been responsible for which 
rate changes. Sorting out the various factors requires a supply of 
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information and a methodological sophistication that have only recently 
become realistic possibilities. The United Nations' (1953) review of 
the debate about the fertility transition illustrates how recently the 
leading authorities in the field were still somewhat at a loss to assess 
the relative contributions of the various factors, and the extent to 
which they were forced to resort to speculation. And, so long as the 
relative contribution of various socio-economic determinants is unknown, 
it is impossible to begin to suggest a mechanism that can account for the 
change. 
Ryder (1959) makes this clear when, in summarizing the societal 
types that have accompanied the three main stages of the demographic 
transition, he points out that such a mechanism would necessarily be 
part of a wider explanatory theory of development; and that we have no 
such theory. His summary nevertheless contains at least some of the 
building blocks for one. The first societal type is typified by high 
fertility and morality, labor intensive agriculture, and consanguineal 
familism. In these societies, fertility is controlled by various 
combinations of infanticide, abortion, and abstinence. Some peasant 
societies in the Far East still d~splay these characteristics. Second 
is the type characterized by somewhat lower fertility and mortality, 
agriculture which is still labor intensive, but in which consanguineal 
familism has been replaced by a conjugal pattern and where fertility is 
controlled by a later age at marriage. Such was the case in pre-
industrial Europe in the sixteenth century. Third and last is that type 
characteristic of the modern west, where fertility and morality are low, 
industry replaces agriculture as the dominant economic activity, 
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individualism predominates over familial values and in which fertility 
is mainly regulated by contraception within marriage. 
Leibenstein (1957) has provided a speculative account of the chang-
ing utilities of children through the period of development. He begins 
by making several assumptions about the fertility desires: Assuming that 
the desire for children for their own sake remains constant over the 
period of rising per capita income, it also being a basic assumption of 
the whole theory that this income is indeed rising. However, these 
children's utility as a source of productive labor to augment the family 
income and their utility as a source of security to offset the income 
drop at the end of the parents' productive life both decline. On the 
other hand, the direct cost of each child increases since, he assumes, 
the effect of rising income is to promote a desire for "higher quality" 
children. 
The new occupational environment Hmits opportunities for 
child labour, requires more costly training for children, and 
necessitates smaller family obligations on the part of the 
parents so that they can take advantage of new and different 
economic opportunities (Leibenstein, 1957, p. 164). 
Further, the indirect costs of children increase in the sense that there 
is a greater opportunity cost involved in looking after them. 
Leibenstein makes two important qualifications of detail to his 
general model. First, he suggests that as infant mortality declines at 
the beginning of the transitional period, the number of expected child-
utility years increases, and within the desired and so the actual number 
of children. Eventually it will be realized that the costs of caring 
for this extra load outweigh the ultimate b¢nefits, and the fertility 
rate will then decline. This temporary rise and fall he terms 
the infant mortality hump. Second, he argues that the most important 
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determinant of ft.~rti.l.!ty in the l.ast period nf lht' transition wi.ll be 
th(' cyclical fluctuations of th~· mnt:11re, lndustr1.al economy, whether 
they are called long (so-called "Kuznets cycles") or short (more usually 
referred to as "business cycles"). 
The first of these two qualifications, together with the general 
model, is supported by Lorimer's (1967) Calculation. Lorimer constructs 
models from six variables (the level and pattern of fertility, the level 
of mortality, consumption needs by sex and age, production potentials 
by sex and age, the relation of the nuclear family to other social 
structures, and productive resources) to simulate the following condi-
tions: (1) traditional agriculture, high fertility, and high mortality; 
(2) the same, except for moderate mortality; (3) early industrialization, 
high fertility, and moderate mortality; and (4) the same, except for 
moderate fertility. His calculations, therefore, apply solely to the 
early period of transition. High fertility he takes to be 7.0, moderate 
4.0; ages at marriage in the first three conditions are 18 for women and 
21 for men, and are postponed five years for the fourth; it is assumed 
that children leave the parental family at marriage; and it is assumed 
that the first birth occurs after an interval of 1.0 to 1.9 years, 
successive intervals being of 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, and 4 years. Female expecta-
tions of life at birth are taken to be 30 years (high mortality) or 50 
years (moderate mortality). Lorimer further assumes, from some Indian 
and Filipino data~ that an adult male consumption unit is taken as 1.0, 
an adult female's will be 0.8, and that those of children of both sexes 
will be 0. 3 under two years old, rising by equal amounts to 0. 4 at five 
and thereafter by larger amounts to the adult level at 15 years. He 
remarks that this scale may be conservative. He takes the relative 
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productivity values under traditional agriculture as 1.6 adult male 
consumption units (males) and 0.8 units (females), with children of both 
sexes only contributing 0.15 at eight years, rising to a mean of the 
adult level (1.2) at 15 years. Half the children reaching 18, that is, 
the males, remain at home for another three years. Under early 
industralization, male productivity rises to 1.8, female drops to 0.6 
(giving the same couple.equal productivity as in agriculture). Children 
reach 0.12 at 12 years, rising to the mean level (1.2) at 15. He re-
marks again that this too may be conservative in understanding 
agriculture-industry differences. 
From these assumptions, which rest on contemporary demographic 
observations and a few surveys, Lorimer (1967) calculates that under the 
first set of conditions there is a net surplus of production-consumption 
units of 14.34. The period of deficit during the stage of family forma-
tion is 11 years but only amounts to -2.16 units. Under the second set, 
the surplus drops to 12.52, and the deficit period, also 11 years, 
amounts to ~4.79 units. It is under the third set of conditions that the 
greatest stress occurs. There the overall surplus becomes an overall 
deficit, of -11.07 units, and the intermediate deficit period has ex-
tended to 23 years and -19.08 units. Finally~ a net surplus re-emerges, 
albeit a small one (2.56 units), and the deficit period drops back to 15 
years and -10.59 units. In this last stage, the delayed age at marriage 
does not affect production-consumption relations but changes their 
location in the family cycle. 
These calculations are hypothetical in that they do not relate to 
one observed population. Lorimer has assembled data of various kinds 
22 
from var:Lous socletJt•H and 11111tly7.cd their Interactions in nne model. 
Nevertheless, there is already some evidence that for presently develop-
ing societies, this model (and thus Leibenstein's too) does correspond 
to reality (Gupta and Malaker, 1963). These transitions differ 
internally, and economic historians·and historical demographers cannot 
often agree on what exactly happened within one society (Krause, 1967; 
Razzell, 1965, 1967; Habbakuk, 1955, for Britain; Petersen, 1960, for 
the Netherlands; Wrigley, 1969). 
There is, however, one crucial assumption behind Leibenstein's 
(1957) and Lorimer's (1954) work that cannot be evaded. This is that 
economic growth is, or was, largely independent of and prior to any 
demographic transition. Economists, economic historians, and demog-
raphers still do not agree about this, although there is at present a 
conventional wisdom, well sununarized by Ohlin (1967), which would 
justify the assumption: 
By and large; the growth of population in the past must to a 
large extent have been a response to economic advance in a 
broad sense. Instances of 'population pressure' undoubtedly 
occurred, but the broad sweep of growth is more easily 
interpreted as a consequence of the opening up of new ter-
ritories and industries (Meade, 1968, p. 147). 
[For more discussion of the issues and arguments, see, for example, the 
papers in United Nations (1967), Clark (1967)]. On the other hand, the 
growth of population in modern, under-developed, and developing 
societies has occurred much .more swiftly and at a different stage in 
the process of economic advance,.and the Leibenstein-Lorimer approach 
can only be justified on the assumption that these societies, despite 
their chronic demographic difficulties, can nevertheless mana~e to 
achieve some economic growth before population growth begins to 
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decelerate. Such an assumption, of counw, begs one of the most crucial 
questions in the political economy of the presently developing nations. 
All one can say is that if economic growth does emerge, then these sorts 
of mechanisms will gradually come into play. All of which is not to deny 
the possibility of a reverse process, the possibility of couples 
deliberately limiting their families to a size below that necessary to 
maintain their standard of living, and thus creating a surplus for in-
vestment of various.kinds. Most economic historians are skeptical of 
this (Wrigley, 1969}, but whether or not family limitation was always 
practiced to balance resources or sometimes to increase them must remain 
open for economic and demographic history. 
Leibenstein's second qualification, that in the last period 
of the demographic transition the main determinant of fertility and mar-
riage rates will be cyclical fluctuations in the economy, was supported 
by one study that he researched and wrote (Galbraith and Thomas, 1941). 
His work has since been corroborated by others (Kirk and Nortman, 1958; 
Kirk, 1960; Silver, 1965). Two cross-sectional studies, however, have 
found no relation between recessions or booms and fertility (Westoff, 
Potter and Sagi, 1963; Freedman and Coombs, 1966). Thomas pointed out 
that the persistence of correlations of between .70 and .90 between 
business cycles and marriage rates "is perhaps, one of the most firmly 
based empirical findings in any of the social sciences" (comment to 
Kirk, 1960, p. 258). Silver's work on the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan did not produce quite such startling associations 
(the coefficients of determination were of the order of .50), but they 
are still good. The association with fertility is less strong, and its 
absence in the two cross-sectional studies suggests that business cycles 
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may have their strongest effect on marriage rates and first-parity 
births. In short, they are perhaps determinants of the timing rather 
than of the quantity of vital events, although if a recession delays the 
reproductive behavior of couples in which the wife is towards the higher 
end of the child-bearing period then there might well be an effect on 
total fertility. Studies in the United States suggest this (Campbell, 
1967), and Ryder (1969) implies that this was the effect of the relative 
depression before the Second World War. Easterlin's (1962, 1966) 
empirical work has been on the impact of longer Kuznets cycles, and in 
it he has made the necessary connections between the aggregate events 
and the micro-economics and micro-sociology of which those events are 
the intellectual construction. He sees economic conditions working in 
part via the income effect and in part via preferences by shaping 
primarily material aspirations during adolescence. This is slightly at 
variance with some earlier studies of the relationship between business 
cycles and fertility, in which it was assumed that the effect was 
achieved through the impact of fluctuations in the rate of unemployment. 
There is no direct evidence for this assumption and the second of the two 
published Princeton studies by Westoff, Potter and Sagi (1963) reveals 
that couples most affected by a recession that happened to fall between 
the two surveys were more likely to be contraceptively effective; thus 
nullifying, if not actually reversing, the expected relationship. More 
affected in the expected direction were those groups of higher status. 
However, several sociologists have assumed that since there is no 
direct relationship between income and fertility in recent cross-
sectional (as distinct from time series) studies, so that hypothesis two 
must be discarded (Blake, 1967, 1968). A glance at the findings of bqth 
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the Princeton and the Growth of American Families studies would seem to 
bear out this skepticism, and it is also corroborated by some census data 
from other societies [see, for instance, the data for West Germany 
reported by Clark (1967)]. Blake's argument, for example, is 
simple. Once fertility control has become "diffused" evenly through an 
industrial society, one would expect a positive relationship between 
income and ideal, desired, expected, or actual fertility. She takes 
this point of departure from Becker (1960). However, she points out 
such a positive relationship does not exist. Indeed (and excepting for 
the moment Catholics, who constitute a comprehensible special case in. 
this respect), there is virtually no relationship at all. The income-
fertility hypothesis, she thus concludes, must be abandoned. She 
adduces additional circumstantial evidence to suggest that the crucial 
determinants are rather much more straightforwardly sociological, in 
that they have to do with non-economic norms. 
This argument misunderstands the sophisticated economic thesis and 
the misunderstanding is revealed by some ether evidence of the impact 
of income on fertility in both advanced and developing, or undeveloped, 
societies. It is brought out in Easterlin's (1960, 1969) own argument 
against Becker. Easterlin (1969) insists that the effect of income must 
be seen as the effect also of tastes, preferences, or norms for the 
disposal of that income: 
Per capita income growth operates through two channels. On 
the one hand, it has the effect usually emphasized of tending 
to increase the fertility by giving the second generation more 
resources. On the other hand, it tends to lower fertility by 
increasing the relative desire for material goods. Since 
these two influences may be more or less off-setting, it no 
longer follows that per capita income growth tends to increase 
fertility secularly (p. 147). 
It does not follow, however, from this that one may ignore the income 
variable altogether. The nature and extent of the offsetting process 
26 
is an empirical question to be determined afresh for each sample studied. 
Evidence from Easterlin's argument is of two kinds. The first argu-
ment he makes bears directly on tastes. Freedman and Coombs (1966) found 
in a 1961 Detroit sample that there was an in~erse relationship between 
fertility expectations and aspirations for children. They also found 
that when income expectations (a rough measure of potential or permanent 
income) were matched against fertility expectations, there was a positive 
relation. It follows from this, although it was not directly tested, 
that the highest fertility would be likely to accrue to those whose 
income rose over time but whose tastes did not, and that the lowest 
would accrue to those whose tastes did rise but whose income did not. 
Secondly, there is indirect evidence which may be interpreted to measure 
the effect of tastes. Freedman (1963) found that an income above the 
mean for the husband's occupation, age, and educational status was 
conducive to more children than was normal for the values on these 
latter three dimensions with the mean income, and that when the income 
fell below the mean, there were fewer children. "Being in a higher in-
come," she adds, "means fewer children if the higher income is only what 
is usual for the husband's age and occupational status" (p. 419). This 
interesting finding is corroborated from some old Swedish census data 
in which income and occupation were cross-tabulated for fertility 
(Hyrenius, 1946). Stys (1957), in his famous article on the effect 
of holding size on the fertility of peasants in southern Poland (birth 
cohorts, 1885-1929), noticed that the absolute values of the relative 
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differences between the richer peasants, with higher fertility, and the 
poorer ones, with lower fertility, were lower in those villages near 
towns. This implies some impact of tastes spreading out from the urban 
zone to the rural settlements. The steady differential between the 
richer peasants and the poorer peasants, steady in its direction if not 
its magnitude, would lead one on the present. hypothesis to assume that 
tastes were more nearly constant across all peasant strata. The upturn 
in fertility among the land-less peasants is explained by Stys as the 
effect of their guaranteed employment as laborers on. large estates. 
Easterlin (1969) himself quotes work by Goldberg (1958, 1960) and Duncan 
(1965) to show that the more positive relation that emerges between in-
come and fertility when farm background and education are controlled 
might indicate that once taste-forming factors have been eliminated, the 
relationship is as expected. Duncan's (1964) work on the Indianapolis 
data also supports this. [Goldberg's (1960) and Duncan's (1964) 
reinterpretations of the 1941 Indianapolis data--see Whelpton and 
Kiser (1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948)--are open to the contam-
ination of income classes in those data by differential, and associated 
planning success, see Blake (1968)]. However, the study of background 
variables assumed or known from other sociological and social-
psychological studies to be determinants of attitudes, norms, tastes, or 
whatever can only be a second-best alternative to the kind of inquiry 
conducted by Freedman and Coombs (1966). 
A further problem involved in examining the relationship between 
income and fertility, and which may at first sight seem merely technical, 
is that of measuring income. Quite apart from the distinction between 
income and wealth, arid no study to this investigator's knowledge has 
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yet looked thoroughly at both together, there is the question of current 
versus past and potential (or permanent) income. Freedman and Coombs 
(1966) and Freedman (1963) took this into account, but most of 
the more common cross-sectional studies have taken a cross-sectional 
view of income. This is likely to be a particularly severe distortion 
for those couples, usually in middle and upper status~groups, whose 
income typically rises more or less steadily over time, especially when 
those couples are observed at the beginning of their married lives. 
Taking a simple view of the costs involved· in bringing up children, 
Mincer (1963) has attempted to examine the effect of foregone potential 
income on fertility. Making Becker's (1960) assumption that when con-
traceptive efficiency in a population is high, fertility will respond to 
income in the direct way that classical demand theory suggests (an 
assumption alr'ead)r criticized, but' which does not violate the interest 
of the analysis), Mincer regresses husband's and wife's income onto 
fertility for a sample of 400 families from a 1950 survey of consumer 
expenditures in which the wife was between 35 and 45. He finds a 
positive effect of husband's income outweighed by a negative effect of 
wife's income: the former is 0.10, the latter 0.19. His inference is 
that the wife's income represents the opportunity cost of children to 
her, a cost that outweighs the benefit of the income itself which, taken 
alone, might be expected to show the positive effect on fertility of 
the husband's income. These results can be further interpreted to 
contradict Mincer's original assumption from Becker (1960) that income 
and fertility are directly related, since it is likely that as the 
husband's income rises, so does that of the wife (given the high degree 
of assortative mating in all societies). Since the latter income 
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measures the opportunity cost of children to the wife (if not to the 
couple), the upshot is likely to be the lack of a clear relation between 
income and fertility--just as it is found from other cross-sectional 
studies. Perhaps the conclusion to studies of the income effect must 
be that independent of changing tastes, income is directly related to 
fertility, but that tastes are rarely independent, and thus that the 
obserVed relationships are likely to vary within narrow limits around 
the measure of no association. Perhaps one can conclude by suggesting 
that the positive effect of income over time will be marked temporarily 
as tastes, which characteristically lag behind, catch up. 
Five points may be made about this work on the association between 
income and fertility. First, income is the factor most obviously related 
to economic development, and thus tb the main theses about the causes of 
the various demographic transitions in various societies. Secondly, 
however, it has been relatively neglected. This can only partly be ex-
plained by the vary considerable practical difficulties involved in 
obtaining infonnation about it. Thirdly, is the fact that. it is 
deceptively difficult to measure. This does not apply to the more usual 
notion of current income, but to the more meaningful one of permanent 
or potential income. Fourthly, income has frequently been adduced 
without sufficient attent.ion to the way in which it might affect 
behavior generally and fertility in particular. FifthJy, the complexity 
of the demonstrated income effects on fertility is powl'rful in itself 
against the more embracing measures of social position that are commonly 
used. A simple association between "socio-economic status" and fertility 
' . 
can be interpreted in a variety of ways. At its simplest, it could be 
measuring the effects of class rather than the status (in the Weberian 
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senses of these terms). At its most complex, it could be measuring the 
effects, some of them contradictory, of a host of factors: absolute 
and relative income and wealth, occupational security, occupational and 
collli!lunity prestige or status, educational experience, consumption pat-
terns, and so forth. The offsetting effects of income and tastes for 
material and social advancement would be quite lost within the great 
majority of standard social class or socio-economic status measures. 
Occasionally, one can gather information on the class dimensions, but 
depend upon the extensivereporting of qualitative interviews. This 
material usually does not appear in tabulations. It is inadequate.to 
hope for, rather than expect, such precision. 
Determinants of Preferences and Intenti<Jns 
The following review of literature deals with the social factors 
other than income that seem to have some effect on fertility intentions. 
These factors, which include the level of education, n~ligJous belief, 
etc., can be seen as determining of preferences, and thus as complemen-
tary to income. 
Religion 
The difficulty with many of the socio-economic, social, and socio-
psychological factors that can be seen as affecting prt~ferences is that 
they are also strongly related to the level of income. A well-educated 
couple is also likely to be a prosperous one. Several surveyors have 
not held income constant when tabulating fertility by l'ducation, and 
this practice makes for uncertain interpretations (WheJpton, Campbell, 
and Patterson, 1966). But perhaps the factor least dependent upon 
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socio-economic status and y~ strongly related to preferences for chil-
dren is that of religious affiliation. Studies of fertility in both 
developing and developed societies and regions have found it to be highly 
related. The greatest differences appear between Moslems and other in 
the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Indian sub-continent (Driver, 
1963; Kirk, 1967; Mazur, 1967, Rizk, 1963, Yaukey, 1961). Indian studies 
have also pointed to the relatively high Hindu fertility (exceeded only 
by that of Moslem groups). In revi~w of the social correlates of fertil-
ity among 36 ethnic groups in the U S.S.R., Mazur (1967) also points to 
the high fertility of Buddhists. T te exact interpretation of the meaning 
of these religious differentials is not easy. Given the fact that 
Moslem, Hindu, and--to a lesser extent--Buddhist practices predominate 
in societies in which, for the reasons that were discussed in 
Leibenstein's (1957) thesis, there is a strong need for male survival 
under conditions of labor-intensive agriculture, it is dangerous to 
assume that religious affiliation has a truly independent effect on 
fertility. It may so happen that the religious prescriptions coincide 
with economic necessity, and that it is therefore possible to see both 
fertility and religion as dependent upon economic considerations. It 
should in principle be possible to test the independence of religious 
affiliation by assembling cross-tabulations of fertility by both religion 
and economic resources (or some proxy variable). The hypothesis would 
predict that religious fertility differentials would decline in the same 
proportion in a transition from one economic base to another. Data is 
provided by Yaukey (1961) in his study of Christians and Muslims in 
rural and urban Lebanon. 
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Assuming that the economic base in the villages differed from that 
in the towns (Yaukey provides no detailed information about this), the 
hypothesis is not borne out. The decline from country to town is greater 
among Christians than among Moslems, and even after a period of education 
the Moslem resistance to lower fertility is strong. And by no means all 
of the differences can be attributed to the differential availability of 
birth control (differential use being a measure of motivation and thus 
irrelevant as a confounding factor in this argument). At first sight, 
evidence such as that provided by Mazur (1967) on the fertility differ-
ences among eastern Orthodox groups would appear to be more favorable 
for the hypothesis. Eastern Orthodox fertility is gent•rally below the 
median level of that in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, but there is one sub-
group--the Eastern Orthodox Yakuts-~in which it is sta1·tlingly high. 
As many as 20 children appear in Yakut families, and children are 
regularly purchased. The economic system is one of extremely labor-
intensive agriculture. It is, thus, possible that the power of .religious 
affiliation to act independently of economic circumstances is very 
limited. However, the Eastern Orthodox faith, like Protestantism in 
all but its extreme anabaptist forms, makes no strong prescriptions 
either way about fertility, and allows its practitioners to regulate 
their fertility according to other criteria. The conclusion can only 
be that until more is known about the inter-relations between religious 
. . 
belief and economic behavior it is best to treat as independent of each 
other and thus to be surprised at interdependence, rather than by its 
absence. 
Blake (1966a, 1966b) has documented the comparative ideal family 
sizes of Catholics and non-Catholics in the United States, and both the 
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Princeton and Growth of American Families studies ·found a direct rela-
tionship between Catholic education and ideal, desired, expected, and 
achieved family size. Catholic education below the high school level 
did not seem to have much affect, and the greatest impact was visible in 
those with a college education. These findings corrorborated in the 
more particular study by Westoff an:l Potvin (1966). Blake's ideal 
family size studies now in some cases a.U-shaped relation, rather than 
a direct one, holds. These Protestant-Catholic differentials do seem 
to be lessening as Catholics hecome more similar in other respects to 
Protestants (Traina, 1974; Westoff and Jones, 1977). 
Education 
Fertility decisions are less certain for educational level. The 
researcher has already mentioned the well-known direct relationship 
between educational level and contraceptive usage and effect.iveness, 
and without sophisticated cross-tabulations it would be difficult to 
ascertain the impact of education on fertility intentions were the rela-
tionship between fertility and education an inverse one. Both the 
Princeton and Growth of American Families studies found a direct, al-
though somewhat weak, relationship between fertility and education. The 
stronger positive relationship betwf~.en education and contraceptive effec-
tiveness suggests that the total, and inverse~ correlation may mask a 
small positive relationship between education and fertility intentions 
(Blake, 1967). Recent British evidence supports this. The new differ-
ential between self-employed professionals and professional employees, 
which appeared in 1961 (General Register Office, 1966), cannot reasonahly 
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be attributed to differences in contraceptive effectiveness, and at a 
glance at the tables of fertility by the terminal education age of the 
parents shows that, with the exception of those few couples in which the 
husband's education stopped at 17 or below and the wife's continued until 
. after 20, the highest fertility fell to those couples in which both 
partners had been in full-time education up to and beyond the age of 20. 
The suggestion is that a change in preferences is occurring at this level. 
Rindfuss, Bumpass, and St. John (1980) found that once the process of 
childbearing has begun, education has very little effect on fertility, 
but it has an indirect effect through age at first birth. They found 
that older ages at first birth lead to longer interbirth intervals 
(Bumpass and Mburugu, 1978), more effective contraceptive use (Vaughn, 
Trussell, Menken and Jones, 1977), and prefernces for fewer children. 
Female Employment 
Blake (1965) and Davis (1967) have together argued that if fertility 
reduction is to be the goal of population policy, especially in develop-
ing countries, then encouraging couples to limit their fertility to 
their expressed desires will not be enough. The desires themselves have 
to be lowered. One way of doing this, Blake maintained, would be to 
demonstrate the advantages of gainful employment to the mothers. Qual-
ifying her confidence by admitting that the direction of the causal rela-. 
tionship is not always clear, she neverthele~s asserts that the 
"association between married women working and family size is generally 
acknowledged to be one of the strongest, most persistent over time and 
space, and most theoretically reasonable" (p. 738) in the field of 
social determinants of fertility. 
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To begin with, and as Blake (1957) admits, there is a considerable 
proportion of working women who seek employment as a result of sub-
fecundity. The second Growth of American Families study found that 55 
percent of the women in its sample who had been working 4.5 years or more 
were in this category. It is perhaps for this reason that this group of 
women (working for this length of time or more) expected fewer children 
than they said they wanted. There is a further discussion within those 
who were not subfecund and who also worked. On the one hand are those 
who worked because they liked working, few of whom expected more children 
than they wanted, and those who worked in order to supplement the family 
income, more of whom expected more than they wanted. The former group 
were clearly better planners than the latter, but of course the latter 
come from thos socio~economic groups who are in any event characterized 
by less success in birth control than those in other groups. It seems 
possible that for the second of these groups, the wife's working worsens 
the conjugal relationship, and this could cause poorer planning success. 
Blake does not consider such possibilities. Several other studies docu~ 
ment the relation between female employment and fertility, if in less 
. detail than the G.A.F. authors (United Nations, 1953; Freedman, Baumert, 
and Bolte, 1958; Ridley, 1959; Blood ~nd Hamblin, 1960). 
Several native analysts of conditions in the U.S.S.R. have 
attributed low fertility there to working women (Davtyan, 1967; 
Sadvokasova, 1967; Urlanis, 1967), and Szabady, Tekse, and Pressat (1966) 
have suggested a similnr relationship in eastern E11rope. All, however, 
distinguish between urban areas, where the association is clear, and 
rural areas where it is much less so. 
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There is some evidence in the literature of some concern directed 
toward the relationship between members within the nuclear family in an 
industrialized society. Stycos (1962) indicates that one of the 
facilitating conditions for effective fertility planning or control is 
the extent to which family structure facilitates sharing of goals and 
knowledge: effects of segregation of the sexes, dominance patterns, 
ease of communication, stability of conjugal bonds, and articulation of 
family with other social institutions. On a societal basis it is assumed 
that male-dominant family systems are causally related to high fertility. 
The authority of the husband, the importance of demonstrating virility 
in terms of number of male offspring as well as the assumed economic 
values of male children, the separation of the woman, and her limited 
opportunities for experience in nondomestic roles are elements of the 
patriarchal system that are thought to be causal social antecedents of 
high fertility. The absence of fertility planning and the rigidity of 
marital roles are also characteristic of such societies. This hypothesis 
has been applied across cultures (Lorimer, 1954; Rizk, 1963; Yaukey, 
1961) and within cultures (Westoff et al., 1961; Westoff, Potter, and 
Sagi, 1963; Hill, Stycos, and Back, 1959). 
Ramification of woman's employment outside the house, and the 
greater involvement of husbands in matters concerning fertility, also the 
greater planning tends to move couples toward equality (Goldberg, 1958). 
This is an organized pattern that developed among employed spouses in 
order to arrange their life to achieve their goals and maintain their own 
separate careers in addition to fam ilyhood. · This· pattern of authority 
balance is important for the female in order for her to maintain her 
career outside·as well as inside the home (Hill, Stycos, and Back, 1959). 
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Summary 
In conclusion, this brief review of literature leads to several 
points: (1) there are several social and economic factors that can 
affect what Davis ( 1967) and Blake ( 1965) have called the "intervening 
variables" so as to increase or depress fertility; (2) such factors can 
' 
also serve to affect fertility intentions, arid they do so by altering 
the balance of resources, costs, and preferences available and perceived 
by the husband and the wife. The five-factor explanatory model enables 
one to collapse the often bewildering array of independent variables 
into a meaningful order so that considerable explanation is achieved. 
However,. to say that fertility can be explained by the interaction of 
these five components is not to state a testable theory, it is, rather 
to specify what variables a theory must contain. It is only when 
specific values are attached to each variable (including fertility) that 
a testable and potentially explanatory theory can emerge. To develop a 
theoretical foundation in its most general form is to open oneself to. 
charges of vacuity; and to specify causal connections between particular 
reason of particular behavior is. perhaps opening onself to charges of 
triviality. It may well be that one cannot construct general causal 
laws in the stronger sense of "general" by looking at the effect reasons 
have on behavior. The laws may only be confirmed or rE'jected by one 
instance because they are only applicable to that one instance. Whether 
or not one describes that instance as unique seems to be a matter of 
one's own conceptualization. The indication perused here is to con-
centrate more ·on the so called unique, to conceptualize phenomena so 
that one can be exact rather than general in the discussion of fertility. 
Through the years, sociologists have become more sophisticated in their 
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use of paradigm. They are now moving towards showing in detail how the 
insights of that paradigm can generate precise explanations of specific 
aspects of beliefs, values, and behaviors.· The paradigm will stand or 
fall, depending on these explanations. 
The literature argues for the existence of intervening variables in 
the process of explaining the fertility decision making. Multivariate 
analysis has been the standard statistical procedure used, Since the 
present research represents the first sociological study of fertility 
decision making in Kuwait, it was felt by this researcher that a bi-
variate analysis constitutes a sound first step toward the development 
of a fertility paradigm. This not to undermine the importance of multi-
variate application. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
. This model is specH ically designed to provide a theoretical frame-
work through which the relationship between fertility decision making and 
societal, social-psychological, biological, as well as economic compon-
ents can be analyzed. Model is used here as the utilitarian sense of 
the term rather than the deductive sense of modeling. This means a sup-
port of one variable does.not lend support for the whole model. However, 
the model is general in nature and could possibly be used to investigate 
any activity which presumably activates decision making and planning. 
Models concerning the nature and behavior of human beings are based on 
certain basic assumptions. In order to explicate the explanations which 
. are the basis of the model presented in this chapter, the concepts of 
critical importance in this study will be defined. 
Nominal Definitions of Concepts 
1. Fertility--The actual number of children born. It is also 
referred to as the physiological ability to reproduce. 
2. Fecundity:--The potential reproductive capacity of the human 
being. 
3. Number of Births--The number of children ever .born to the 
couple. This includes live and still birth~. 
4. Number of Live Births--The number of live chiJdren ever born. 
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5. Desired Family Siz~--lt is taken as a class of fertility. These 
preferences vary from couple to couple in such respects as the strength 
of preference, spouse consensus, and stability over time. The agreement 
between actual family size and the desired size is rarely perfect. 
a. Birth postponement--The degree to which couples are able to 
achieve desired delays in their pregnancies and births. 
b. Biological components of fertility--Factors that may have some 
bearing on fertility (e.g., heredity, reproductive span, nutri-
tion, sterilizing operation). 
c. Societal components of fertility--Value system, social regula-
tions of marriage, religions, and cultural expectations to have 
children. 
d. Social-psychological components of fertility--Opportunities and 
motivations for child bearing. 
e. Economic components of fertility--Government services to aid and 
motivate family planning and higher standards of hygiene. 
Assumptions 
1. The degree to which religious and traditional values are inter-
nalized is directly related to desire for children. 
2. There is a curvilinear relationship between age at marriage and 
fertility. The lower the age at marriage, the higher the fertility. 
3. Income is presumed to be related to the level of health and 
nutrition in a positive manner. 
4. General mortality of the population and particularly the infant 
mortality level is positively related to fertility. 
5. Female level of education is both related to level of contracep-
tive knowledge and communication. 
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6. Female education is highly related to planning in general and 
family planning in particular. 
7. Female education is seen to be negatively related to fertility 
due to postponement of childbearing. 
8. The compatibility assumption: this assumption states that a 
particular pattern of fertility performance and control depends on the 
extent to which having another child (or a certain number of children) 
is compatible with other life values and interests. Although at the 
level of truism, this serves to bring into prominance the notion that a 
fertility choice (whether implicit or explicit) involves a "cost" for the 
individual and for the family (i.e., certain desires and interests are 
either yielded or compromised in preference to others). This assumption 
underlies most of the broad "theme" hypotheses and specific variables 
discussed. 
9. The type of economic insecurity reported by a respondent at a 
high level of income is qualitatively different than that reported by a 
respondent at a subsistence level, a factor to be taken into account in 
the analysis and interpretation of relationships. 
10. Urbanization, due to the availability of extra familial activ-
ities, may hae a depressing effect upon fertility. 
11. Government services to indiv:l.duals, depending upon the type of 
service, can be seen as a motivating factor to either increase or de-
press fertility. 
Major Components of Fertility 
Fertility refers to the actual number of children born as distin-
guished from fecundity, the potential reproductive capacity of human 
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beings. Physiologically, a woman can bear children for a period of 
approximately 30 to 33 years, from about the age of 12 or 15 to the age 
of 45 years depending on the quality of nutrition. Since there are 
periods of infertility after each child is born, the maximum number a 
human female can have, excluding multiple births, is about 20 to 25. 
Although a few women may come close to this maximum, there is no society 
in which all, or even most, women are so fertile. 
Fertility is a product of biological factors as well as complex 
social and cultural forces that may encourage childbearing or discourage 
and limit it. Changes in the fertility are due to shifting cultural and 
social patterns. Whether children will actually be born and have many 
(given the capacity to reproduce) is largely a result of the social 
environment in which people live. Figure 1 shows the major components 
of fertility: economical, sociological, and social-psychological compo-
nents of fertility. 
The means for regulating fertility have been labeled in population 
studies as the intervening variables (Davis and Blake, 19 56). These 
are the factors through which any social factors influencing the level 
of fertility must operate. According to Davis and Blake, there are three 
phases of fertility: intercourse, conception, and gestation. Inter-
course is required if conception is to occur; if conception occurs, 
successful gestation is required if a baby is to be born alive. The 
process can be interrupted at any point. The following is a discussion 
of various components of fertility. 
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Determinants of .Fecundity_: A Component 
of Fertility 
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There are mahy factors that affect th~ fecundity, the physiological 
ability to reproduce, of the human female. 
Heredity. Evidence is not clear; however, one factor influencing 
the innate ability to reproduce is the relative fecundity of one's 
parents. On the one hand, fecundity can be impaired by any one of a· 
. number of defects in the sexual organs, and a predisposition toward such 
constitutional impediments can be inherited. Certain of such heredity 
defects inhibit reproduction and with others offspring die before they 
procreate. The inheritance of a high fecundity is suggested by the 
proportion of multiple births which correlate with the general fertility. 
Heredity can have great influence, positive or negative, on such factors 
as inbreeding or marrying within the same blood group. 
Reproductive Span. Generally, the reproductive span of the human 
female varies between 30 to 33 years, which starts from the age of 12 
or 15 to 45~ Therefore, the lonier the female waits, the shorter the 
time when she is at risk of bearing children. 
Nutrition or Diet and Disease. The literature on the subject of 
nutrition, as related to fertility, suggests that the level of diet and 
some specific constituents of diet may affect the onset of the menarche 
(or first menstruation) which is usually taken to define puberty. The 
studies analyzing the age at menarche indicate the following: (1) the 
better the food, the lower the age; (2) certain diseases sometimes delay 
the onset of menstruation; (3) because of these two factors, there is a 
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difference in the average age of menarche according to the country's 
social development (Pearl. 1939; Kumar, 196n. With regard to disease, 
there are other diseases that may lead to sterility (such as venereal 
diseases). 
Sterilizing Operation and Oral Contraceptives. These two variables 
can impair fecundity; however, these factors are not produced by heredity 
but induced and by social factors such as the desire for children~ 
Societal Components of Fertility 
To avoid extinction, the society will always attempt to have favor-
able attitudes toward human reproduction. Therefore, the major con-
cern here is with 8urvival. Su~vival here will refer to human survival 
as well as ideological survivaL Fertility differences among various 
groups reflect contrasting values, institutions, and social organiza-
tions (Lorimer, 1954). Survival in terms of human numbers and ideology 
lead society to gear its value system toward o~e that supports high 
fertility. The intensity of these values depends upon the type of 
society (that is, tribal, traditional rural, or modern urban type of 
society). Also, the intensity of the value system toward high fertility 
is influenced by the health, the well l,)eing of that society, and the 
level of infant as well as the level of the general mortality rate. If 
infant and general mortality are high, the society will favor high 
fertility for the shear survival. In classical China, fertility was 
encouraged by ancestor worship. This practice requi.red a large number 
of children to ensure appropriate observances for the dead. Women in 
the traditional Chinrue family wished to have children because their 
(+) 
Fata 1 is tic 
Traditional 
(+) 
(+) 
Social Regulation 
of Marriage and 
Sexual Relation 
{+) 
Religious & Culture 
Exoectation to 
· Marry 
(+) 
Religious & Culture 
Expectation to 
have Children 
Figure 3. Model Three--Societal Components of 
Fertility 
47 
48 
status in their husband's family improved, particularly when they pro-
duced sons. 
According to Davis (1955), the population goes through three stages 
of development: Stage 1--The population experiences stable growth and 
the population has high fertility equaled by high mortality. Stage 2--
The population experiences explosive growth due to the progress and 
advancement in health technology. The mortality, as a result, drops very 
drastically. In the mean time, fertility remains the same. Therefore, 
fertility out numbers mortality and this leads to high population 
growth, characteristic of many developing countries. Stage 3--Fertility 
starts to drop and the population growth begins to stabilize. This 
characterizes industrialized countries such as the United States. Based 
on existing societal values, every society will have certain regulations 
with regard to marriage and sexual relation. Therefore, every society 
will have high expectations to marry coupled with high expectations to 
have children. Finally, the relationship between the value system of a 
society will be positively correlated with fertility. The variability 
that exists in family size in terms of number of offspring is influenced 
by a great many other social, economic, as well as social-psychological 
factors. 
Socialand Social-Psychological Components 
of Fertility 
The opportunities and motivations for childbearing vary considerably 
from one social environment to another, and the result is great variabil-
ity in the number of children women have. According to the Guinness Book 
of World Records (McWhirter and McWhirter, 1975)f the individual record 
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for fertility is held by a Russian woman of the nineteenth century who 
in 27 different pregnancies gave birth to 69 children, most of whom 
lived to adulthood. For a group, however, the highest childbearing 
record belongs to the Hutterites (an anabaptist sect in North and South 
Dakota, and parts of Canada). In the nineteenth century, there were 
about 400 Hutterites who migrated from Switzerland and in a span of 100 
years they have doubled their population about five times to a current 
total of more than 15,000 (Westoff and Westoff, 1971). There are other 
factors that affect fertility directly such as the probability of inter-
course. Other factors to a lesser degree also affect fertility, such as 
abortion, non-oral contraception, and miscarriage. Countless social 
factors related either positively or negatively to the "probability of 
intercourse" variable. The following dicussion deals with these factors. 
Age at Marriage. This is a factor which studies have shown to be 
important. Based on these studies, an increase in age at marriage of 
two years from 15 to 17 years, the crude birth rate reduction is insig-
nificant. It appears there is a crticial level below which postponement 
of marriage will not reduce the fertility index to a significant extent. 
However, if the mean age at marriage changes from 15 to 19 years, the 
crude birth rate falls by 11 percent. The increase in mean age at 
marriage of six years, from 15 to 21 years, the crude birth rate falls 
by about 24 percent (Malaker, 1972). Leasure (1963) showed similar find-
ings among the Bolivian and Turkish females. Cole and Tye (1961) 
demonstrated also that postponement of marriage can contribute sub-
stantially to a reduction in birth rate and population growth. This 
contribution is potentially greatest in those countries which have high 
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fertility and a low average age at marriage. So when the reproductive 
span is reduced by increasing the age at marriage, the result is a 
shorter time when she is risking a pregnancy. 
Age at marriage seems to have a curvilinear relationship with regard 
to miscarriage (i.e., those who are very young and those who are at the 
end of their reproductive span will more likely have a miscarriage than 
females in the zenith of their reproductive years. 
Frequency of Intercourse. In a study done in Lebanon, Yaukey (1961) 
found that during the first years of marriage among women who were not 
using contraceptives, the more frequently intercourse was engaged in, 
the less time it took for a woman to get pregnant. Studies in the 
United States have produced similar resul-ts. Furthermore, Kinsey ( 1953) 
found that among stable married couples, frequency of intercourse tended 
to decrease steadily as age increased. 
In the west,· voluntary abstinence is uncommon except shortly after 
childbirth, since a woman does not ovulate during this time. In pre-
industrial societies, postpartum taboos on intercourse occasionally 
extend to several months or even a few years in societies in which inter-
course is forbidden while a mother is nursing a chi.ld. The reasoning is 
that intercourse will somehow harm either the mother or child (Davis and 
Blake, 1956). Involuntary abstinence, on the other hand, could be a 
result of either impotence or involuntary separations. Voluntary 
abstinence can have an effect on fertility in a negative way. Separa-
tion or divorce can be classified under involuntary abstinence, along 
with post-widowhood celibacy. 
Premarital and Extramarital Relations. Without the knowledge or 
the availability of contraceptives, these activities could be positively 
related to fertility. However, when taking age into account, the female 
engaging in premarital sex may be more vulnerable to pregnancy than the 
person engaged in extramarital sex. That is, young females who engage 
in premarital relations are more likely to become pregnant than older 
females who engage in extramarital relations. This is due to the per-
ceived social cost of a pregnancy on the part of the female as well as 
her partner who are involved in extramarital relations. 
Deviation from Heterosexual Intercourse. It seems obvious that the 
factor will be negatively related to fertility unless it exists along 
with heterosexual relationships. This area is under-researched. With 
sexual liberation with regard to homosexuality, the greater prevalence 
and popularization of these life styles in the United States and the 
west in general can have devastating long-run negative influences upon 
fertility. The knowledge of its prevalence or what it may entail in 
the future is not very accurate. 
Desire for Children as Related to Fertility. A very important 
variable related to the probability of intercourse. This variable is 
influenced by the value system in a society, 'as well as an intervening 
variable, namely, the availability of contraceptives. For example, if 
the desire for chi~dren is very high, the use of contraceptives will 
be zero and the probability of intercourse will be very high. If the 
desire for children is very low, the use of contraceptives will be high, 
and probability of intercourse will be high. On the other hand, if the 
desire for children is very low, but contraceptives are not available, 
the probability of intercourse will be low to prevent childbearing. 
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There are countless economic, social, and social-psychological 
variables that wo~k either to intensify or alter the desire for chil~ 
dren. Two factors that seem to heighten the desire for children, not 
taking socio-economic factors into account, are religion and involvement 
in war or perceived threat of war. Other factors such as urbanization, 
socio-economic status of male and female occupation type, standard of 
living, education, female education in particular, communication, deci-
sion making (whether it is bilateral or unilateral), plus other social-
psychological factors 1 such as welf concept and how females derive self-
identity and gratification. 
There are many studies related to the effect of urbanization on 
fertility. The growth of cities, which has often accompanied industrial-
ization (although some large cities have no industry, and modern industry 
has sometimes been located in the rural areas), generally contributes to 
a lower birth rate. Jaffee (1942) found similar differences in Sweden 
in the mid-eighteenth century, in the United States throughout the 
nineteenth century, and in various other countries in both past and 
present. There are changes in the interpersonal relationships between 
the sexes which lead to greater freedom of males or females to associate 
informally outside the home, to choose their own friends, and to select 
the persons they will marry. There are changes in the family power 
structure in general. There are changes in the social roles of the fam-
ily members both within the home and outside it. Behavior tends to be 
individualized and roles often uncoordinated. This may lead to 
diversification interests and decline of family solidarity (Gist and 
Fava, 1964). 
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Based on 1, 384 household survey cases collected in Iran, Paydarf ar 
(1975) demonstrated that there are significant differences with regard 
to fertility attitudes and practices among three groups (tribal, rural, 
and urban groups). Tribal dwellers had the highest and the urban 
residents the lowest fertility pattern. Paydarfar also found that modern 
·values; high socio-economic, and high social mobility reduced fertility 
among the urbanites; however, it produced the opposite among the tribal 
groups. The reason for the high fertility among the tribal group is 
that they equated large numbers with power and authority. He also noted 
that tribal groups were the most fafalistic as compared to the urban, 
educated; those who held modern urban values were the least fatalistic. 
Other factors such as the standard of living, female education, 
education in general, communication, female income, and type of female 
occupation were all related to each other. For example, high standard 
of living facilitated education and female education which leads to the 
unintended consequences of that which leads to higher aspiration, greater 
awareness, on the part of the female, of their potential in their 
participation in the labor force and consequent reduction of fertility. 
Higher education, especially female education, increases her ability 
communication and authority lead to be bilateral rather than unilateral 
(Coombs and Fernandez, 1978). 
In addition to female education, it was female income and the type 
of occupation she held which was related very highly with the desire for 
children. Upward occupation mobility and high female income lower the 
desire for children (DeFronzo, 1976). 
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There has be~n little research directly related to the question of 
how population· der1sity affects humans. There is consistent evidence that 
high density, br perhaps the presence of large numbers of individuals 
that have to interact, produces negative effects in a wide variety of 
nonhuman animals. These effects include increased adrenal size, de-
creased testes size, and severe breakdowns in social and reproductive 
behavior. Many researchers have been tempted to generalize from this 
work on animals to human response to density; however, this is very 
questionable and may be a risky type of generalization. There is not 
enough research to show the effects of density on human responses and 
in fact the demographic studies that dealt in this area failed to find 
an effect of density when other factors are controlled (Freedman, 1973). 
A number of studies have demonstrated dramatic effects of over-
population among animals. The most famous laboratory study was con-
ducted by Calhoun (1962). A small number of rats were placed in an 
enclosed area, given sufficient food and water, and allowed to increase 
freely. Under these conditions, the population of the colony increased 
rapidly for a while, then began to fall off, and finally decreased 
sharply. According to Calhoun, the maximum population achieved was con-
siderably less than the space would have supported. Whether or not that 
is true, the population did reach a maximum that was less than would 
actually fit in the available ~pace and that this maximum was not main-
tained. 
Upper Class Elite's Fertility. Sly and Richards (1972) found that 
wealth was positively related to fertility, on the average the number of 
children was between 2.6 and 2.8. They found elite Catholics' fertility 
much lower than that of the elite who were Protestant; and in terms of 
education, those who did not finish college had the lowest fertility·. 
The explanation is that among men with marginal education and who are 
Catholic, to maintain their elite position required them to have low 
fertility. At this level the femnle is more likely to be a homemaker 
and children are not costly. 
The Economic Components of Fertility 
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The economist, Spengler (1966), has explained the general response 
of desired birth rate to income in terms of the economic and social 
changes.that occur during the process of industrialization. He believes 
that each family, consciously or unconsciously, weighs the value and 
cost of an additional child against the resources the family has avail~ 
able to devote to that child. This process results in a general 
attitude about family size that shifts as income increases. 
The "value" of a child includes monetary considerntions, such as 
the child's l.abor contribution to the family farm or business and the 
eventual dependence on the child's support when the parents reach old 
age. As the country becomes industrialized, child labor laws, compulsory 
education, and social security provisions all reduce the potential 
monetary value of a child. "Value" also includes the more intangible 
values of a child as an object of love, a carrier of the family name, 
an inheritor of the family property, and a proof of masculinity. These 
values tend to be important in any society and so the reward function 
always has a positive value. It is particularly important in poor 
societies, where there are almost no alternative modes of personal 
gratification. 
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The "cost" of a child includes the actual financial outlays neces-
sary to supply the child's needs, tlw opportunity costs of the mother's 
time devoted to child enre, and the lncrt>nsed responsibU1ty nnd dl~-
creased freedom of the family as a whole. The coHt of children is very 
low in traditional society. No additional living space is added to 
house a new child, little education or medical care is available, cloth-. 
\ 
ing and food requirements are minimal. . 'fhe mother is generally un-
educated and assigns no value to her time. The. family has little freedom 
to do anything that a child would hinder, and the extended family struc-
ture is there to provide child care if it should become necessary (for 
example, for a parent to leave home to find a job). 
As family income increases, however, children are given more than 
the basic food and clothing requirements. They receive better housing 
and medical care, and education becomes both necessary and expensive. 
Travel, recreation, and alternative employment for the mother become 
possibilities that are not compatible with a large family. The extended 
family structure tends to disappear with industrialization, and substi-
tute child care is costly. 
The "resources" that a family has to devote to a child generally 
increase with income. At very high income, the value and cost become 
nearly invariant with further increases in income, and the resource 
becomes the dominant factor in the composite desired birth rate. Thus, 
in the rich countries, such as the United States, desired family size 
becomes a direct function of income. Here also one must emphasize that 
"resources" are partially a social-psychological concept in that present 
actual income must be modified by an expectation of future income in 
planning family size. 
The model of fertility presented in this paper is applicable to 
any society, one that has an increasing population or one that has a 
decreasing population. This paper, by no means, is exhaustive of the 
variables that operate on fertility. 
Model Application 
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The model identifies a group of dependent variables to be predicted. 
These denote different aspects of fertility process. The main dependent 
variable is the total number of children or actual family size. Other 
dependent variables of interest are the pattern of fertility planning and 
desired versus actual fertility. 
There are two broad classes of independent variables to be analyzed 
in search of explanations of variations in these dependent variables. 
The first is concerned with the socio-cultural environment of the respond-
ents--both as a historical and the contemporary setting for their values, 
attitudes, and behavior. Second, is concerned with those social-
psychological variables that determine the respondents' personal orienta-
tion toward various aspects of their life situations. 
All of the components of the independent variables are located 
within one of four major substantive areas: religion, socio-economic 
status, family, and residence. In other words, each specific independent 
variable, whether an aspect of the respondents' socio-cultural environ-
ment or of their personal orientations, refers directly to one of these 
four dimensions of social life. 
The basic rationale for concentrating on these particular areas is 
that there is either a body of accumulated evidence or strong plausible 
speculation that variations within each of them are relevant for 
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differences in fertility. Thus, there is some evidence that those who 
marry early have larger fam:U ies, thar rural and bedouin populatIons 
have a different fertility history from that of endogenous urbanites and 
so on. 
To state that these relationships are "known" is both an overstate-
ment and a simplification of our current state of kndwledge. What is 
known is that within each of these content areas there is a variable or 
cluster of variables operating that is sufficiently strong so that com-
parisons between gross. categories reveal significant differences among a 
wide range of fertility--connected variables. To take education as an 
example, there is a considerable body of e~idence that family size and 
education are negatively correlated. What is known, however, is whether 
this relationship is an effect of an intervening correlation between 
intelligence and the efficiency of contraceptive practice or whether .the 
lower income segments of the population actually want more children. 
Numerous other illustrations could be offered of instances where 
significant associations have been observed between fertility and such 
gross environmental variables as religion, occupation, and income. One 
of the primary objectives of the study and of the selection of variables 
has been that of attempting to trace the influence on completed family 
size of these socio-environmental variables, and to elucidate the 
social-psychological variables that mediate between an environmental 
factor and fertility preference (e.g., level of income and feeling of 
economic security). Or put another way, although existing empirical 
evidence links fertility to variables that are grouped into a category 
termed the socio-,cultural environment, a more meaningful explanation of 
these fertility differentials requires an intervening set of 
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psychological concepts which show how these large-scale social facts are 
tran.sl<lted into lndlvldlllll r{;rtiiHy I.'VCilt!-1. Tlw C/ltt'gnry of IH'nwnnl 
orientntion iA lntC'nded primarily l•l H{'rve thiH function. 
In summary, the variables within the socio-cultural environment 
category provide a description of the major characteristics of the social 
milieu within which individuals must act. They are the conditions to 
which they react and to which they adjust in one form or another. The 
personal orientation variables are conceived as the resultants of this 
reaction and adjustment process. It is these orientations that are 
viewed as impinging directly on the fertility process although clearly, 
in terms of action potential, they are filtered through and no doubt 
partly determined by the personalities of wife and husband. 
Hypotheses 
The general hypotheses constituting the basic framework for the 
study are exploratory rather than systematic. The flow is from a variety 
of empirical and theoretical sources rather than from one unified theory 
and they serve the function of opening up the problem for exploration in 
terms of a wide range of variables rather than of providing a test of a 
restricted number of hypotheses. 
H1 : Highly religious and highly tradition~! individuals are likely 
to favor large families and are likely to have large families. 
H2: A high level of security in the area of socio-economic status 
is associated with desires for larger families. The direction of 
association is positive. 
H3 : Education, particularly female education, is related in a 
negative manner to the level of fertility. 
H4: Females married at a younger age will tend to have a larger 
family than those married at an older agl'. 
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H5 : Hi.gh asplratlons for soci.al mobility will lw asflot~iated with 
the desire for a smaller family .. It is expected to see larger families 
as being incompatible with successful social mobility and, therefore, 
respondents for whom the latter is important are likely to show a 
preference for small families. 
H6 : The absence of fertility planning and the rigidity of roles 
are associated positively with fertility. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the methodological and procedura] techniques 
used in this research. The focus of this research was the evaluation of 
the social and psychological aspect~; of fertility. Emphasis was placed 
on the motivation in family planning and family size preferences. 
The first section of this chapter contains a discussion of the 
objectives of this research. Included in this section are the factors 
related to fertility to be analyzed. The second section of this chapter 
is concentrated around the population sample and the characteristics of 
the sample. The third section of this chapter is addressed to the 
discussion of the sampling procedure. The fourth section includes a 
discussion on the 'interview schedt1le, the manner in which the interview 
schedule was put together, and a step-by-step description of the method 
and procedure employed in the selection of the final items in the 
schedule. The last section in this chapter is a summary of procedures 
used. 
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research included the following: 
l. The derivation and measurement of social-psychological factors 
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and their impact on fertility as suggested by the review of litera-
ture. 
2. An analysis of the differences· in fertility of each proposed 
sociai-psychological variable with regard to: 
a. Number of children desired. 
b. Number of children ever born. 
c. Number of children considered ideal. 
An interpretation of the fjndings in this study have been based 
upon the above research variables and upon an examination of social as 
well as the motivational aspects of fertility desired from a factor 
analysis of the items used in the interview schedule. 
The Sample 
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To achieve the research objectives, it was necessary to obtain 
couples of different backgrounds, different age groups, and different 
family sizes (couples who are in the process of completing their family 
size and older couples who have already completed their family size). 
The two methods of collecting data were incorporated. Each of 
these methods included a wife's interview schedule and a husband's inter-
view schedule. One hundred individuals were interviewed by the author. 
The 100 indivic!uals (SO couples) were native-born Kuwaiti citizens. 
These couples, utilized in this research, lived in 23 residential areas: 
Sharq, Dasma, Da'iya, Abdulla Alsalem, Shamia, Nuzha, Faiha, Keefan 
Hawalli, Salmiya, Sha'ab, Rawda, Adeliya, Khalidya, Rumaithiya, Funtas, 
Rega, Sabahia, Mansouriya, Kheetan, Mishrif, Bayan (Mishrif and Byan 
are brand new residential areas), and Nugra. 
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A brief description of the sample in terms of several demographic 
variables is presented in Table VTT). First, age, many of thC' husbands 
were clustered between the ages of 20 and 30 years (56 percent); 38 
percent were between 31 and 40 years of age. Only slx percent of the 
husbahds were over the age of .40. The distribution of the wives was as 
follows: 37 percent of the wives were between the ages of 20 and 30 
years, with six percent under the age of 20 and 20 percent were above 
the age of 30. The wives were generally younger than the husbands. 
Second, in terms of occupation, a little over 35 percent of the husbands 
were in the teaching profession as opposed to 50 percent of the wives 
in the same profession (35.4 percent, 50.0 percent, respectively). The 
rest of the husbands and wives were widely spread among other occupa-
tions. In terms of education, the husbands were unequally distributed 
with regard to the various levels of education; 36 percent had a higher 
learning degree (such as a Masters or Ph.D~ as compared to only 14 per-
cent of the wives. The wives, on the other hand, were more evenly 
distributed with regard to the different levels of education· (Table VII). 
Husbands appear to have higher education than wives. Finally, the 
couples were widely·spread over the different variations with.regard 
to residence. 
The Sampling Procedure 
This rese~rch.began with the idea of studying not only fertility 
patterns, but various aspects of the social milieu as well as the 
motivational factors that.orient some individuals favorably for addi-
tional children while. ot}ler~ toward fertility restriction. 
'\ . 
Characteristics 
Age: 
Husbands 
Wives 
Education: 
Husbands 
Wives 
Husbands 
Wives 
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TABLE VII 
DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE 
Categories N % 
-----------------------
20 to 30 years 
31 to 40 years 
Over 40 years 
Under 20 years 
20 to 30 years 
Over 30 years 
No education 
Read and write (no formal education) 
Elementary and junior high school 
High school 
Technical Institute (degree more 
than high school but less than 
college) 
College education (degree) 
Higher learning (Masters or Ph.D.) 
No education 
Read and write (no formal education) 
Elementary and junior high school 
High school 
Technical Institute (degree more 
than high school but less than 
college) 
College education (degree) 
Higher learning (Masters or Ph.D.) 
Clerk 
Teacher 
Government job 
Private business 
Law 
Engineer 
Physician 
Housewife 
Student 
Secretary 
Teacher 
Private business 
Engineer 
28 
19 
3 
3 
37 
10 
1 
2 
9 
8 
10 
2 
18 
3 
1 
11 
11 
11 
6 
7 
7 
17 
4 
11 
2 
6 
1 
12 
3 
7 
24 
1 
1 
56.0 
38.0 
6.0 
6.0 
74.0 
20.0 
2.0 
4.0 
18.0 
16.0 
20.0 
4.0 
36.0 
6.0 
2.0 
22.0 
22.0 
22.0 
12.0 
14.0 
14.6 
35.4 
8.3 
22.9 
4.2 
12.5 
2.1 
25.0 
6.0 
14.6 
50.0 
2.1 
2.1 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
Characteristics Categories N % 
Place of Residence: 
Sharq 1 2.0 
Dasma 3 6.0 
Da'iya 3 6.0 
Abdulla Alsalem 2 4.0 
Shamiya 1 2.0 
Nuzha 1 2.0 
Fiaha 2 4.0 
Keefan 2 4.0 
Hawalli 1 2.0 
Salmiya 2 4.0 
Sha'ab 4 8.0 
Rawda 3 6.0 
Adeliya 5 10.0 
Khalidiya 1 2.0 
Rumaithiya 1 2.0 
Puntas 1 2.0 
Reg a 8 16.0 
Sabahia 2 4.0 
Mansuria 1 2.0 
Kheetan 2 4.0 
Mishrif 1 2.0 
Bay an 3 6.0 
The sample was selected on a "snowball" basis, i.e., a number of 
people agreed to be interviewed, then they were asked to guide the 
researcher to other couples they knew who in turn agreed to tell about 
1 d others. There was no guarantee that the interviewees selecte in any 
way constituted a random or a representative sample of the Kuwaiti 
1 Hunter (1953) used the same sampling technique with slightly dif-
ferent goals in mind in his study of the community power structure in 
the city of Atlanta. 
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families. However, particular attention was given to having people across 
age, class, education, and occupational background. The interviewees 
were visited several times. The first visit was usually an introduction 
of the researcher and acquainting the respondent with what the researcher 
wanted to do and the purpose of the research. Generally speaking, the 
first visit was an establishment of a communication line and obtaining 
the consent ~f the people to be interviewed. The other visits were to 
conduct an interview separately with the wife and then the husband. All 
the people the researcher was introcluced to were very cooperative and 
did not object at all to being inte viewed. 
Interview Schedule 
The items utilized in this research were constructed with the 
following purposes in mind: (1) to provide support or qualifying infonna-
tion with regard to findings in the review of literature; (2) to provide 
a comparison to work by Westoff et al. (1961) in the social and the 
psychological aspects of fertility ttsing several of his original ques-
tionnaire items, with a few modifications and translation into Arabic 
for the purpose of comprehension. 
The wife's interview schedule contained 29 questions, placed at the 
beginning of the interview schedule. The purpose was to get such data 
as age, education, occupation, place of residence, etc. Included in 
that first portion of the interview schedule was information about con-
traceptive use and also the type used, the desire and expectation toward 
another child, and the general attitude toward family planning. Fifty-
six items [adopted from Westoff et. al. (1961) comprising 10 different 
social-psychological scales, were added. The total number of items was 
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85. The husband's interview schedule was considerably shorter. Only 
eight questions to obtain general data and 40 items comprising five dif-
different scales [also adopted from Westoff et al. (1961)] were added. 
The interview schedule was administered to all. It consisted of 
open-ended questions as well as forced choice items. The interview 
schedule was the primary source for gathering data. The idea of collect-
ing data this way is that it opened the door for a richer body of 
information. In addition, the interviewer recorded the manner in which 
people responded to questions, the way the respondents expressed them-
selves, whether or not they thought a particular subject was appropriate 
for discussion, and why they thought subjects were appropriate. 
Method of Analysis 
Once the quantitative data had been collected, it was coded and 
transformed into data cards and .analyzed utilizing the Statistical 
Analysis System (SAS) computer program. Factor analysis was employed as 
a device for studying the structure of relationships among items compos-
ing a multi-dimensional measure, and as a means of selecting items that 
appear to measure some general underlying dimension. A bivariate anal-
ysis is utilized in order to establish the existence or the non-existence 
of a pattern with regard to fertility decision making. 
Selecting Items 
Items judged to have common content were included. Items were 
factor analyzed and the first centroid factor extracted corresponded 
closely to the common content of the items judged as face validity and 
large factor loadings. Items with very small loadings were eliminated 
Crom inclu1->ion. The following summary gives a quick idea about the 
scales adopted from Westoff for wives and husbands: 
Wife's schedule: 
1. Religiousness 
2. Achievement of life goals. 
3. Satisfaction with husband's work. 
Lf. Feeling of economic security. 
5. Drjve to get ahead. 
6. Aspiration for childrC'n 1 s college education. 
7. Marital adjustment. 
8. Liking for children. 
9. Dominance patterns. 
10. Patterns of help available to wives. 
Husband's schedule: 
1. Husband's level of status satisfaction. 
2. Commitment to work. 
3. Feeling of economic s<:curity. 
4. Drive to get ahead. 
5. Importance of getting ahead. 
70 
These factors plus the items that c<Mprise them with their factor load-
ing and Westoff's first factor loading are represented in Table VIII. In 
addition, the sample mean response for each item is included in the 
table. The responses were arranged so that the lowest response represents 
a negative attitude toward fertility and a high response represents a 
positive attitude toward fertility. The following items were eliminated 
as a result of their low loadings: Items Q35, Q58, Q60, Q62, Q67, MIS, 
Ml8, Ml9, M23, M40, M47. 
TABLE VIII 
PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR THE 
VARIOUS SCALES AND THEIR ITEMS 
~estoff'a Ori~inal Scale and Items 
1. Religiousness 
Q222. Aside from attendance at religious servicll!&, h.ow 
religious-minded would you .say you are? Very, .more 
th~n overage, less than average, or not at all? 
**Q35. Have you ever gone to ·see a religious person for advice 
or help on family or personal matters since you have 
been married? 
**Q34. To what extent is religion included in the home activ-
ities of your family? For example, family prayers, 
reading the Quran, or other religious materials, say-
ing grace at meals, and·so fo:rth. 
**QlO. If you have the opportunity, which would you rather 
teach? 
Ql6. Which is more important to you? Religion or Politics? 
Q27. What would you rather have a son of yours do? Follow 
a career in the church or follow a career in the Army? 
**Q33. How religious-minded would you say you are? 
*Q)l. ~ould you like to be a missionary? 
Q49. Which spouse would you prefer7 One who will command 
admiration or one. who likes to read religious books? 
**Q32. Whom would you rahter have been? Playwrite or social 
and religious writer? 
**Q36. Which spouse would you prefer? A deeply religious 
one or a rich and good provider? 
Original 
Final Firat 
Mean Factor 
3.65 
2.41 
3.37 
1.92. 
1.92 
1.98 
0.06 
0.)4 
0.44 
0.53 
0.44 
0.79 
0.77 
Final Weatoff'a 
Firat . ,,. Firat 
Factor Factor 
0.69 
0.70 
0.63 
0.50 
0.59 
0.85 
0.84 
Final Factora 
iota ted 
Orthogondly 
1 11 
0.02 
0.21 
0.67 
0.81 
0.01 
0.81 
0.36 
0.36 
0.13 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff's Original Scale and Items 
**Ql7. Would you prefer to read: a book with religioua theme, 
•octal, nonf1ction 1 r0111antic, polica or othar7 
2. Achievement of Life Coals 
Ql8. We all have our O\ffl picture of the kind of life we would 
really like to lead and the things we would really like 
to do in life. Whatever your picture, how much do you 
Final 
Mean 
S.l5 
feel that you are reaching it? 3.54 
Q39. What do you think the chances are of the living the 
kind of life you would like to have? 
Q40. S0111e people feel they can make pretty definite plans 
fur their lives for the next few yjars, while others 
feel they are not in a position to plan ahead. How 
about you? Do you feel you are able to plan ahead or 
not? 
Q41. Do you feel you now know and can look forward to the 
kind of life you will have 10 years from now? 
3. Satisfaction with Husband's Work 
Q42. In general, how well satisfied are you with your 
husband's present job or work? 
Q43. More wives are more satisfied with some things about 
their husband's job than they are with others. How 
satisfied are you, for example, with the steadiness 
of his· work? 
Q44. How do you feel about his hours and working 
c:ond 1t ions 1 
Q45. How do you feel about his chances to get ahead in hia 
work? 
Q46. Finally, how satisfied are you with your husband'• 
income? 
3.36 
2.36 
1.30 
2.50 
3.24 
2.70 
3.22 
2.86 
Original 
First 
Factor 
0.56 
0.67 
0.76 
0.63 
0.62 
0 •. 70 
0.67 
0.54 
0.83 
0.74 
Final 
Firat 
Factor 
Westoff'a 
First 
Factor 
0.70 
0.64 
0.68 
0.60 .. 
0.60 
0.82 
0.50 
0.45 
0.64 
0.72 
Final Facto.ra 
Rotated 
Orthogonally 
1 11 
o.u 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff's Original Scale and Iteas 
4. Peeling of Econoaic Security 
Q47. -All in all, what lttnd ot breaks do you feel you aDd 
your husband are having financially? 
Q48. Are there times when you feel you have to deny your-
self many of the extraa you want because of your 
income? 
Q49. Suppose you ran into an unexpected heavy expense. Do 
you feel that your income and aavings are enough to 
handle it? 
QSO. In general, how would you describe yo\Jr present 
financial situation? 
Q51. Are you ever faced with the possibility of your 
hu~>band getting a large cut in income or being out of 
work for several months? 
Q52. On the whole, what would you say your financial 
future looks like? 
5. Drive to Get Ahead 
*Q53. For example, if getting ahead meant that you had to 
move to a strange part of the country, would you be 
wllling to move? 
*Q54. Would you be willing to entertain people because they 
were connected with your husband's work, even though 
you might not like them? 
*Q55. Would you be willing to leave your friends? 
*QS6. In order to get ahead, would you be willing to become 
aore active in'your community organizations and clubs 
not of your own choice? 
*Q57. Would you be willing to leave your cloae relatives? 
Pinal 
He an 
2.80 
2.20 
2.88 
2.80 
3.30 
1.62 
1.52 
1.60 
1.39 
1.17 
Original 
Firat 
Factor 
0.81 
-o.21 
0.57 
0.90 
0.59 
0.68 
0.51 
0.68 
o. 70 
0.67 
0.42 
Final 
Firat 
Factor 
We1toff's 
Firat 
Factor 
0.88 
0.67 
0.68 
0.90 
0.40 
0.86 
0.69 
0.60 
0.80 
0.59 
0.72 
Final Factors 
llotated 
Orthogonally 
1 11 
0.64 
0.40 
0.74 
0.62 
0.10 
0.32 
0.65 
0.16 
-0.09 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff'a Original Scale and Items 
*Q58. Would you be willing to postpone having another child? 
Ql60. Would you be willing to keep quiet about your 
religious views in order to get ahead? 
Ql61. Would you be willing to have your husband take a 
chance on a job that he might be less certain of 
holding, if it had better opportunities? 
Ql62. Would you be willing to move to a leas pleasant 
neighborhood temporarily? 
Ql63. Would you be wtlling to keep quiet about your political 
views in order to get ahead? 
**Q59. Would you be willing to keep quiet about your views in 
order to get ahead? 
*Q60. Would you be willing to live temporarily in leas 
desirable housing? 
*Q61. 1 f getting ahead meant that you would see less of your 
husband because he would spend more time at work, would 
you be willing to do this? 
oi!Q62. And finally, if getting ahead meant you might have to 
send your children to another school not quite aa good, 
would you be willing? 
6. Aspiration for Children's College Education 
**UQ63. Do you expect to send your children to colle~e? 
****Q64. How do you expect this college education to be paid 
for? Specific ~tepa already taken or in process? 
****Q65. Would you send your daughter to college even if it 
meant serious financial hardship? 
****Q66. Would you send your son to college even if it meant 
serious financial hardship? 
Final 
Mean 
1.40 
1.50 
7.18 
1.50 
2.43 
1.77 
Original 
Firat 
Factor 
0.17 
0.47 
0.20 
0.40 
0.20 
Final Weatoff'a 
Firat Fint 
Factor Factor 
0.45 
0.61 
0.43 
0.68 
0.55 
0.65 
o. 50 
0.55 
0.58 
0.58 
0.82 
0.79 
Final Factors 
Rotated 
Orthogonally 
l II 
0.02 0.74 
0.13 0.77 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff'a Original Scale and Itema 
7. Marital Adjuatment 
*Q67. How often do you and your husband hai1e different opiniona 
about the best way to ralaie or handle the children? 
Ql22. When you get upset about having to take care of the house 
and the children, is your husband as sympathetic aa you 
would like him to be? · 
*Q68. In general, compared to most couples you know, how well 
do you and your husband get along with each other? 
*Q69. Have you ever wi11hed you were not married? 
*Q70. Everything considered, how happy has your marriage been? 
8. Liking for Children 
*Q71. Compared to other things you like to do that are not 
mainly connected with children, how much do you like to 
read or talk to children? 
*Q72. Compared to other things you like to do, how much do you 
like looking at pictures of children in magazines or 
newspapers? 
*Q73. How much do you like showing children good places to go 
and new things to do? 
*Q74. How much do you like seeing movies or plays about chil-
dren, or reading stories about them? 
*Q75. Compared to other chorea, like housekeeping wurk and 
things like that, how 111uch do you mind straightening 
up after childre~7 
*Q76. All in all, in comparison to your other interests, how 
interested are you in spending time with children? 
Final 
&an 
3.30 
3.00 
3.44 
3.02 
2.57 
3.00 
2.50 
3.16 
3.18 
Original 
Pint 
Factor 
0.16 
0.80 
0.54 
0.83 
0.57 
0.82 
0.84 
o. 70 
0.60 
0.60 
Final Weatoff'a 
Firat Firat 
Factor Factor 
~ 
..u.! 
..Q.J.Q 
..!LM1 
~ 
0.33 
0.47 
0.65 
0.63 
0.76 
0.69 
0.65 
0.69 
0.66 
0.06 
0.69 
Final Factora 
li.otated 
Orthoaonally 
1 11 
........ 
V1 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff's Original Scale and lte.s 
9. Dominance Patterns 
*Q77. In some families the father .. akes the main dec1s1ona 
about the children, in others he leaves it to the 
mother. When it is about the children, who has the 
most to say in your family, you or your husband? 
*Q78. Which of you has the most to say about other things 
not mainly connected with the children? 
*Q79. Who has the most to say about friends you see most 
often? 
*QBO. Who has the most to say about what you do together 
for recreation? 
*Q8l. Which of you has the most to say about how to spend 
~he family income? 
Ql20. And finally, who has the most ssy about running the 
houAe7 
10. Patterns of Help Available to Wives 
*Q82. How often can you count on someone to take care of 
the children? 
*Q83. How often can you count on your husband to take care 
of the child~cn? 
*Q84. How often can you count on someone other than your 
husband to help you around the house? 
*Q85. On the whole, do you feel satisfied with the amount 
of freedom you pave away from the children? 
Final 
Mean 
1.77 
1.58 
1.83 
1.81 
1.73 
1.91 
2.23 
1.83 
2.1S 
Orhinal 
First 
Factor 
0.64 
0.58 
0.78 
0.37 
0.79 
0.8) 
0. 75 
0.92 
0.81 
Final Westoff'• 
Pint Fint 
Factor Factor 
0.64 
. 0. 58 
0.78 
0.37 
0.62 
0.38 
0.59 
0.73 
Final Factors 
Rotated 
Orthogonally 
1 11 
-0.21 
0.31 
0.30 
0.06 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff's Original Scale and Items 
Husbands 
1. Hu~band's Level of S~ptus Satis!action 
**H9. I would be satisfied if a son of mine, when he reaches my 
age, is in the same kind of work that I am now in. 
**MlO. 1 would be satisfied if my children receive the same 
amount of education as I have. 
**Mll. I am pretty well satisfied with the chances for getting 
ahead in my present work. 
**!112. I would be oat isf ied 1 f my children, when ~hey reach my 
age, have the same income and live the same as I. 
2. Comm 1tmen_t_J.9_'r/.Qtt 
**Ml3. I would much rather relax around the house all day than 
go to work. 
**Ml4. My work is more satisfying to me than the time I spend 
around the house. 
*"I'll 5. If I inherited so much money that I did not have to 
work, I would still continue to work at the samething I 
am doing now. 
*"'Ml6. More than almost anything else, it.is work that makes life 
worthwhile. 
*"'Ml7. Some of my main interests and pleasures in life are 
connected with my work. 
**Ml8. I have sometimes regretted going into the kind of work 
I am now in. 
*"'Ml9. The work I do is'one of the most satisfying parts of my 
life. 
Final 
Mean 
2.12 
1.92 
2.43 
2.22 
2.52 
2.00 
1.52 
2.14 
Original 
First 
Factor 
0.88 
0.83 
0.76 
0.84 
0.48 
-0.36 
0.21 
-0.74 
-0.33 
-0.09 
-0.26 
Final Westoff'• 
First First 
Factor Factor 
0.88 0.85 
0.83 0.68 
0.76 0.74 
o. 84 0.73 
0.52 0.66 
-0.37 0.61 
0.68 
-~ 0.37 
0.28 o. 79 
0.51 
0.86 
Final Factor• 
Rotated 
Orthogonally 
I II 
0.55 -0.05 
0.10 0.69 
-0.58 0.37 
-0.04 -~ 
...... 
...... 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Weatoff'a Original Scale and Itema 
**H20. I enjoy my ~pare time activities much more thari my work. 
**H21. To my, my work is just a way of making money. 
3. Feelings of Economic Security 
**H22. I feel that my wife and 1 have had very good financial 
breaks since we have been married. 
**H23. It. is extremely important to me to have a higher inc:OGe. 
**H24. I feel that my present financial situation is very good. 
**H2~. On the whole, my financial future looks very good. 
**H26. There are many times when I have to deny myself and my 
family things we would like because of our income. 
**H27. I worry sometimes about the possibility of a large cut 
in income or beipg out of work for a while. 
~*H28. In my present financial situation, I have to worry about 
billa or debts. 
4. Drive to Get Ahead 
*H29. For example, if getting ahead meant that you would have 
to go without any vacation for several years, would you 
be willing to do this? 
*HJO. Would you be willing to leave your friends in order to 
get ahead 1 
*H31. If getting ahead meant that you would have to live in 
an undesirable neighborhood temporarily, would you be 
willing? 
*H32. Would you be willing to give up your leisure tiae in 
order to get ahead? 
*H33. Would you be willing to postpone having another child 
in order to get ahead? 
Final 
Mun 
1.84 
1.88 
2.70 
2.28 
2.46 
2.42 
2.40 
2.34 
2.12 
1.46 
1.36 
1.44 
1.48 
Original 
First 
Factor 
0.53 
0.73 
o. 7l 
-0.02 
0.66 
0.56 
0.80 
0.57 
0.80 
0.67 
o. 72 
0.48 
0.62 
o. 59 
Final Westoff'a 
Firat First 
Factor Factor 
0.79 
0.81 
0.78 
0.46 
0.83 
0.80 
0.74 
0.43 
o. 7l 
F~l Factors 
Rotated 
Orthogonally 
1 11 111 
.Q..;,£ 0.13 
.!h!! 0.09 
0.74 0.17 
0.26 0.81 
0.08 .Q..:M 
0.74 0.32 
0.68 o.ooz 
~ 0.20 
0.55 .Q.dQ 0.08 -0.21 
0.70 -JLWl§ 0.02 -0.14 
0.62 -0.09 0.22 ~ 
0.56 ~ -o.l6 -0.71 
0.52 -0.17 o.os -~ 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff'a Original Scale and Items 
Q39. To get ahead, would you be willing to move your family 
to a strange part of the country? 
*H3S. Would you be willing to do leas interesting or lea a 
enjoyable work, in order to get ahead? 
*H34. If it meant not seeing your wife or children as much 
as you would like, would you be willing? 
*H37. Would you be willing "to take some risk to your health 
in order to get ahead? 
Q43. Would you he willing to keep quiet about your 
political views in order to get ahead? 
*H38. Would you be willing to take a chance on a job that 
you might be less· certain of holding, if it had better 
opportunities? 
*Q36. If getting ahead meant you might have to send your 
children to another school not quite as good, would 
you be willing? 
Q46. And finally, if getting ahead meant that you would 
have to keep quiet about your religious views, would 
you be willing? 
**K39. If getting ahead meant you might have to send your 
children to another school not quite asgood, would 
you be willing? 
**K40. Finally, if getting ahead meant that you would have to 
keep quiet about your religious or political views, 
would. you be willing? 
Final 
Mean 
1.36 
1.34 
1.12 
1.24 
1.40 
1.04 
Original 
Firat 
Factor 
0.69 
0.53 
o. 52 
0.41 
0.80 
0.41 
0.23 
Pinal 
Firat 
Factor 
0.68 
0.51 
0.54 
0.40 
0.81 
0.40 
Weatoft'a 
Firat 
Factor 
o. 66 
0.50 
0.11 
o. 55 
o. 62 
0.31 
0.64 
0.63 
Final Factor• 
Rotated 
Orthogonally 
I II III 
-0.73 0.20 -0.22 
-0.14 0.09 -0.08 
-0.60 0.28 0.28 
0.01 ~ -0.17 
0.10 -0.24 
-o. 21 J2.:11 0.01 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Westoff'a Original Scale and Items 
S. Importance of Getting Ahead 
••H41. I feel that the most important thing about work is the 
chance to get ahead. 
**M42. I spend a lot of time thinking about how to improve my 
chances for getting ahead. 
**M43. Getting money and material things out of life is very 
important to me. 
**M44. 1 t 111 important· to me to own material things, such as 
a home, car, or clothing, which are at least as·good as 
those of .,y neighbors and friends. 
••M4S. I am very anxious to get much further ahead.· 
**H46. Getting ahead.111 one of the moat important things in 
life to ·me. 
••H47. It h quite important to me that my children marry 
persona of at least equal social standing. 
**H48. The mo6t important qualities of a real man are 
determination and ambition. 
*ltema uaed in the present study without any change rt all. 
**Items worded differently by the researcher. 
Original 
Pinal Firat 
Mean Factor 
1.64 
1. 74 
1.42 
2;04 
1.90 
1.72 
1.90 
0.64 
0.82 
0.49 
0.41 
0.76 
0.72 
0.12 
0.48 
Pinal West off's 
First Fir&t 
Factor Factor 
o.sa 
0.65 
0.62 
0. S2 
0.83 
0.83 
0.3S 
0.56 
Final Factors 
Rotated 
Orthogonally 
I II 
0.01 
O.S6 
0.07 
0.04 
0.4S 
-0.15 
0. 74 
0.52 
0.21 
***Question 16 was eliminated by Weatoff because 93.2 percent of 961 women answered in one category--religion (extreae 
diatribution). 
****Not compared to We11toff because he used a different scale classification. 
(X) 
0 
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The Measures of Religiousness 
A necessary point which needs to be stated is that the institutional 
requirements of the various religions were different. The questions 
asked to find out religious commitment needed to be clear (high validity) 
to the individual being interviewed. The author was familiar with these 
religious requirements and variations. 
Two different though overlapping measures of religious values were 
used: (l) home religious orientation (combines information from two 
questions, one on the extent to which religion is included in the home 
activities of the family, and the other is the self-rating of wife on a 
scale of religious mindedness); (2) a measure of personal commitment to 
religious values. The wife was asked a series of questions that attempted 
to measure her perception of the importance of spiritual and religious 
values in comparison to secular values. The wife was asked to choose 
between religious values and other competing values such as politics, 
literary interests, and economic security. 
Wives' Scales and Items 
R~ligi~usness_Scale 
Westoff's scale was used and all the items were included except the 
section dealing with formal practices outside the horne. This was omitted 
since there are no significant differences in religiosity practiced at 
horne or at the mosque. If the Moslem individuals are highly religious, 
they will perform their religious duties at home and at the mosque just 
the same, especially if time and place has permitted time. Items dealing 
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with personal commitment to religious values and religious practices at 
home (i.e., home religious orientation) were included. 
Table VIII i.nd icates that alL i terns dealing with religious values 
seem to cluster together except itl'm number Q35 .. Items dealing with home 
religious orientation clustered separately. Item Q35 was eliminated 
because of the low loadings on the original first factor. The final 
first factor unrotated accounted for 33 percent of the variation in the 
seven religious items, with all items having at least a 0.45 loading. 
Two dimensions emerged from these Hems. One of these dimensions was 
loaded by items Q30, Q31, Q32, Q36, and Q37. This seems to suggest the 
dimension of total commitment to religious values. Items Q33 and Q34 
seem to suggest another dimension and that is total horne religious 
orientation. All items except Q35 were totaled as the measure of total 
religiosity. Items Q33 and Q34 were added together to measure total 
home religious orientation. Items Q30, Q31, Q32, Q36, and Q37 were also 
added together as the measure of total commitment to religious values. 
The study by Westoff et al. (1961) had two measures of religiosity. 
Items Q222, Q34, and Q35 were one measure using a different scale for 
classification and cannot be compared. The second measure they used 
was similar to the one used by this writer. Their second measure was 
factor analyzed and added together, except one question was eliminated 
since 93.2 percent of their sample responded in one category. The 
items in this investigator's relig:j.ousness scale were all factor anal-
yzed and items were added together for a given measure. The researcher 
doubts that comparison with Westoff et al. is possible on the religious 
scale due to differences in items cornpris.ing it (Table VIII). 
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Achievement of Life Goals Scale 
In this scale, all the items cluster together and only one factor 
emerged. Thus. nothing was eliminated. The first factor unrotated 
accounted for 45 percent of the variation in the four items. with all 
items having at least a 0.62 loading. Therefore, these items were added 
together as the measure of achievement of life goals. Westoff et al. re-
tained all the items and used the same procedure in deriving this measure. 
First factor loadings are similar to West off et al. and this writer. 
Satisfaction with Husband's Work Scale 
With only one factor extracted, all the items had a very high load-
ing. The first factor unrotated accounted for 49 percent of the varia-
tion in five items, with all items having at least a 0.54 loading. 
Therefore, these items were added together as a measure of satisfaction 
with husband's work. Westoff et al. retained all the i terns. Their first 
factor loadings are very similar to this investigator's final first 
factor loadings. 
Feeling of Economic Security Scale 
All items have high loadings. The first factors unrotated account 
for 52 percent of the variation in the six economic security items, with 
all items having at least a 0. 57 loading. The items were totaled 
together to form a measure of feeling of economic security. Westoff 
et aL's and this researcher's first factor loadings are similar on all 
items except item Q35 which Westoff et al. eliminated because of its 
low loading. 
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Drive to Get Ahead Scale 
Again, all items, except itenis Q58, Q60, and Q62, have large load-
ings on the first factor. Items Q58, Q60, and Q62 are eliminated be-
cause.of their very low loadings. The final first factors unrotated 
account for 33 percent of the variation iri these items with all items 
having at least a 0.32 loading.· Total drive to get ahead consisted of 
items QS3, Q54, QSS, Q56, QS7, Q59, and Q61. Two dimensions emerged 
from these items. One of these dimensions contains items QS3, Q54, QS6, 
and Q57. This suggests the dimension of sacrificing physical comfort to 
get ahead. Items QSS, Q59, and Q61 suggest another dimension of 
' 
sacrificing emotional comfort to get ahead. First, all items except 
Q58, Q60, and Q62 were added together as a measure of total drive to get 
ahead. Then, items Q53, QS4, QS6, and QS7 were totaled together as the 
measure of amount of sacrificing physical comfort to get ahead. Items 
Q55, Q59, and Q61 were also added together as a measure of the amount 
of sacrificing emotional comfort in order to get ahead. 
Westoff et al. retained all the items and obtained four clusters: 
Cluster l--Q53 (move to strange part of the country, Q55 (willing to 
leave friends), QS7 (willing to leave relatives); Cluster II--Q54 (will-
ing to entertain people), and QS6 (become more active in organization); 
Cluster III--Ql62 (move to less pleasant neighborhood) and Q60 (live in 
less desirable housing); Cluster IV--Ql60 (keep quiet about religious 
views) and Ql63 (keep quiet about political views). Items Ql61, Ql62, 
and Ql63 were combined or worded differently by this researcher. Items 
in this study have clustered in a dramatically different way than in the 
study by Westoff et al. 
Aspiration for Children's Colleg~ 
Education Scale 
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The first factor accounted for 49 percent of the variation to the 
for items, with all factors havtng high loadings. All items had at least 
a 0.58 loading. Therefore, all the items were added together as a 
measure of aspiration for children's college education. This will not 
be compared to Westoff et al. (1961) because of the different scale 
elassifications which they used. 
Marital Adjustment Scale 
Item Q67 is eliminated because of the low loading. The rest of the 
items had large loadings. The final first factor loadings account for 
33 percent of the variation in the three marital adjustment items, with 
all items having at least a 0.54 loading. All the items in this scale 
except item Q67 were added together as a measure of marital adjustment. 
Westoff eliminated items Q67 and Ql22 because of low loadings; the rest 
were retained. Consequently, three items make up this measure, while all 
five items were used by Westoff et al. 
Liking for Children Scale 
All items have very large loadings. The first factor accounts for 
49 percent of the variation, with all the items having at least a 0.57 
loading. Therefore, all the items were added together as a measure of · 
liking for children. Item Q75 was eliminated by Westoff et al.; other-
wise they are.the same. 
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Dominance Pattern Scale 
All·items have large loadings. The first factors account for 42 
percent of the variation in these items, with all items having at least 
a 0.37 loading. All the items were added together as a measure of the 
dominance pattern. This scale was not compared .to different scale 
classifications us~d by Westoff et al. 
Pattern of Help Available to Wives Scale 
All items have large loadings. The first factor accounts for 69 
perc~nt of the variation in the four items, with all of the items having 
~t least a 0.75 loading. All the items were added together as a measure 
of the pattern of help (domestic help) available to wives. 
Item Q83 was eliminated by Westoff et al. because of low loadings. 
Items loaded much higher on this researcher's final first factor than 
Westoff et al.'s. 
Husbands' Scales and Items 
Husband's Level of Status Satisfaction Scale 
All the items have a high loading on the first factor. The first 
factor account~ for 69 percent of the variation in these items, with all 
items having at least a 0.76 loading. All the items, therefore, were 
added as a measure of the husband's level of status·satisfaction. Both 
this researcher's and Westoff et al. 's factor loadings are very similar. 
All the items were retained by Westoff et al. 
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Husband's Commitment to Work Scale 
All items have high loadings on the first factor except items MIS, 
Ml8, and Ml9. Items MIS, M18, and M19 were, therefore, eliminated. 
The final first factors unrotated account for 31 perce11t of the varia-
tion in these items, with all items having at least a 0.28 loading. Two 
dimensions emerged from these items. One of these dimensions was loaded 
by items Ml3, M16, M20, and M21. This suggests the dimension of work 
for money. The other dimension, Ml4 and Ml7, seems to suggest work for 
leisure. All the items, except items MIS, Ml8, and Ml9, were added 
together as a measure of total husband's commitment to work. Items Ml3, 
Ml6, M20, and M21 were added together as a measure of work for money 
dimension. Items M14 and M17 were added together to measure the total 
commitment to work for money dimension. Westoff et al. eliminated item 
Ml6 because it loaded low. Their first factor loading~ were very dis-
similar. They retained all· the items except for M16. 
Husband's Feeling of Economic Security Scale 
All the items on this scale loaded very high except item M23 which 
loaded very low. Item M23 is eliminated. The final first factors 
unrotated accounted for 48 percent of the variation in these items, with 
all items having at least a O.S6 loading. Two dimensions resulted from 
these items. One of these dimensions was loaded by items M22, M26, M27, 
and M28. This suggests the concern for daily economic security. The 
other dimension is loaded by items M24 and M2S which seems to indicate 
a general economic outlook. All items except item M23 were added 
together to measure total feeling of economic security. Items M22, M26, 
M27, and M28 were added together to measure concern over daily economic 
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security. Items M24 and M25 were added together to measure the general 
economic outlook of the husband. All the items were retained by Westoff 
et al. They were added as a measure of husband's feeling of economic 
security. Westoff et al. 's items loaded differently; generally they were 
higher in loading than the ones appearing in this study. 
Husband's Drive to Get Ahead Scale 
All items are loaded fairly high except item M40 which is loaded 
too low to be considered. Therefore, item M40 is eliminated. The final 
first factor accounts for 36 percent of the variation in these items, 
with all items having at least a 0.40 loading. This is a complicated 
scale; there are three underlying dimensions. Total drive to get ahead 
loaded by items M29, M30, M31, M32~ M33, M34, M35, M36, M37, M38, and 
M39. The first dimension loaded by items M29, M30, M35, M36, and M37. 
The second dimension loaded by items M38 and M39. The third dimension 
loaded by items M31, M32, and M33. All the items except M40 were added 
together as a measure of the husband's desire to get ahead. Items M29, 
M30, M35, M36, and M37 were added together as a measure of sacrifice 
of health, family, and friends. Items M38 and M39 were added together 
as a measure of sacrifice of school standards and permanent job. Items 
M31, M32, and M33 were added together as a measure of sacrifice of stand-
ard of living and leisure. Westoff et al.'s first factor loadings were 
very dissimilar in general than the loadings presented by items utilized 
for this research. Their items clustered differently than the 
clustering on this scale. This difference may be attributed to cultural 
differences and others between the Kuwaiti and the American samples. 
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Husband's Importance of Getting Ahead Scale 
All the items in this scale loaded very high except item M47 which 
is eliminated because of its very low loading. The final first factors 
account for 40 percent of the variation in these items, with all having 
at least a 0.41 loading. Two dimensions emerged. One dimension is 
loaded by items M41, M42, M43, M45, and M46. This suggests the indi-
vidual's emphasis upon the hard work to get ahead. The other dimension 
is loaded by items M44 and M48, whi··h seems to suggest the emphasis upon 
material and real manness. All ite<JS except item M47 were added together 
as a measure of husband's importance~ of getting ahead. Items M41, M42, 
M43, M45, and M46 were totaled together as a measure of individual 
emphasis on hard work. Items M44 and M48 were added together as a 
measure of individual emphasis on material and manness. Item M47 was 
also eliminated by Westoff et al. because of the low loading. All other 
items were added together as a measure of importance of getting ahead. 
Summary 
Within this chapter has been a discussion of the objectives of the 
study, a description of the sample, a discussion of the sampling 
procedure, an explanation of the interview schedule used to collect the 
research data, the method of analysis, and the procedure used in the 
selection of the items for this research. The study is aimed at gather-
ing information concerning the relationship between fertility and 
several independent sociological, motivational, and demographic var-
iables. All the 10 social-psychological scales were used to examine 
family size preference as well as actual family size for the wives. All 
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five scales and the items composing them for the husbands are utilized 
for the same purposes. Furthermore, out of the 10 scales for the wives, 
only five were similar in terms of loadings to Westoff et al. Only one 
scale out of five for the husbands' sca.les displayed similar loadings to 
Westoff et al. All the rest were dissimilar. The following chapter 
discusses the findings. 
CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This chapter consists of several sections. The first section is an 
introduction. The second section includes a presentation of the findings 
and hypotheses evaluation. There is also an attempt which is made to 
analyze the model and the hypotheses generated from it; a subjective 
discourse is useful. Each individual is unqiue within him or herself. 
There are, however, common characteristics in their views on their own 
fertility preferences and family planning. There are obvious limitations 
to any analysis which takes sense impressions into account. However, 
the use of the subjective qualitative data· can lead to a clearer, more 
complete picture. Various comments, reactions, and impressions are 
important in gaining some insight into the internal nature of fertility 
decision making and the impact of the social as well as the psychological 
milieu. The addition of this type of data is intended to present the 
kind of feelings and attitudes that were expressed by the respondents. 
The final section of this chapter is an overall summary of the research 
findings. 
Introduction 
All of the components of independent variables are located within 
three major areas: religion, socio-economic status, and family. Inde-
pendent variables (aspects of socio-cultural or personal orientation) 
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relate directly to these three dimensions of social life. Table IX gives 
an id~a of the cor!.ceptual structure with regard to items utilized in the 
interview schedule. 
These three broad classes of independent variables will be utilized 
to seek an explanation of variations in the dependent variables such as 
additional family size, the ideal family size, and contraceptive use. 
Reading Table IX indicates an arbitrary classification for organizational 
convenience. Biological characteristics and governmental influences are 
excluded from this table, but their influence is there (see Chapter III). 
Table IX shows a brief characterization of the independent variables used 
in this research.· There are· several variables that can be placed differ-
ently. The justification is that an employed wife influences both cat-
egories--the economic and the family. An employed wife contributes to 
·the family income; at the same time, according to Westoff et al. (1961), 
one is dealing with a phenomena not very much is known about or about 
how it operates (adjustment to the mother role). These variables pre-
sented in Table IX describe the major characteristics within which indi-
viduals must act. They are the conditions to which husbands and wives 
react, and to which they decide on one form of action or another. The 
social-psychological variables can greatly affect the outcome of this 
decision making process. Not only can these factors be viewed as imping-
ing directly upon the fertility process, but also in terms of individual 
action, they are filtered through personalities of wife and husband. 
The following is a presentation of the findings as they were observed. 
The results of the research are presented in the form of tables with 
correlation coefficients for the different variables. A 0.05 level of 
significance was utilized. 
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TABLE IX 
CONCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Societal Area 
Religion 
Socio-Economic 
Status 
Economic 
Status 
Social 
Status 
Family 
Social Milieu 
Religious family activities 
Religious education 
Occupational status: 
Present occupation and 
occupation prestige 
Wife's work history 
Occupational mobility 
Employment history 
Education: 
Formal education of 
wife and husband 
Housing: 
Type of house* 
Value of house 
Type of community 
in as child 
Parents living 
Number of siblings 
Marriage duration 
Wife's work history 
Child spacing 
lived 
Personal Milieu 
Home religious orientation 
Commitment to religious 
values 
Achivement of life goals 
Feeling of economic 
security 
Relevance of finances in 
ferility decisions 
Job satisfaction 
Perception of opportunities 
Commitment to work values 
Status satisfaction 
Social class identification 
Importance of getting ahead 
Drive to get ahead 
Aspirations for children's 
education 
Level of enjoyment of 
of children 
Adjustment to mother role 
Patterns of help avail-
able to mother 
Patterns of husband-wife 
dominance 
Marital adjustment 
*The classification "type of house" refers to whether whether the place 
of residence is of a limited income, middle-class, upper-class dwelling, 
or an apartment. 
Presentation of Findings and Evaluation 
of Hypotheses 
The following is a presentation of the results in tabular form. 
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The first one is Table X. This presents the correlation coefficients 
calculated for the wives only. This table gives a summary of the inde-
pendent variables such as: religiosity, achievement of life goals, 
satisfaction with husband's work, aspirations for children's college 
education, marital adjustment, liking for children, dominance pattern. 
the pattern of help available to wi 'les, the place where the wife was 
born, satisfaction with the level of education achieved, planning ahead 
of time, and the use of contraceptives. These independent variables are 
correlated with number of children, additional children desired, and 
ideal number of children preferred. 
Table XI shows variables that were examined for both husbands and 
wives (for example, the relationship between age, education, occupation, 
number of sisters, number of brothers, type of house, ownership of 
house, value of house, willingness to postpone having a child to get 
ahead, whether or not relatives reside with them, and the fertility 
variables--the number of children, the desire for additional children, 
and the ideal number of children). 
Table XII presents variables examined for the husbands only (for 
example, the relationship between husband's level of status satisfaction, 
commitment to work, work for money and work for desire, the importance 
of getting ahead, emphasis on individual hard work, and emphasis on the 
material aspect of life and masculinity with the dependent variables--
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TABLE X 
COHRELATIONS BETWEEN FERTILITY AND SEVERAL INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES CONSIDERED FOR WIFE ONLY 
Total religiosity 
Home religious orientation 
Commitment to religious and 
traditional values 
Achievement of life goals 
Satisfaction with husband's work 
Aspiration for children's 
college education 
Marital adjustment 
Liking for children 
Dominance pattern 
Pattern of help available to 
wives 
Place of birth (village or 
city) 
Satisfaction with level of 
educational achievement 
Planning ahead of time 
Use of pills for contraceptives 
Number of 
Children 
Alive 
0.26 
a .07 
0 .. 39 
('j_ • 007 
0.05 
0.14 
0.17 
-0.01 
0.13 
0.13 
-0.12 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.15 
0.10 
0.24 
a .10 
Additional 
Children 
Desired 
-0.03 
-0.18 
0.10 
-0.36 
a .02 
0.17 
-0.25 
-0.28 
0.05 
-0.08 
0.28 
-0.32 
.05 
0.17 
0.19 
0.45 
a .004 
Ideal Number 
of 
Children 
-0.06 
-0.12 
0.10 
-0.21 
0.10 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.13 
-0.07 
0.38 
a .007 
-0.38 
a .007 
0.30 
a .04 
0.03 
-0.05 
TABLE XI 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FERTILITY AND SEVERAL INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES FOR BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Number of Additional 
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Ideal 
Children Children Number of 
Alive Desired Children 
Age: 
Husband 0. 77 -0.40 0.05 
a 
.0001 a .01 
Wife 0.78 -0.48 0.21 
a .0001 a .001 
Education 
Husband -0.27 0.02 -0.08 
a 
.05 
Wife -0.46 -0.10 -0.20 
a 
.001 
Occupation 
Husband 0.03 -0.14 0.06 
Wife -0.37 -0.30 -0.45 
a .01 a .06 
Number of Sisters 
Husband -0.12 -0.18 -0.25 
a .08 
Wife -0.08 -0.01 0.01 
Number of Brothers 
Husband 0.02 -0.32 -0.26 
a .04 a .07 
Wife 0.43 -0.22 0.20 
a .003 
:!)'____£~_of _H~u~-'=- -0.23 0.28 0.09 
a .08 
_OwnershiE _ of House -0.30 -0.45 -0.10 
a 
.03 a .004 
Value of House 0.14 0.31 0.04 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
Willing to Postpone Having a Child 
to Get Ahead 
Husband 
Wife 
Are There Relatives Residing With 
You 
Husband's Total FeeliE_g of Economic 
Seeurity 
Emphasis on daily economic 
Economic outlook 
Wife's Total Feeling of Economic 
Securi!:_y 
Husband's Total Drive to Get Ahead 
Sacrifice health, family, and 
friends to get ahead 
Sacrifice school standards and 
permanent job 
Sacrifice standard of living for 
desire to get ahead 
Wife's Total Drive to Get Ahead 
Sacrifice relatives and 
ideological values 
Sacrifice immediate family and 
friends 
-------------------
Number of 
Children 
Alive 
-0.17 
-0.04 
-0.31 
a .03 
-0.03 
-0.01 
-0.09 
-0.07 
0.03 
0.05 
0.13 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.02 
-0.04 
Additional 
Children 
Desired 
-0.22 
-0.25 
0.37 
a .02 
-0.04 
-0.05 
-0.09 
0.08 
-0.33 
-0.21 
-0.27 
-0.37 
0.14 
-0.03 
0.27 
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Ideal 
Number of 
Children 
-0.18 
-0.14 
0.06 
-0.07 
0.01 
-0.21 
-0.01 
-0.26 
-0.18 
-0.15 
-0.27 
-0.07 
-0.12 
0.02 
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number of children alive, additional children desired, and ideal number 
of children considered). 
TABLE XII 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FERTILITY AND SEVERAL INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES CONSIDERED FOR HUSBAND ONLY 
Husband's Level of Status 
Satisfaction 
Commitment to Work 
Work for money 
Work for leisure 
Husband's Importance of Getting 
Ahead 
Emphasis on individual hard work 
Emphasis on material aspect of 
life and manliness 
Religion 
Number of 
Children 
Alive 
0.06 
-0.16 
-0.15 
-0.06 
0.03 
0.07 
-0.06 
Additional 
Children 
Desired 
-0.17 
0.13 
0.14 
0.03 
-0.17 
-0.24 
0.06 
Ideal 
Number of 
Children 
-0.10 
-0.10 
-0.16 
0.05 
-0.37 
a .008 
-0.43 
a .001 
-0.07 
The hypothesis stated that: Highly religious and highly traditional 
individuals are likely to favor large families and are likely to have 
large families. 
Three factors were examined: total religiosity, commitment to 
religious values, and home religious orientation. The findings with 
regard to these factors are discussed. 
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Total religiosity is found to associate in the expected direction, 
except for wanting additional children which is negative (r = -0.03). 
(See Table X.) All these associations, however, are very low and 
statistically insignificant. Home religious orientation, on the other 
hand, shows a significantpositive association between the extent of 
religious practice at home and fertility (r = 0. 39, p < 0.05). Addi-
tional children and ideal number of children are associated inversely 
with home religious orientation; however, not statistically significan~ 
(r = -0.18 and r = -0.12, respectively). (See Table X.) Commitment to 
religious values is found to associate in the expected positive direc-
tion, but there are no significant findings. 
Generally, home religious orientation seems to be the one important 
variable that associated statistically significant in ;J way with fertil-
ity. It gives much stronger indication of religiosity than just com-
·mitment to traditional values. Tradition and religion in Islam is one 
and the same thing. However, in this sample the individual who tries to 
observe his religious duties at home is considered a religious person. 
Therefore, home religious orientation is considered a better measure of 
religiosity. The word commitment to religious values seems obscure; 
it can include many facets of life. Statically, the data seem to support 
the hypothesis which stated that total religiosity, as indicated with 
home religious orientation, is positively associated with family size. 
In reality, what appears from the intervi.ews with the wives who 
have large family size is the following: Those wives tended to be 
100 
family oriented. They also considered being a housewife and a mother as 
their full-time job or as in several cases where the wife had no other 
extra-familial job outside the house. It seems that high fertility is 
perpetuated by the familistic orientafion rather than strictly religion. 
The common understanding to all Moslems is that with God's will, as well 
as the individual's will, the fertility decision is made. With this idea 
in mind, regardless if the individual is having many children or using 
contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, the underlying idea is the same--
God's will is revealed. Familism seems to be much more related to 
fertility and, if one could do this study over again, familistic 
phenomena would be the one variable that has to be treated with a great 
deal of attention.· This phenomena seems to be a very significant inter-
vening variable that accounts for the high fertility. Familism can be 
defined as the ties with the old traditional values which prevail: (1) 
the need for children to carry the father's name, and (2) to the mother, 
children are highly commended. they are a sign of her own personal 
validation and contribution to the family. 
Wives who have no extra familial activities outside their household 
(employed outside the home) were the ones who took the mother role very 
seriously. One of the respondents seemed to express this idea which 
prevailed among several: "It sounds very great when people [meaning 
family and friends] say she is the mother of this one and the mother of 
that one, etc." There is a kind of life style that guarantees the basic 
familial prestige and the honor among other families in the community. 
If birth control is considered by wives with large family size, 
the tendency is toward the use of natural contraceptives (e.g., using 
the numbering technique or other traditional techniques).· They also 
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tended to have longer marriage duration and less education than the rest 
of the. sample. It seems that wives are provided with a rote which 
emphasizes her reproductive potential. This, in fact, becomes the major 
source of her social reward and recognition in the community. Religion 
is sometimes used to justify many children and also to justify having 
few children. Religion is also used to justify good fortune and success 
in life. This is the feeling that is conveyed by the people in this 
study. What the researcher is trying to show is the following: While 
there is a particular measure of religiosity that seems to. have a 
statistically significant associationwith the number of children, one 
needs to explore other factors that may have some bearing on the fertil 
ity pattern among less educated wives. See Appendix D with regard to 
the Islamic view toward family planning. 
The next section deals with the socio-economic variables and their 
association with fertility. The socio-economic fact.ors seem to bear 
much more on the difference that appears in actual family size, the 
additional number of children des.ired, and the ideal number of children 
considered. 
Socio-Economic Status 
The hypothesis stated that~ A high level of security in the area 
of social and economic status is associated positively with the desire 
for large families. 
·The dimension of socio-economic status has been emphasized in the 
studies of fertility differentials. The inverse relationship between 
measures of scicio-economic status and fertility was fr~quently viewed 
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with alarm in the United States because bf what It 1mp liE>d for long term 
decline and the quali.ty of the population. There was a partial reversal 
in the pattern of fertility, with the greatest change among the highly 
educated and financially well-to-do segment of the United States. 
Based on what has been found with regard to fertility differentials 
and socio-economic status, it is relevant to study this relationship. 
In general, it is expected to find individuals ranked high on the 
socio-economic scale to be associated with favorable desire for large 
family size. It is also expected to see individuals who ranked high on 
this scale to be successful planners in general and family planning in 
particular. Planning success and contraceptive use are expected to 
vary by social class. Ineffective planning is viewed as a character-
istic of the lower socio-economic segment of the population. This 
indicates that a high level of security of socio-economic status is 
associated with the desire for a large number of children. 
Economic Status 
The hypothesis stated that a high level of income (based on subjec-
tive measures) security is associated positively with the desire for 
large family size. 
The economic dimension of socio-economic status includes several 
other factors that contribute to it and in turn influence fertility (for 
example, the occupational situation as well as type of occupation for 
the husband and the wife). In addition to that, an indices of "feeling 
of economic security" was used. This indices has been intended for the 
evaluation of the couple's financial condition. Data on type of house 
the couple lived in (see Appendix B or C), whether the per~on owned or 
103 
rented, and the value of the house if owned contribute to both the 
economic status and the social status of the individuals. These measures 
used since data on the present income was collected. 
Occupation. The hypothesis stated· that a high level of occupational 
security is associated positively ~ith the large family size. 
All of the husbands in the sample were employed. Only 25 percent 
of the wives were unemployed; the rest of the wives had full-time jobs 
except for six percent who were students and two percent in private 
business· (these were wives who were able to manage the time to go to 
school or to attend to their private business). 
The data regarding wives indicates a significant negative associa-
tion between occupation and number of children (r = -0.37, p < 0.05). 
(See Table XI.) The additional number of children desired was neg-
atively associated; however, the association failed to achieve statis-
ticai significance. The same thing can be expressed with regard to 
ideal number of children considered by the couples. The husband's 
occupation, on the other hand, did associate in the same way as the 
wife's occupation. The number of children and the number of children. 
they considered ideal was positively associated, but not in any statis-
tically significant.way (r = 0.03, r = 0.06, respectively). Although 
the desire for additional children is associated with the type occupa-
tion of the husband in the negative direction (r = -0.14), the associa-
tion failed to be statistically significant. 
What seemed to be happening is that the wife took the matter of 
having children very seriously, especially if she is contributing a 
great deal to the family inco~e. Another point must be noted--many of 
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these wives do not have to work, their husbands are making enough money 
that they can stay home and have children if they want to. However, 
when asked the question of why did they need to work, the common response 
is that they worked hard in school to reach this position and they are 
not about to stay home just to have the child! One person in particular 
said, "I enjoy what I am doing. I like going out everyday in the morn-
ing and seeing my colleagues and friends and comparing notes with them." 
(She was referring to interior decorating as she was furnishing her 
newly built, lavishly furnished house.) 
The husbands, on the other hand, seem to express an ambigious 
feeling toward the subject of fertility. They seem to want the large 
family but are willing to postpone having the children until the "right 
time." What seems to be indicated here is the fact of having children 
being the primary responsibility of the wife and that she must work it 
out with all her other activities, and the husband is willing to accom-
modate her. This feature of relationship between husband and wife be-
comes much more prevalent as you move up the education as the 
occupational professional level. The data iu this study failed to sup-
port the hypothesis. What appears is the opposite, it is those females 
who are ranked in highly secure occupations, and specifically highly 
specialized professions, who seem to be worried about the number of 
children they will have and whether or not they can provide adequately 
for them. As a result, they have smaller families. Findings in this 
research fail to support the hypothesis with regard to occupation for 
wives only. 
Economic Securi_t:x_. The hypothesis stated that a high level of feel-
ing economically secure is associated positively with having large family 
I 0 r, 
size. "Feeling of economic security" is another dimension of economic 
status that was examined in this study. Since fertility is viewed in 
the research in a social~psychological frame of reference, the perceived 
needs depending on the couple's reference group are thought of as a 
reasonable measure of economic status. Typical questions ranged over 
topics such as confidence in being able to meet unex,pected expenses to 
perception of financial future and inclination to worry about bills or 
debts. The questions included in the "feeling of economic security" 
scale were intended to measure or evaluate the couple's financial situa-
tion. The association between "feeling of economic security" and number 
of children for the wives is shown to be negative; the same thing is 
found with regard to ideal number of children, but it is significant 
(r = -0.07, r = -0.01, respectively, Table XI). A positive direction 
is shown for the wives in the case of wanting additional children; how-
ever, the finding is very low (r = 0.08). The association between the 
same scale and the subscales and the fertility variables have been 
inverse in direction except for one--the emphasis on daily economic 
and the number of children considered ideal by the husbands (Table XI). 
One association that seems to have a positive direction with some 
significance is between occupation and feeling of economic security 
(wives, r = 0.22; husbands, r = 0.32; p < 0.05); also, the daily economic 
subdimension for the husbands and occupation was significant (r = 0.28, 
p < 0.05). Husband's daily economic outlook and occupation are shown to 
be in the positive direction but not significant (r = 0.18). 
The pattern indicated by the data shows that as you go up the ladder 
on the professional scale, one finds couples who feel economically secure 
in terms of occupation have very few children. One also finds that these 
106 
couples are efficient planners and successful users of contraceptive 
techniques. On the other hand, couples who ranked low in terms of 
occupation and economic security are the ones who are having the large 
families. Similar findings were shown in the literature. Westoff, for 
example, has found that high income couples tend to have fewer off-
spring than couples of low income. Although data presented in this 
study support the hypothesis with regard to economic security and num-
ber of children, there is an interesting finding with regard to the help 
available to wives which seems to associate in a statistically signif-
icant way with the number of children considered 1de;1l (r "' 0.38, 
p < 0.05). The following discussion deals with another important dimen-
sion of socio-economic status. 
Social Status 
The hypothesis stated that a high level of feeling socially secure 
is associated positively with having large family size. The social 
dimension includes the occupational prestige, the husband's level of 
status satisfaction. Other variables are examined.because they have an 
overall impact on social status as well as income status. These var-
iables are the extent to which the wife felt she had ach!eved her life 
goals, husband's degree of psychological commitment to work, and wife's 
level of satisfaction with her husband's job. These variables <He> not 
considered to belong to the social status dimension because (for example) 
the husband's high level of commitment is seen as an attitude toward 
work which values work as a main source of meaning in life. For the 
wife's level of satisfaction with the husband's job, it is defined in 
terms of her perception of the steadiness of his work, hours and working 
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conditions, chance to get ahead, and adequacy of income. Type of house 
seems to be negatively associated with number of children but not 
statistically significant. Ownership, on the other hand, is statis-
tically significant with the number of children (r = -0.3, p < 0.05) also 
the desire for additional children (r = -0.45, p < 0.05, Table XI). A 
common response was that as one wife put it, "I want to prepare myself 
first. I mean to establish ourselves and pay some of our debts so that 
we can get what we want and provide an adequate life for our children." 
Findings show that when the level ofhusband's status sati.sfaction 
is high, the number of children is found to be in the positive direction 
(r = 0.06). His needs for additional children are negative and what he 
considers an ideal number of children is low or negative (Table XII). 
The husband's high commitment to wort: is associated in the negative 
direction with number of children and ideal number of children even 
though his desires for wanting additional children may be present. 
Working for money is associated similarly. However, when the husband 
is working for leisure, still the number of children is inversely 
associated, whereas his desire for additional children and ideal number 
is shown to be in the positive direction, generally insignificant. 
Husband's importance of getting ahead and the subfactors of 
emphasis on individual hard work and emphasis on material aspect of 
life and manliness generally associated negatively on most dependent 
variables (Table XII). The importance of getting ahead and emphasis on 
individual hard work are associated in a statistically significant way 
with the ideal number of children considered by the husbands (r = -0.37, 
p < 0.05; r = -0.43, p < 0.05, respectively). 
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Wife's level of achievement of life goals is shown to be inversely 
associated with the desire for additional children (r = -0.36, p < 0.05). 
Wife's satisfaction with husband's work is indicated to be in the pos-
itive direction although statistically insignificant findings. 
Findings in this research support the hypothesis which stated: A 
high level of security in the area of socio-economic status is associated 
with desires for larger families. 
Education. The hypothesis stated that education, particularly fe-
male education, is related in a negative manner to the level of fertil-
ity. The educational dimension is considered an antecedent factor to 
many factors such as occupation, social and economic status, also social 
mobility which will be discussed in the next section. 
The average Kuwaiti family within the realm of this research study 
regarded education as being very important for both males and females 
and a common response was that 
..• the woman loses all her rights because of her ignorance, 
it is only by education that a woman is aware of her rights 
and also by education she makes others around her aware of her 
rights--have you ever seen somebody who tried to cheat a judge 
and get away with it? It is just the same with women who are 
knowledgeable. 
The data show that education did negatively associate with the 
fertility variables. The association is statistically significant and 
is in the expected direction for the wives (r = -0.46, p < 0.05, see 
Table XI). The desire for additional children and the ideal number of 
children preferred is inversely related to education, although the 
association is very low (wife's r = -0.10, -0.20). With regard to 
husbands, the association of education to fertility variables 
is significant, although it is not as strong (r = -0.27, p < 0. OS). 
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The data at large seem to confirm the hypothesis for the wives and the 
husbands alike. The weakness of the association with regard to husbands 
seems to tie up with the findings on occupation. Working wives seem to 
.find it hard to care for the additional children they would like to 
have. The most common response which was given by wives as a justifica-
tion for not having the extra child is that they did "not want a stranger 
[in most cases, a servant] bringing up the child." Three percent of the 
wives said they wanted one additional child to what they already have, 
20 percent said they wanted two additional children (this included all 
childless wives). Most of the childless wives are married between one 
and five years, so they are considered at the beginning of the family 
building process. Most of the wives in the sample have indicated that 
they must have that first child after marriage. That seems to confirm 
their motherhood and seemed to satisfy the urge of being a parent and 
confirm their desire to have children. The next step is then making 
sure the child gets all the attention he needs and to raise him or her 
well. These ideas were more prevalent as the level of education and 
awareness is increased for the wives. 
Social Mobility. The hypothesis stated that high aspirations for 
social mobility will be associated with family size desires. It is 
expected to see large family size as being incompatible with successful 
social mobility and therefore, respondents for whom the later is I , 
important are likely to show a preference for ~mall families. The basic 
theoretical rationale for the inclusion of socio-economic status in the 
study of fertility is that different occupations, levels of education, 
and income imply different patterns of values and. life interests, 
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which, in turn, possess varying degrees of compatibility with smaller or 
larger families. Many individuals at the same class level have been 
exposed to a similar environment all their lives, others have been up-
wardly mobile, and still others downwardly mobile. For some, mobility 
has been a result of marriage, and for others the product of their own 
efforts. 
The basic hypothesis is expressed frequently in the literature: 
The socio-economic and psychological re.quirements for upward mobility 
are inconsistent with expenditures of time, energy, and money for 
children. For some persons, the "requirements" may be more exacting 
than for others. The economic costs of another child may not constitute 
a handicap toward a certain income level. Another complication is the 
fact that social mobility as measured in objective categories of income 
or occupational change may not sufficiently reflect level of aspira-
tion. Perhaps it is that decisions about another child or the effec-
tiveness of contraceptive practices are involved with the attitudinal 
' ~ 
or perceptual kspect of the level of aspiration of the wife and the 
husband. This is an aspect that may only be loosely connected to visible 
changes in circumstances. 
Thus, wives and husbands who have moved up the scale rapidly may 
perceive their situation as not requiring much devotion to the process 
of moving upward as other couples who may not have moved so fast. And 
many individuals may be very ambitious and yet be in a job situation 
where they have either already reached their ceiling of advancement or 
in which the rewards are assured over the long-term range. 
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Examined here are only two aspects of social mobility: (1) the 
drive to get ahead for husbands and wives arid (2) the aspiration to send 
children to college • 
. An aspect of social mobility is the "drive to get ahead." The 
hypothesishere indicated that individuals with high drive to get ahead 
will favor smaller number of children. 
There is the importance attached to the perceived rewards of success 
and the level of drive to get ahead. The hypothesis that fertility 1s 
. ' . 
negatively associeted with level of <ispiration or amibition has been. 
present in the literature for some time. One of the major orientations 
of the current study has been to test the validity of this hypothesis. 
The respondent is presented with the question of the value or 
importance of getting ahead in life (work is emphasized for husbands) 
as well as with a list of 13 other values and the wife is asked whether 
she would be willing to sacrifice some of her values in order to get 
ahead. The list of items ranges over such values as having to leave 
friends, having to become more active in community organizations not of 
her own choice, having to keep quiet about religious views, having her 
husband in a job with more opportunity but not security, having her 
husband spend more time at work, and having to send her children to 
another school not quite as good. A direct question is also asked 
whether she would be willing to postpone having another child in order 
to get ahead. A similar index is asked for the husbands which is an 
eight-item index on the importance of getting ahead. 
The logic of the question structure underlying these indices of 
"dtive to get ahead" is that respondents who feel that these other con-
siderations would be more important than "getting ahead" are revealing 
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lower levels of aspiration than those who would diregard them (Westoff, 
1961). The hypotheses to be tested are that individuals who have a 
high drive to get ahead will want smaller families and will exhibit more 
successful levels of fertility control than couples whose aspirations 
are presumably lower. The correlations for wives and husbands, sep-
. ' ~ 
arately, are s~own in Tables XI and XII. The association between 
husband's total drive to get ahead and his sacrifi~e of standard of liv-
ing plus leisure time with the desire of additional children is found to 
be statistically significant in an inverse way (r -0.33, p < o~os; 
r = -0.37, p < 0.05, respectively, see Table XI). For the husband, the 
drive to get ahead and all the sub-dimensions all associated positively 
with regard to number of children. However, the first and third depend-
ent variables (number of children they have and number of children they 
considered ideal) associated negatively for wives with regard to their 
desire to get ahead. 
This factor seems to need more investigation and to deal with each 
individual's drive to get ahead. This factor influences the individuals 
depending on their social establishment ln the community and also the 
gap between the husband's education and his wife's education. The more 
years of education for the wife, the more likely they are willing to 
sacrifice family and friends fOr the sake of her husband's or her own 
mobility. The hypothesis is not statistically confirmed. 
Wife's aspiration to send children to college is another aspect of 
social mobility that was examined. The hypothesis stated that high 
level of aspiration is associated negatively with number of children. 
Many persons conceive social mobility in terms of the future status of 
113 
their children and perceive their own role to be that of maximizing 
opportunities for their children. Such an attitude may or may not 
derive from a frustration of the parents' ambitions or that feeling of 
deprivation which is expressed in the f~miliar phrase "giving my kids 
the breaks I never had as a kid." Whatever the background of the 
attitude, the avenue of mobility for the child is perceived clearly to 
be education. A college education is rapidly becoming a sine qua ~ 
of entry into professional and technical jobs. Thus, the parents' 
ambition for their children will tend to take the form of concern that 
their children be able to take advantage of higher education--a concern 
which may conflict· with having additional children. 
A fairly common reply encountered in the question of why no more 
children were desired for women who wanted to stop at two was that they 
felt they could not adequately meet the "costs of raising more than two 
or three children::• More often than not, this type of reply revealed a 
concern for the child's need to grow independently and get his/her 
share of attention from both parents. This might be ari acceptable way 
to rationalize to themselves for not wanting more children. 
The association between the wife's aspirations to send children to 
college is shown to be negative on number of children and additional 
children desired·and positive on ideal number of children; but not 
statistically significant. Very often the wife 1 s ideal number of chil-
dren exceeded the actual number she had and the repeated justification 
was that it is impossible to fulfill the children 1 s needs to secure a 
better quality of life. Very often this is surprising, since education 
in Kuwait is provided free to all Kuwaiti citizens. The. aspiration of 
some of the wives may be beyond what is available free in Kuwait. Also, 
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education can be costly if the family hires private tutors to assure the 
scholastic achievement of their children. 
The findings in this study fail to statistically confirm the mobil-
ity hypothesis with regard to aspiration. It would seem like the neg-
ative association is present but the number is not large enough to 
produce a statistical significance. 
The hypothesis stated that females married at a young age will have 
the tendency t·o have a larger family than those married at an older age. 
Once when visiting one of the respondents, a few of her friends 
dropped by in addition to a couple of her female aunts, augnatic aunts. 
Instead of the interview that day we just visited with everybody and 
to the researcher it was just perfect. _The investigator was introduced 
to all of these five people and the two aunts. Some how we got to talk-
ing about the advantage of marriage at an older age (three of the friends 
were college students, the others were teachers). One of the aunts did 
not like how the discussion was progressing and said: 
Young people today are very fragile, they worry about things 
that are not worth worrying about •.•. The problem is that 
women today are older when they get married and less patient 
with children. I guess they want the easv life, they too 
are pampered. 
The traditional Muslim culture is characterized by a traditionally 
sanctioned institutional structure noted for its strong familism. The 
criterion of pride and familial prestige depen<is largely, if not 
exclusively, upon conformity to behavioral norms that are conceived as 
having to do with family honor. The older individuals in the family see 
the younger generation male, as well as the female, going to schools 
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and particularly the female as having much more freedom than what they 
had available to them. The freedom here is with respect to opportunities 
open to all Kuwaiti females today, which is education and employment and 
the confidence given to her by her family. It seems that family 
prestige is slowly being achieved through what the various family mem-
bers acquire in terms of education and how well they become modernized 
in their homes and in- their attitude toward their young children. Per-
sonal achievement is the mode of life. 
The sample used is very small and cannot be tested to produce 
statistical significance; however, the three women who have completed 
their family size and no longer bear children were married at a very 
young age and have over nine children as compared to two other people 
in the same sample who were over the age of 30 and had only one child. 
This seems to be in line with the hypothesis, also based on the findings 
of the association of education and fertility. Age certainly has an 
impact upon fertility. 
Family 
The hypothesis stated that individuals with high marital satisfac-
tion and high degree of liking children is related positively to the 
number of children. 
Several questions are asked about the nature of help available to 
the wife (help from the husband, from other family members, and/or 
regular domestic help) with regard to the care of children and household 
chores. In addition to these questions, there were questions about the 
number of brothers and sisters of both husband and wife, plus questions 
about marital adjustment and the dominance pattern within the family. 
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The size of the family is partly determined by the social relations 
within the family. The attitude structure may affect the number of 
children desired and may affect the efficiency of pLanning and the use 
of contraceptives. 
Marital Adjustment. Ultimate size of family and marital adjustment 
are associated. Certainly the rejection of the hypothesis of no 
association between fertility and marital adjustment has been suf-
ficiently frequent to justify this assertion. It is also true that 
observed associations have all been of small magnitudes. Equally 
plausible reasons have been given for the expectation of negative or 
positive correlations. On the one hand, wives who are satisfied with 
their marriage are more willing to take on the responsibilities and 
duties that motherhood entails or, on the other hand, children (espe-
cially unplanned children), not only create new burdens but upset adult 
routines, deprive the wife of desired leisure time, and curtail economic 
and social opportunities. 
The observed correlations in this research failed to support 
statistically the hypothesis of the direct causal link between 
adjustment to marriage and the number of children desired. There is an 
extremely small correlation (r = 0.13 for number of children) between the 
adjustment variables and the fertility variables; and a negative associa-
tion exists with regard to additional children desired (r = -0.28). (See 
Table XI.) 
Husbands'-Wives' Dominance Pattern. Family structure of relations 
vary a great deal. There are those who are characterized by egalitarian 
patterns of husband-wife decision-making which obscure the traditional 
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delineations of sex roles within the family. The working mother and the 
domesticated father are variations of parental roles that are not, at 
least theoretically, associated with the male dominant family type. The 
expectation that such crossing of traditional sex roles is to be found 
among families with equalitarian patterns of husband-wife decision-making 
and is based on the prior assumption that extensive communication between 
spouses is most likely to be found in the equalitarian household and is 
a prerequisite if role alternatives are to be successfully explored. 
Through this medium of extensive communication, the equalitarian 
mode of decision-making is presumed to associate with a greater activity 
of extrafamilial type for wives, a. greater involvement of husbands in 
domestic chores, greater success in fertility planning, and lower 
fertility desires. This follows from the assumption that the explora-
tion of other role possibilities implies values competitive with hi.gh 
fertility. 
The theme that is developed here is related to the theory that 
causally relates male-dominant family systems to high fertility. The 
authority of the male, the low status of the female, the separation of 
the male from involvement with child-bearing routines, the importance to 
the male of demonstrating virility in terms of numbers of male off-
spring as well as the assumed economic value of male children, are the 
elements of the patriarchal system that are thought to be the causal 
social antecedents of high fertility. The absence of fertility planning 
and the rigidity of marital roles are also characteristic of such 
societies. The association between dominance patterns and wife's 
occupation is in a negative direction (r = -0.01) which means that the 
more highly ranked occupation, professionally, the tendency is toward 
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inequality rather than the equality in the authority pattern. The asso-
ciation between the dominance pattern and husband's occupation is very 
significant (r = 0.28, p < 0.05). This refers to equalitarian authority 
pattern, is associated with high occupations, and also with income and 
education which is implied in this study. Another very significant find-
ing indicated a positive association between the pattern of help and 
husband's occupation (r = 0.47, p < 0.05). These findings seem to be in 
support of sociological theory with this regard. 
The equalitarian household, in contrast to the patriarchal house-
hold, has as its basis of control a sharing of decision-making between 
husbands and wives in many important areas of family structure (Mather, 
1935; Wilkening, 1958). Authority in the patriarch is institutionalized 
and, by definition, is largely vested in the authority of the male. 
Findings seem to support the hypothesis which refers to higher de-
gree of equality in the structure of authority patterns among husbands 
and wives as their educational and occupational level is high. There 
is a greater degree of communication. 
The traditional family is nuclear with many children. The main 
reason for the change from traditional extended family is that young 
families are much more mobile with regard to their Jobs in the city or· 
in other areas. The family is patriarchal; however, the tendency is more 
equalitarian among the upper classes and the educated. Children are 
especially welcomed in the family. Many mothers wean their children 
at the age of two years. Marriage age among the limited income fam-
ilies ranges between 13 or 14 to about 18 years. In middle- and upper-
income families, the age at marriage ranges between 20 and 26 years. 
119 
The next comments are from different respondents which indicate 
that the differences in the life styles are resulting from socio-
economic factors and education seems to have a great impact. The ques-
tion that was posed was inquiring about the use of contraceptives, what 
kind and why the decision was made to use one over the other, and also 
what are the reasons for using the contraceptive in the first place. 
If birth control is used, it is only because I want to have 
time to rear my young child. Don't get the idea that I use 
it because I don't want the child--you can look at it this 
way, it is that I use the pill because I love my children, 
and I want to give them all of it possible. 
This is a response which was received from a woman whose life was 
around her family, no other job or school .to worry about. The contrast 
is much wider especially if the woman is a student or employed. Having 
the plans are much more precise, with a greater degree of·accuracy in 
the efficiency of contraceptive use. One lady expressed brilliantly: 
I will use the loop under any condition because its probabil-
ity of success is only 70% and knowing how my luck always 
runs the contrast is much especially if the wife has spent 
long years of difficult education and who is employed as an 
engineer. She has much more difficult and precise plans about 
how many children she would like to have and .when to have 
them. 
One lady engineer expressed this very accurately when asked why 
she used the pill when other techniques were available: 
I will not ever use for example the loop because I inquired 
about that--its success probability is only about 70%; and 
knowing how my luck runs, I know that I will end up one of 
those unfortunate 30%. Now you know that it is much more 
safer. 
Abortion is against the religion. The researcher was told that 
unless pregnancy poses a major threat to the mother's life, abortion is 
not performed. The cause of abortion differs among the people. A woman 
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is thought to have an abortion if she lifts a heavy weight, or affected 
by A supernatural power ltke the will of God, or the evil eye. Spirits 
cause abortion aH weLl nR flter1llty, dcnth of lht• children, or tlw deJny 
of childbirth for several years. One lady the researcher asked very 
cautiously about any induced abortion became a little suspicious and 
gave a long discussion about the immorality of induced abortion, it 
was "Haram" (morally wrong). This was also indicated by Sebai's (1974) 
findings in Saudia Arabia. 
The reply as to the cause of abortion from a person of higher socio-
economic status was that the will of God was still there but they still 
needed medical attention. 
Summary 
This chapter has attempted to discuss the major findings in the 
present research. The evaluation of the hypotheses for this research 
indicated that all predicted relationships between the variables were 
supported except for few. 
In the test of the first hypothesis, the relationship between 
religion and fertility is confirmed statistically. It shows a general 
tendency for positive direction with those who have home religious 
orientation. The test of the socio-economic hypothesis is confirmed 
statistically. The test of the education hypothesis is negatively re-
lated to fert·ility and, therefore, was confirm~. The hypothesis was 
confirmed statistically. The.family variables seem to be related, how-
ever, to fertility variables. The dominance pattern seems to produce 
statistical significance between occupational prestige and the authority 
between husbands and wives but not fertility. See Table XIII for a 
summary of hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Literature dealing with social-psychological factors and their 
influences upon fertility have been provided in the past four decades. 
The literature has indicated that some individuals tend to delay mar-
riage and/or postpone having children to achieve their career goals. 
This research attempted to identify the impact of social milieu as well 
as personal factors with regard to fertility. 
In addition, the utility model presented in Chapter III is a frame-
work in which it is used to conceptualize the range of alternatives and 
the competing variables for individual females. Also, the model gives a 
conceptual framework of the various factors that affect fertility in the 
sense provided by Davis and Blake (19 56). 
Research Procedure 
In order to test the theoretical model, data were collected through 
an interview schedule which was conducted with a sample of 50 Kuwaiti 
couples. The sample was Sf;!lected on a "snow ball" basis (i.e., a number 
of people agreed to be interviewed, then they were asked to guide the 
researcher to other couples they knew who in turn supplied the names of 
others). The purpose of the interview was to collect data relating to a 
variety of social and psychological factors utilizing scales from Westuff 
et al. (1961) to examine fertility preferences and the extent of family 
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planning. This data were collected by inquiring about the following: 
(1) the number of children the wives already have, (2) how many more 
children they would like to have, (3) what is the number of children 
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they consider ideal. Westoff's socio-psychological scales were used 
with the intention of finding out how these factors interact with fertil-
ity variables .discussed above and whether there is similarities in the 
pattern formed in the Kuwaiti sample and patterns found by Westoff and 
others in the literature review. The attempt here wasdirected toward 
exploring the various explanations with regard to the fertility 
decision-making process. 
The data were examined by utilizing factor analysis and Pearson's. 
correlation to establish statistical association. Qualitative analysis 
was also introduced in addition to quantitative application. 
Hypotheses 
There are six main hypotheses that were examined in Chapter III. 
Some of these hypotheses are compound ones (i.e., they consist of several 
ideas put into one). The presentation of these hypotheses nere is the 
same as they were examined and they are also presented in the same order 
as shown in Chapter V. 
Generally speaking, a quick look at the tabular results of the 
hypotheses indicates several important issues (Table XIII)~ One of the 
issues which is apparent is that it shows a gap between actual fertility 
and preferences with regard to husband's aspiration for social mobility. 
Had the unit of analysis been the couple, this might have been different 
results. Also, if husbands were compared to their wives, this might 
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have shed some light on the effects of the gap in terms of educational 
level and occupationHl skills. 
Another issue that i.H quit€:' appnrPnt ts tlw dHference in thl' 
association of occupation with all the fertility factors. Employed wives 
tend to favor fewer children, whereas husbands tend to think the other 
way around. This ties up nicely with the traditional thought which 
maintains that fertility is usually in most cases the woman's respon-
sibility. If the wife is extra ambitious with respect to activities out-
side the home, she must manage it within the framework provided to her 
traditional sex role. The following is a short discussion of each 
hypothesis: 
H1 : Highly religious and highly traditional individuals are likely 
to favor large families and are likely to have large families. 
(Accepted.) 
H2 : A high level of security in the area of soc.io-economic status 
is associated with the desire for larger families. The direction of the 
association is positive. 
a. Economic status (includes subjective measures) which consists 
of: 
1. Husband's occupation. (Accepted.) 
2. Wife's occupation. (Rejected.) 
3. Husband's "feeling of economic security," emphasis on 
both daily economic and outlook. (Accepted.) 
4. Wife's "feeling of economic security." (Accepted.) 
5. Type of house. (Accepted.) 
6. Ownership of house. (Rejected.) 
7. Value of house. (Accepted.) 
126 
b. Social status-:....includes education, occupational prestige, 
husband's level of status satisfaction, the extent to which the 
wife felt she had achieved her life goals, husband's degree of 
psychological commitment to work, and wife's level of satisfac-
tion with her husband's job. The hypothesis is accepted for 
the wives and the husband, except the husband's importance of 
getting ahead and emphasis on individual work. Both of these 
factors are statistically significant with regard to the number 
of children the husbands considered ideal. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is rejected for both of these factors with regard to 
ideal number of children. 
H3 : Education, particularly female education, is related in a 
negative manner to the level of fertility. (Accepted.) 
H4 : High aspirations for social mobility will be associated with 
smaller family-size desires. The author expected to see large families 
as being incompatible with successful social mobility and, therefore, 
respondents for whom the latter is important are likely to show a pref-
erence for small families. This hypothesis includes a test of a set of 
items relating to the husbands' and wive's "drive to get ahead." The 
test included the following: 
a. Husband's total drive to get ahead. This hypothesis is accepted 
for all fertility factors. 
b. Husband's sacrifice of health, family, and friends--accepted 
with regard to number of children alive. 
c. Husband's sacrifice of school standards and permanent job--
accepted with regard to number of children alive. 
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d. Husband' i> sacrifice of standards--accepted with regard to num-
ber of children alive. 
With regard to the wives, the hypothesis is accepted for total drive to 
get ahead, sacrifice of relatives, ideological values, sacrifice of 
family and friends. 
H5 : Females married at a young age will have the tendency to have 
a larger family than those married at an older age. This hypothesis can 
neither be accepted nor rejected because it needs much ·further examina-
tion. Data available were not enough for statistical analysis. However, 
indications appear to show that there are some associations with the 
age factor. 
H6: The rigidity of roles within a family are associated with 
fertility. The pattern of that asso~iation is positive. This hypothesis 
was tested by utilizing the following: 
a. The wife's marital adjustment. The hypothesis is found to 
associate positively and is accepted. 
b. Wife's liking of children. The tendency is also toward a pos-
itive relationship. (Accepted.) 
c. Dominance pattern within the family as perceived by the wife. 
The association tended to be negative in all fertility var-
iables; however, also of no statistical significance. The 
hypothesis, therefore, is Eccepted. 
d. The pattern of help (from the husband or provided by domestic 
help) available to wives. The tendency here is positive with 
very high significant positive relationship between pattern of 
help available to wives and the ideal number of children they 
considered. Therefore~ the hypothesis here is accepted. 
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Findings 
Findings in this study suggest that religiosity (Hypothesis 1), 
tested by home religious orientation of wives, does associate with large 
number of children. The statistical findings in this research seem to 
give support to the religion hypothesis. However, based on interviews, 
wives who tended to have a largenumber of children were also the ones 
. I 
who.scored very low in terms of formal educational level. They also 
tended to be strictly housewives and mothers (Le., restricted to 
familial activities only). The sample examined all devout Moslims and 
what seems to be a differentiating factor with respect to fertility is 
socio-economic factors and education (i.e., formal education). 
Westoff (1961) and his research colleagues have found a direct 
association with regard to fertility and number of children desired 
among Catholics in the United States. Religious education, they sug-
gest, exerts a strong influence both on the number of children desired · 
as well as the success of fertility planning among the Catholics. 
Catholics educated in secular schools and colleges behave more like 
Protestants in their fertility behavior than tl1ey do like Catholics with 
religious education. More recent findings, however, show that the 
Protestant-Catholic fertility gap is lessening as Catholics become more 
similar to Protestants (Traina, '1974; Westoff and Jones, 1977). This may 
also mean that Catholics in the United States are coming closer in tenns 
of socio-economic status to Protestants. 
I 
With respect to the second hypothesis, it is suggested that indi-
vidual husbands who feel secure in terms of socio-economic status seem 
to favor a large number of children. Sometimes, however, they may fee] 
indifferent or in a compromising position when the wife is pursuing a 
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career outside the house. Wives, on the other hand, differed with re-
spect to differences of education and occupational prestige and skill. 
Generally speaking, employed wives are found to be much more efficient in 
terms of general planning and fertility planning. Also, they are more 
concerned with trying to insure a compatible life style for themselves 
and their family. 
Slight associations between socio-economic status arid measures of 
fertility were reported by Westoff et al. (1961). They interpreted 
small, unsystematic economic differences as further evidence of the nar-
rowing of the traditional dif ':erences (i.e., the increased fertility of 
higher economic status and th·~ decl Lning fertility of lower classes). 
Similar findings were reported by Fteedman (1963), Whelpton and Kiser 
(1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 194 7, 1948), and Campbell (1967). 
The third hypothesis (education) is found to be negatively asso-
ciated with fertility for the husbands and much more stronger negative 
associations for the wives. Westoff et al. (1961) found a low positive 
correlation with regard to fertility planning success only for the 
Protestants and Jews and inverse relationship for the Catholics. Family 
size preference for the Westoff et al. findings were positive for Jews 
and Catholics. This finding prompted Westoff and his research colleagues 
to conduct an analysis of church related education. Their analysis 
showed that Catholics with the highest education and the most education · 
in religious schools exhibit the least tendency to plan fertility and ex-
press desires for an average of more than five children. These relation-
ships were examined for the Catholics whose education was secular; the 
same types of associations exist as they do among non-Catholics (Westoff 
et al., 1961). The findings in this study with respect to educational 
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influence on fertility are also support~d by many other Middle Eastern 
researcher's findings (Yaukey, 1961; Protho, 1974; Behar, 1975; Hill, 
1978; Mynitti, 1978). 
The fourth hypothesis (high aspirations for social mobility) is 
found to have a negative association with respect to fertility, espe-
cially if they have to sacrifice the children's school standards and the 
general living standards~ A consistently negative association between 
mobility and fertility was reported by Westoff et al. (1961). 
Hypothesis 5 (age at marriage) seems to indicate that females mar-
ried young have a larger number of children. This hypothesis cannot be 
examined due to the fact that the number of females who can be considered 
as ones who completed their family size is extremely small. Therefore, 
this hypothesis was not statistically tested. The findings in the 
literature indicate that age at marriage has a very important influence 
with regard to fertility (Davis and Blake, 1955, 1956; Petersen, 1960; 
West off et al., 1961; Rindfuss and Bumpass·, 1980). 
With respect to hypothesis 6, the rigidity of roles, as it is exam-
ined by wife's marital adjustment and her perceived pattern of dominance, 
are found to associate positively with the la~ge family size. Other 
familial factors that are. tested include "liking for children" and "the 
pattern of help available to wives." Wives who indicated a high degree 
of enjoyment being .around or with children are found to associate favor-
ably with large family size, as well as large number of children they. 
considered ideal. Other research findings have failed to uncover sub-
stantive important correlations between fertility variables and the nature 
of social relationships within the family. Social and personal orienta-
tions of wives and husbands toward their marriage and children does 
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affect fertility. However, the measured variables were found to have 
minor association (Westoff et al., 1961). 
Conclusions 
Many noted authors have written about the Arabs (Dickson, 1959; 
Goode, 1963; Berger, 1964; Kirk, 1967). Scholars have been largely con-
cerned with the reflective ideas of the philosophers, theologians, and 
moralists and very little with what went on in the minds of the individ-
uals. To use such writings alone as a means of understanding the influ-
ence of religion on various sectors of life would be invalid, since the 
teachings of the theologians finally filter through to the level of the 
individual after much ''diffraction. and diffusion." El-Hamamsey (1972) 
contends that the concepts of "little traditions" and "great traditions" 
which Redfield (1958) uses to describe the relationship between peasant 
children and that of the larger society of which it is a subordinate 
part is useful in describing the relationship between Islamic theology 
and the ordinary individual's belief systems. According to Redfield: 
In a civilization there is a great tradition of the reflective 
few, and there is a little tradition of the largely unreflec-
tive many. The great tradition is cultivated in schools or 
temples; the little tradition works itself out and keeps it-
self going in the lives of the unlettered in their village com-
munities. The tradition. of the philosopher, theologian, and 
literary man is a tradition consciously cultivated and handed 
down; that of the little people is for the most part taken for 
granted and not submitted to much scrutiny or considered re~ 
finement and improvement (p. 70). 
In accordance with this concept, then, the relationship between 
Moslem's religious beliefs and population planning needs to be studied, 
not only through an analysis of Islamic theology and doctrine, but also 
through an investigation of the living religion and "the little tradi-
tion," particularly those aspects of it that relate to the procreational 
behavior of individuals and families. 
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El-Hamamsy indicates that Islam must be viewed (as any religious 
system must be viewed) as a religion that interacts with, affects, and is 
affected by the conditions and circumstances of teh life of a group. A 
"fatalistic," family-oriented person who prays and fasts and has absolute 
faith in God as the creator and provider of all things is a Moselm. So 
is an ambitious professional urbanite who also prays and fasts and has 
absolute faith in God. They may have very different world views and dif-
ferent interpretations of Islamic belief, but they both conceive them-
selves among the faithful. 
What a specific Moslem society consciously or unconsciously selects 
to emphasize and interpret from the various possible strands of Islamic 
doctrine and thought depends largely on the life circumstances of the 
societal members. The selected strands, once incorporated into the total 
fabric of belief, will reinforce and give powerful sanction to individual 
behavior patterns compatible with them (El-Hamamsey, 1970). 
The primary sources upon which any interpretation of Islamic law is 
based are Koran and the Hadith, or prophetic tradition. When no definite 
directive exists in either the Koran or Hadith, Islamic jurists have had 
recourse to Ijtihad, which is the exercise of the faculty of reason for 
the formulating of an opinion. Clearly, the use of Ijtihad opens the way 
for a number of interpretations. Madkour (1965) made a thorough survey 
of Islamic pronouncements on the subject of family planning and the 
practices of birth and arrives at the following conclusion: 
There has been no Koranic text or definitive statement in the 
Hadith that constitutes proof or evidence (on which to base a 
precise opinion). There have been only individual reports 
which were somewhat contradictory and the scholars have come 
out with different opinions (p. 26). 
He affirms that the majority of the Moslem jurists have declared the 
use of contraceptives to be lawful, and only a few scholars have come out 
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against it. All four orthodox schools of Islamic law have allowed the 
practice of coitus Jnterruptus, the method of contraception known to them. 
For example, the Maliki and Hambali schools have stated that the consent 
of the wife is a basic condition fdr such practice. More recently, the 
muftis of different nations have made official pronouncements (or 
"fatwas") on the subject of birth control. The fatwas express differing 
opinions; some are unqualified in their support of family planning, 
others are conditionally so. One main condition by most is the need for 
consent of the wife. Another condition advanced by the Mufti of Malaysia 
is that contraception merely for the sake of preserving the beauty of the 
figure, or as a means of escape from the responsibility of bringing up 
children, is unanimously judged to be "haram" or forbidden. Most Muftis 
oppose sterilization, but those who discuss abortion state that it is 
permissible up to four months of·pregnancy, on the grounds that the fetus 
is not a human being with a soul until then. The Egypt ian fa twa declared 
that abortion is allowed only if the life of the mother is in danger. 
A study of the opinion given by the Grand Mufti of Jordan, reported 
in the population council's collection of materials relating to Muslem 
attitude and family planning, is revealing in that it shows the kind of 
reasoning and the indirect evidence used to reach a conclusion favorable 
to family planning. The fatwa emphasizes that the general viewpoint of 
Islamic law is that the law must accommodate itself to nature and human 
conditions. The argument for family planning starts with the postulate 
that one of the natural things inherent in human beings is marriage, the 
purpose of which is procreation and perpetuation of the species. The 
fatwa presents the supporting evidence from the Koran in the following 
terms: God says, "God, too, has given you wives from among yourselves and 
has given you sons and grandsons from your wives, and supplied you with 
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good things" (Al-Qalgili, 1967, p. 3). Marriage has been one of the 
Islamic religious ways and procreation one of its desirable aims. Even 
the law giver views multiplicity with favor forit.implies power, 'influ-
ence and vulnerability. This is why in one of the traditions of the 
prophet, marriage with an affectionate prolific woman is urged. The 
tradition says: "Marry the affectionate prolific woman, for I shall be 
proud of you among the nations" (Al-Qalgili, 1967, p. 3). 
But the Grand Mufti argues further, God made marriage conditional 
upon the ability of the man to provide adequately for the children. "And 
let those who do not find a match," says the Koran, "live in continence 
until God makes them free from want out of his bounty" (Al-Qalgili, 1967, 
p. 3). He goes on to quote the Hadith: "O young men, whoever of you is 
capable financially let him marry, and whoever is not capable let him 
fast, for fasting dispels desire" (p. 3). Then the Mufti concludes: 
The definite influence is that 'restriction of procreation' is 
legal a fortiori, because to stop procreation altogether is 
tnore than to limit it. It is a cause for much wonder that 
those who urge celibacy should at the same time hesitate to 
allow family planning (Al-Qalgili, 196 7, p. 3). 
The Mufti also refers to the traditions that contain references to 
the practice of coitus interruptus during the lifetime of the prophet, 
which he knew of and did not prohibit. One of the incidents most often 
referred to from the tradition, in support of birth control, is the 
following: 
A man said to the.prophet: 'I hate ayoung wife, I hate that 
she be pregnant, and I want what men want; but it is claimed 
that coitus interruptus is a minor infanticide. 1 The prophet 
replied: 'No, if God wishes to create the child, you will not 
be able to diverte Him from that' (Al-Qalgili, 1967, p. 4). 
Although this last statement seems to be a reaffirmation of the supremacy 
of God's will, it is interpreted to mean that a human being should not 
entertain the fear that by using coitus interruptus he would be 
135 
thwarting Cod's w"ill. If coitus interruptus prevents the birth of a 
child to be born, it is only because God also wills it so, and if God 
wishes a ch"ild to be born it will be born. The Grand Mufti concludes 
with the statement: "Accordingly we hereby give our judgement with 
confidence in favor of family planning' (Al-Qalgili, 1967, p. 5). 
Since Moslem theologians have pronounced it lawful, with or with-
out conditions, for a Moslem to practice birth control, what impact 
are these pronouncements expected to have? First of all, a fatwa, or 
a respected Moslem opinion, naturally has much influence among the more 
reflective and pious Moslem's; that is, among those who need to 
reconcile their behavior more consciously with what is acceptable to 
Islam. Even though a Moslem does not have to accept the opinion of the 
Mufti and is entitled to his own interpretation of the true belief, an 
official fatwa does give special weight and authority to the particular 
point of view it endorses. When a fatwa seems to express a liberal 
interpretation of a question, it usually means that educated public is 
already aligned with this interpretation. For a national family planning 
program, the issuance of a fatwa giving religious support and sanction 
to birth control is very important. A government or a private group 
would have real difficulty in a Moslem country if they decided to 
establish a family planning program in direct opposition to a fatwa 
categorically condemning the use of contraception. 
Social scientists are increasingly aware that their contributions 
to understanding of fertility and family planning in developing countries 
during the past 15 years have been much too limited. Hauser (1973), for 
example, indicated that 
• there as yet have been no fertility studies or pro-
grammes designed to restrict fertility . . . which have 
employed a comprehensive sociological approach. On the 
contrary, most fertility investigations of family planning 
programmes in general, while they have made use of some 
elements. of lilociological theory and methOds, have lacked 
an holistic .. ~.ttack either on problems of research or prob-
lems of famiiy planning (p. 306). 
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Rather than concentrating almost all attention on knowledge, attitudes, 
and behavior in regard to fertility, the family context (in which 
decisions are made)· is closely considered. The institutional family is 
in the midst of currents of social change and is faced with new problems 
to solve and with new optio!ls for problem-solving. It is among these 
families that traditional fertility patterns are changing. Because 
behavioral change is a complex affair, it is impossible to pick out any-
one variable (such as fertility) for sociological study or, in the case 
of family planning, for behavioral modifications. One must clearly bear 
in mind the interrelated changes in numerous aspects of behavior that 
accompany change in an area such as ferqlity behavior. It is only 
through a holistic approach to social change that one can play the role 
in both elucidating the determinants and effects of change. This sec-
tion attempts to discuss one factor accompanied by social change which 
contributes a great deal to behavioral modification--formal education. 
Change and the Educational Institution 
The education of members in the society.is very crucial, In the 
research,education is considered the one factor antecedent to all other 
factors--the basis is the socio-economic status v:triable. Education, 
especially in developing countries, is a contributing factor toward 
change or the modification of attitudes toward many aspects of life. 
One major change which presently is in process in developing countries, 
such as Kuwait, is the edu.cation of the mass population. This 
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phenomena was experienced by developed countries such as in the United 
States in the early part of the century. The traditional family is 
similar for the developed and developing countries in many respects. For 
example, the. traditional family was a product of village life, a sub-
sistence economy and a provincial outlook. Marriage was subjected to· 
rigid· conimunity or familial controls. Families selected marriage 
partners for their offspring on the. basis of economic concerns and in 
the interest of strict social control over individual behavior. Romance 
was considered relatively unimportant, children were valued, and privacy 
for intimate relations was virtually impossible due to extended struc-
·\ 
tural type of famfly (Shorter, 1977). 
The advent of industrialization required societal members to take 
upon itself the education of the masses. Soon jobs attracted many young 
people to the cities or to urban centers. Two major changes faced the 
large traditional family. The first major change has happened in the 
realm of education. In a modernizing society, education has been moved 
from family responsibility to society's responsibility. This one partie-
ular·change is major because the transfer of formal education of children 
from family society. One of the most fundamental functions of educatlon 
by the family was solidarity. In other words, children were taught to be 
loyal. The family was the focus of the whole education. In addition to 
that was learning how to .read and write in order to be able to practice 
as well as to be knowledgeable of one's own religion. It is this type 
of socialization that contributes considerably to the gap interms of 
fertility between traditional family and a modern family. Instead, the 
modern family of today is charged with the responsibility of procreation 
and primary socialization. Then, at the age of three or. six, children 
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are sent to public school where they can learn various skills in prepara-
tion for an independent life in an industrial, highly complex modern 
society. Durkheim (1956) has pointed out that the humans are born 
selfish, egotistic, and asocial. Now, instead of the family, the society 
takes upon itself the responsibility of socializing its newcomers to be 
loyal citizens of the state and dutiful to things beyond themselves. 
Taking for granted that each society has central, agreed-upon values 
and beliefs, Durkheim (1961) argued that the chief function of schools is 
moral education. A child who has internalized societal (rather than 
family) values has a powerful system of self control--an internal police 
force. In traditional societies and traditional families, Durkheim 
argued that the family performed the function of instilling this moral 
conscience. With the rise of urbanized industry, the building of the 
moral fiber is done by the society. Therefore, the individual (male and 
female) feels more obligations and loyalty toward the betterment of his 
society. This is created by the efficient planning of one's own life 
in terms of need to achieve the ultimate goals of their ambition whatever 
they may be. 
In a developing society, we find the change much more apparent for 
the females than males. Females, after all. are the ones who dramat-
ically encounter the societal change by entering the field traditionally 
considered only for males. The formal education of the female, unlike 
traditional family education, opens the door for many alternative extra 
and non-familial roles. These changes lead to the establishment of the 
form of family authority structure in which power and decision-making 
are shared equally between spouses--eqalitarian authority structure. 
This type of authority structure may be syncretic, in which all decision 
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making is shared, or autonomic, in which each spouRt~ has separate sph1·rc~s 
of decision makin~. Tht' new type of HOC lal Izat !on of the young ( formul 
education rather than traditional faml ly education) ts a major factor 
contributing to fertility differences. 
The second· major change has been in the realm of family economy. 
The modernizing society provides jobs for everybody. Therefore, members 
of society become more specialized and no longer depend on the family. 
This leads to the segmentation of extended family structure and smaller 
nuclear family units become the prevalent pattern. This change leads to 
weighing the decision made by husband and wife toward many things 
(including having children) in terms of family resources (costs and. 
benefits for wife and husband). Although the concept of resources need 
not refer only to income and wealth, there are also the scarce resources 
of time, energy, and ability to assess logically varying ends and realiz-
ing a solution through the implementation of the most appropriate means. 
People run out of these resources at some point in time. What is 
empirically interesting is the threshold on each and its implications 
for the choice people make. 
In one of his well known essays, Parsons (1959) analyzed the class-
room and argued that the two major functions of the school are socializa-
tion and occupational selection. Since schools reward children on the 
basis of achievement, he argued, they are uniquely suited to the task of 
sifting and sorting individuals according to the physical and intellec-
tual demands of different occupations. Once again, one observes that in 
a modernizing society the major socializing agent is being transformed 
slowly from the family to the society. Therefore, achi.evement rather 
than ascription is emphasized by the individual and demanded by the 
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society. In addition to all the manifested functions (such as cultural 
transmisSion, social integration, social control, training and develop-
ment of workers, and screening and allocation), the educational system 
consists of s~veral hours of child care. This function has important 
implications for the family life as more women seek economic independ-
ence through full-time employment. 
Another latent function of the education and the system of moderniz-
ing society is that it raises the marriage age. The schools not only'are 
students of both sexes socialized into their respective gender, but the 
students are also given a prolonged opportunity to think and choose a 
marriage partner. Indirectly, this prolonged period affects the female's 
fertility; it allows her to develor> certain ambitions and certain 
attitudes toward family size preferences. She now identifies herself 
with other roles in addition to her biological role. In order to fulfill 
all her extrafamilial ambitions with her original role, she finds it 
necessary to reduce the number of children she might have in the future. 
In conclusion, fertility deicsion making is filtered through many 
social-psychological factors, economic factors, societal, governmental, 
and biological factors. The process of decision making becomes much 
more crystallized as the individual's education and awareness are in-
creased. This research reveals how important is modern formal education, 
particularly technical education. One interesting result, based on 
interviews with wives, is the enlarged definition of self concept toward 
family and their participation in society. 
This study shows that the various sociological and psychological 
factors seem to have different associations with regard to women, 
particularly career women, than with men. Homen who are strictly 
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housewives are more accommodating to their husband's desires of whatever 
number of children. The tendency, therefore, is. toward less planning 
with respect to ·the number of children. · As education of the housewife 
increases, although the ideal number of children may be around four or 
six, more control is managed over the actual number of children. These 
wives may indicate the desire for additional children; however, the 
right time must be achieved in order to afford an adequate life for 
their children. If the wives are childless, the justification for not 
havirig children is usually that they are waiting until they establish 
themselves and/or meet their housing needs which seem to be an important 
issue to several of the wives. Wives who are strictly housewives and 
mothers, specifically ones who have little or no education, on the other 
hand, feel much more content with the number of children they have. The 
reason given if they were to consider the use .of contraceptives (tradi-
tional or man-made synthetic contraceptives) is the fact that they are 
over-loaded already and they must resort to some type of fertility con-
trol in order to manage their life a little better. 
Formal education and involvement in extra familial activities out-
side the house for females seem to be highly associated with consequent 
type of fertility decision making based on interviews. It is apparent 
how wives can gain relatively greater access to individualistic benefits 
without necessarily being able to involve husbands. The impasse can be 
resolved, consciously or unconsciously, thrOugh having fewer utilities 
of some sort (children). which then allows wives to have more utilities 
of another sort (greater time which provides occupational access). This 
type of resolution also seems to be moving toward a greater equalitarian-
ism with regard to such a family. 
142 
Limitations and Problems 
ln this tlworetlcnl and emplrlt'nl effort, thl•re lti H FJct of Jlmltn-
tions which were recognized at the outset of this study. The limitation 
of time, the nature of subject matter pursued, plus the conservative 
attitude observed in an Arab society like Kuwait. One of the limita- · 
tions of this study is the "snowball" sampling procedure which is 
utilized. This procedure may have excluded certain groups of individ-
uals. It may have also exaggerated certain biases. Another limitation 
which is fully recognized is the small size of the sample and the 
statistical significance which becomes impossible unless this level is 
raised to say 0.10 rather than 0.05. Doing that may change certain 
conclusions. 
Another limitation has to do with the decision of having unequal 
measurement conducted to wives and husbands. This decision was based on 
the fact that material dealing with knowledge, attitudes, and the 
practice of family·planning are sensitive subjects for people in a 
conservative society such as Kuwait. Generally, wives were shy about 
discussing these subjects. The researcher was aware of the impropriety 
of discussing these sensitive areas with the husband (particularly when 
the researcher happens to be a female). The use of comparable measure-
ment would certainly have been much more useful in terms of comparing 
wives' and husband's responses to the same set of questions, .and may 
have given the researcher same idea about how they perceive their various 
familial and non-famHial roles. However, the comparability of measure-
ment might be possible in the future with more preparation and sufficient 
funds to hire a male interviewer in order to achieve comparability. 
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Another recognized limitation is the use of a structured question-
naire. The inability to manipulate independent variables with regard to 
causal analysis created a limitation. One cannot progressively 
investigate one aspect after another of the independent variable to get 
a closer look at the real causes; also, the statistical device 
utilized--bivariate analysis such as correlation coefficients. The 
limitation here is that it can only show association between independent 
and dependent variables not necessarily a cause and effect. Another 
limitation needed to be mentioned is the fact that the unit of analysis 
·used in this research is the person, not the couple. Had the unit of 
analysis been the couple, different results might have been achieved. 
There is a great confidence in the responses given by wives, although 
sometimes the researcher was perceived as one who was knowledgeable 
about the various contraceptive practices; namely, what they are, how to 
obtain birth control information, and which contraceptlves work better 
or have higher probability of success. Sometimes part of an interview 
session consisted of providing information to respondents as well as 
indicating the importance of conferring with their family physician. 
The need was made to let the respondents know that the researcher is 
·really interested in the information and how much it was important for 
the achievement of this research. Generally speaking, people were 
cooperative in answering the question needed. If in doubt about certain 
responses, checking and rechecking was conducted when it was possible. 
This was done with respect to one respondent and the feeling was that 
information obtained was fairly accurate. 
It was mentioned earlier that qualitative data was being utilized. 
This may have presented a problem with external validity. However, tl1is 
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can be argued on the basis of amount of the in depth information present. 
The researcher's knowledge of the Arab culture, the Kuwaiti environment, 
as well as the Arabic language, and very good understanding of the 
Kuwaiti dialect and accent helped a great deal in communication. There 
is no one method that is free of all errors, but what one tries to do is 
eliminate, as much as possible, methodological bias without affecting the 
quality of the data and conclusions drawn. 
Suggestions and Recommendations for 
Future Research 
The countries in the Arab Near East are currently in the process of 
demographic transition from high to low or moderate mortality and fertil-
ity. As in other places in the world, demographic change appears to be 
related to socio-economic development. In addition, the variables 
traditionally associated with the development of differential fertility 
and decline are important factors in determining population dynamics in 
the Arab Near East. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the 
demographic transition may be moving at a fast pace in this area of the 
world in comparison with the time it took to complete the transition in 
present developed nations (Allman, 1978; Allman and Matheson, 1975). 
The demographic changes in the region have ~ttracted some demog~ 
raphers, statisticians, planners, and policy-makers. llowever, there is 
a need for the social scientists to b~ involved in conducting sociolog-
ical research. Few studies were conducted dealing with family patterns 
and the woman's status in the family framework (Goode, 1963; Vallin, 
1973; Behar, 1975; Duza and Baldwin, 1977; Hill, 1978, Prothro and Diab, 
1974; Khuri, 1970; Mernissi, 1975;Myntti, 1978; VanDusen, 1976). 
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One of the major shortcomings of research on family patterns and 
family planning is the lack of awareness or knowledge of social changes 
in the socio-economic structure. There is a need for much more refined 
cross-cultural sociological research. ·One point that needs to be noted 
is an over-emphasis on values, norms, and belief systems. This approach 
needs to include more attention to empirical indicators of the impact of 
new social institutions, the participation of people in the a.rea in new 
roles, and problems faced in the development of new behavior patterns 
and their impact to others. 
Consideration in developing research on the family, women, and 
population dynamics is very important. In addition to that, there is 
a need to look at problems which are the real concern of people in the 
region. For example, the study of youth and students in the region who 
are uneducated, dropouts, and the rural farm youngster would aid in 
understanding fam·ily problems. Micro studies, such as urban slums, 
suburban communities, and working class and middle class urban commun-
ities, particularly irt provincial· centers of change, aie much needed. 
The most important suggestion centers around the need for a 
longitudinal design where . the respondents are interviewed after marriage 
and repeatedly over a number of years .. Such a procedure has its own 
complications as a result of divorce and remarriage, death, or subsequent 
refusal to be interviewed. One would then be betterable to determine 
the actual degree of significance of the role of the social...,psychological 
factors in determining the movement of wives in and out of the labor 
force, birth intentions, contraceptive efficiency, etc. There is also 
the need to focus on the variable of change and how it interacts with 
present norms. The ability to analyze changes would be especially 
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relevant with individuals from working-class family who has traditional 
orientation as to specific sex roles. Generally speaking, whatever the 
class background, such a study would provide the unique opportunity to. 
research the dynamics of communication process between husband and wife 
and the proce'ss of bargaining between them. This can lead to much more 
valid and reliable sociological information with regard to the interest 
in seeking to understand behaviors that are strongly linked to family 
si.ze as shown in the model in Chapter III. This is one of the benefits 
from having a utility model which allows one to see the scope of possible 
factors that may have an important link with regard to family size. More 
investigations need to be implemented with regard to the husband's re-
wards when he relinquishes his traditional prerogatives in the interest 
of the wife who is seeking her own rewards. 
Another important question for future research would be in the 
area rif socialization. How do employed parents behave with their chil-
dren, how old do their children have to be before the parents begin to 
treat them according to their sex roles, do employed p.arents segregate 
based on sex or do they treat their children (both sexes) equally. This 
type of data is extremely important for it will in turn affect the chil-
dren's future behavior toward family planning and size. 
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Location 
The state of Ku~ait lies on the northwest coast of the Arabian 
Gulf, between latitudes 28°-30°~ and longitudes 46°-48° east. It is 
bounded on the west and north by Iraq, on the east by the Arabian Gulf, 
and on the south by Saudi Arabia. 
The nation of Kuwait is 18,860 square kilometers Lncluding several 
islands. The largest, Bubiyan, is in the northwest part of the Arabian 
Gulf and is uninhabited. To the north of Bubiyan is the small island 
of Warbah. At the mouth of the Bay of Kuwait is the ancient island of 
Failaka, an inhabited island, about 30 kilometers'to the northeast of 
Kuwait. Close to Failaka, are the islands of Muskan and Oha. Three 
small inhabited islands lie further south, Kubbar, Qaro, and Urn Al-
Maradem. In the bay itself, more than one island is found. 
Kuwait has a great influence on the Arabian Gulf; this is mainly 
due to its excellent coastal location.. The geographical location of the 
Gulf itself, made it the gateway to.the civilizations of Mesopotamia and 
Syria and route to India and the Far East. Hence, .it became the 
cultural link between many different civilizations. Kuwait 1 s strategic 
position gave it a dominant influence on the route way leading to those 
civilizations and trading centers. In addition, Kuwait had a cultural 
tradition of its own. The excavations carried on in Failaka indicated 
the existence of civilization founded in these regions more than 4,000 
years ago. 
Furthermore·, Kuwait 1 s position on the Gulf made it a trading center 
for goods imported from the Orient (India, Indo-China, Indonesia, and 
Cylon) on their way westward, passing through the Indian Ocean, the 
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Arnbian Gulf, the EuphrateA, Syria, and the Medltt>rr1tllt'lln to l•:uropl'. 
This is why the population, like all inhnbltnntH of the Gulf, is famous 
for seafaring. They are reputed to have directed Vasco de Gama, in the 
fifteenth century, to the sea route leading through the Indian Ocean. 
This position resulted in the improvement of navigation and build-
ing of large sailing· ships to explore the oceans. The Portugese 
benefitted a great deal from the Kuwaiti's experience and that of the 
Gulf inhabitants. 
Relii:!f and Climate 
The surface of Kuwait consists mainly of flat, sandy plains with 
some low hills. It slopes gradually from the west to the east. These 
plains are covered chiefly with pebbles, gravel, and sand formed by the 
action of the wind. The wind plays a major role in forming the surface 
topology, giving it a general aspect of similarity in its plains and 
light waves of sand. In many places, especially to the south, one finds 
dome shaped hills suitable for oil accumulations. They are emphasized 
as small islands protruding from a sea of sand. Generally, they are 
formed of sandstone and other sedimentary rocks, as is the case in the 
regions of Warah and Burgan. 
Among the significant landmarks, is Mount Qudai to the north of 
Kuwait Bay. It consists mainly of hills of sedimentary rocks extending 
to the northwest of the village of Jahra. Running almost parallel to 
these are the hills of Liah. In between are the hills of Kerah Al-Maru, 
full of pebbles and gravel of various sizes and colors. In the west 
lies the desert area of Dibdiba, where the plant "Hamd" is abundant. 
This.plant is very good for camel grazing during the summer. Many 
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valleys and shallow depressions are found in Kuwait. The most important 
valley is the Batin Valley, and to its east lie ranges of hills dissected 
by dry valley. The region is known as Esh-Shegaya. 
The climatological area of Kuwait is considered a transitory region 
between the desert climate and that of the Mediterranean. This climate 
is characterized by two main seasons: a long hot, dry summer and a 
short, warm winter with a limited amount of rain. The wind blows all 
the year around from set directions according to the season.. The tem-
perature may rise up to 50°C in the summer, and in the winter it may 
drop to 0°C at night and l5°C during the day. The average rate of 
humidity during the summer is 27 percent. This occurs when the country 
is subject to dry north and northwest winds. The humidity sometimes 
reaches 95 to 100 percent when the southeast winds are blowing. The 
average rate of humidity in winter is 70 percent. 
One must note that a high humidity when accompaniE·d by a high tem-
perature causes the air to be heavy and stifling, which results in a 
great deal of perspiration and may lead to a lot of discomfort. 
Historical Notes 
Ancient History 
Kuwait lies on the northwestern side of the Arabian Gulf, an outlet 
to Ancient Mesopotamia which has been, and still is, an important sea 
route connecting the ancient civilizations of the Near East in Iraq, 
Syria, Turkey, and Egypt with those of the southeastern part of Asia in 
India and China. An ancient civilization must, therefore, have existed 
in Kuwait, and this was indeed confirmed by the excavations made by the 
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Danish archeological expeditions which were begun in 1958 on the island 
of Failaka. In 1964, the Museums Department of the Ministry of Educa-
tion published a report summarizing these excavations :md featuring some 
93 of the relics found on Failaka. 
Some historians claim that the Gulf was the passage through which 
the Sumrnerians penetrated to the lower part of Mesopotamia, where they 
established their civilization around 2500 B.C., but there tended to be 
a continuous migration overland from the interior of the Arabian 
Peninsula to the north along the Gulf Coast. Hence, it was thought that 
the first phoenicians settled on its shores before leaving for those on 
the Mediterranean. They founded the civilization of Dilmun, whose 
center was the island of Bahrain and the island of Failaka. The numerous 
ruins found in the excavated areas of those islands support this claim, 
since the inscriptions and works of art are different from those of the 
Summerians, albiet related in style. 
Alexander the Great is said to have sent his fleet through the Gulf 
in 326 B.C. to explore the sea route between the Indus Valley and that of 
the Tigris and Euphrates. This resulted in a Greek settlement on Failaka 
to which a memorial stone inscribed with thanksgiving prayer to Zeus, 
together with remains of many pillars and statues. 
Kuwait and Its Place in the Medieval Period 
With the advent of prophet Mohammed, Islam became widespread among 
the Arabs and dominant in the Arabians peninsula. In the Lunar year 12 
(633 A.D.), the Caliphate Abu Bakr Al-Sedeek had his first encounter 
with the Persians on the Gulf Coast at Kadhema "That As-Salassel," which 
resulted in their retreat. The Gulf route was used by the Caliphate Ornar 
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Ibn Alkhatab to conquer Persia. During the Omayad this part of the world 
was very important for they made it the most important trade route. 
Trade flourished even further in this area during the Abbaceet rule, 
especially after the founding of Baghdad. The Arab tribes have traveled 
to the northwestern part of the Gulf all through the Islamic era and it 
appears that the area of Kadbema was continuously mentioned in poetry. 
Furthermore, it was frequently referred to in "Yakout's Me'jam Al-
Buldan." Those Arab tribes used to settle in this region during the 
winter and spring seasons for it was on the route to the south of Iraq. 
Kuwait and Its Modern History 
Authorities refer to the region of Kuwait in general since Kuwait 
City came into existence 300 years ago. The Coast of Kuwait, known as 
Qurain during the Portugese days, was probably given this name by the 
Portugese as it is assumed that they had reached the Island of Failaka 
and built a fortress on the island located in the Bay, opposite the 
present Port of Shuwaikh. 
The word Kuwait is a diminutive of Kut, which is a common, well-
known word in Iraq, Najd, and some other Arabic countries. It denotes a 
residence built on a height, such as a citadel or a fortress. It was 
named after a small fortress which, it is assumed, has been built by 
Mohammed Ibn Uria-er, the chief of Bani Khalid, to be used as a store 
house for food, ammunitions, and other supplies. One cannot definitely 
ascertain the data of its establishment through lack of historical 
evidence, but some historians state that moderk Kuwait was built during 
the mid-seventeenth century, arou~d the above mentioned Kut. It started 
as a small village inhabited by nomads, fisherman, and spme tribes 
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related to Bani Drai-er, and did not become famous until some important 
houses such as the Al-Sabah, Al-Khalifah, Al-Jalahimah, and Al Ma'awidah 
migrated from Najd and settled there. 
The first two built stone houses were Al-Sabah's, who resided in 
Kuwait. In short, Kuwait was not owned by people different from those 
who built it, and probably it was known by its present name "Kuwait" 
only in the mid-seventeenth century, since it was ruled by Al-Sabah. 
The Sabah House 
The Sabah House is of the Unaizah tribe, which was among the larg-
est and most important of Najd's. The Arab geographer, Al-Hamadani, 
stated in one of his scripts that the tribe has existed in Najd since 
the tenth century A.D. 
The Unaizah tribes consisted of main branches and sub-branches. 
One such sub-branch is the J amilah, which spread its influence over the 
Aflaj in Najd. It was from the Jamilah that tribes of Atoub, Al-Sabah, 
and Al-Khalifa descended. 
Historians indicate that the Al-Sabah and Al-Khalifa migrated from 
Najd about 1710 A.D. because of tribal wars and severe famine. After 
the Al-Sabah settled in Kuwait, its population grew -and was able to 
cooperate with others to shun a common emeny, Bani Khalid, who dominated 
the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. 
The first European to visit the area was a Danish tourist, Carsten 
Nieibuhr, who visited Kuwait in 1765. He stated that Kuwait was a 
prosperous commercial city. 
In 1776, many people from Basra, a region in the southern part of 
Iraq, migrated to Kuwait to escape the Persians who had conquered Basra 
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that year. During the Persian occupation of Basra (1776-1779), the 
city'~ trade with Baghdad, Aleppo, Izmir, and Astana was transferred to 
Kuwait, thus strengthening its commerical ties with the Arabian ports, 
and increasing its prosperity. Kuwait was visited by many western 
explorers, such as the English travelers Stokler and William Palgrave, 
who described it as the most active port on the Gulf. 
Pearling was very important for Kuwait, as this wns the main income 
.for the people before oil was discovered. ·Many businesses were estab-
lished such as trade, hardware, jewelry, building, and construction. 
The most important among these businesses was shipbuilding. Wood was 
imported from India and used for various types and sizPs of sailing 
boats, the most famous of which are those used for pearling, passengers, 
cargo, and seafaring. With the discovery of oil, Kuwait began its 
modern development. 
In 1899, Kuwait signed a treaty with England due to Turkish designs 
over that part of the world.. The treaty established Kuwait as a protec-
torate of England (i.e., the main purpose was to protect Kuwait from any 
foreign designs over Kuwait without any interventiors jn Kuwait's 
authority at home or its sovereignity. 
The treaty was annulled on June 19, 1961, and Kuwait acquired full 
independence. On July 16, 1961, Kuwait became an active member of the 
Arab nations' family. On May 14, 1963, Kuwait joined the United Nations. 
It also joined numerous international organizations emanating from the 
U.N., such as: World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, UNESCO, International Labor Organization, and the World Bank. 
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Wives' Interview Schedule 
Answers to these questions are kept confidential except for research 
purposes. 
1. Age: 
(1) Husband 
(2) Wife 
2. Religion: 
Sect 
3. Nationality 
4. Name of the area of residence 
5. Number of brothers 
6. Number of sisters 
7. What is your educational level? 
(1) No education 
(2) Read and write (no formal education) 
(3) Elementary and junior high school 
Number of years completed 
----(4) High school 
Number of; years completed 
-----
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(5) Institute higher than high school but less than university 
Number of years completed 
-----(6) University 
Number. of years completed _____ _ 
(7) Higher education 
Diplomas ____ __ 
Masters _____ _ 
Ph.D. 
-------
8. What is your occupation? 
------------------------
9. Are you content with the level of education you achieved? 
(1) Yes 
(2) I want a higher degree 
(3) I need some type of training 
(4) I want more education but do not have tht~ time 
(5) I want more education but do not have the money 
(6) If you have another reason, please state clearly 
10. How many children do you have? 
(1) Total 
(2) Boys 
(3) Girls 
] .69 
11. ln ~enernl. do you mak(• p I1111H In ndvnnce or do yn•1 net on t:hc.• Hpll r 
n f t hC' momt.•n l '( 
12. If you do not have chlldren now, how many would yqu ll.ke to have? 
(1) Total 
(2) Boys 
(3) Girls 
13. If you have children now, how many more would you like to have? 
(1) Total 
(2) Boys 
(3) Girls 
14. In your opinion, what is the ideal number of children? ------
15. How many years have you been married? 
------
16. What type of residence do you live in? 
(1) Single-family house--upper class 
(2) Separate floor in a single-family house 
(3) Apartment 
(4) A room in an apartment house or a single family house 
(5) Limited-income housing 
(6) Middle-income housing 
(7) Temporary wooden structures 
(8) Tent 
17. Do you own the place of residence? 
(1) Yes 
{2) No 
18. If you own the place of residence, how much did you invest in your 
house (approximate price)? · 
-----------
19. If you rent, how much rent do you pay per month? 
20. Where were you born? 
· {1) In the cou·ntry 
(2) In a small town 
{3) In the city 
21. Do you believe that children are reason to prevent divorce? 
(1) Yes 
-·-
(2) No 
22. Did you ever think that you had enough children? 
{1) Yes 
(2) No 
23. Did you do anything to prevent pregnancy? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
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24. When you thought about doing something to prevent pregnancy, after. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
which pregnancy? What technique did 
you use? 
-----------------------
If you did not do anything to prevertt prognnncy, ,,lease explain 
why not.· 
~--
Was there anyone who made you. think that you already had enough 
children? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
If answer to the previous question is "yes" specify relation to 
you What is his/her age? 
-------What is his/her occupation? -----------~--------~------~-
Do you have any relatives living with you? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
If yes, specify the number and the relation to you, age, and 
occupation. 
Religiousness 
30. If you have the opportunity, which would you rather teach? 
(1) English language 
(2) Arabic language 
(3) Religion 
31. Would you like to be a missionary? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
32. Whom would you rather have been? 
(1) Playwright 
(2) Social and religious writer 
33. How religious-minded would you say you are? 
(1) Very 
(2) More than average 
'(3) Average 
(4) Less than average 
(5) Not at all 
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34. To what extent is religion included in the home activities of your 
family? For example, family prayers, reading the Quran or other 
religious materials, saying grace at meals, and so forth. 
(1) A great deal 
· (2) More than average 
(3) Average 
(4) A little 
(5) Not at all 
35~ }:lave·you ever gone to see a religious person for advice or help on 
family or personal matters since you've been marrled? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
36. Which spouse \'lould you prefer? 
(1) Deeply religious 
== (2) Good provider 
37. . Would you prefer to read a story: 
(1) Religious 
(2) Social 
(3) Non-fiction 
(4) Romantic 
(5) Police 
(6) Other type 
Achievement of Life Goals 
38. We all have our own picture of the kind of life we would really 
like to lead and the things we would really like to do in life. 
Whatever your picture, how much do you feel that you are reaching. 
it? 
(1) Very much 
(2) Much 
(3) Little 
(4) Very little 
39. What do you think the chapces are of living the kind of life you'd 
like to have? 
(1) Very good 
(2) Good 
(3) Fair 
(4) Not too good 
(5) Don't know 
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40. Some people feel they can make pretty definite plans for their 
lives for the next few years, while others feel they are not in a 
position to plan ahead. How about you? Do you feel you're able 
to plan ahead or not? 
(1) Yes, able to plan uhend 
(2) Depends 
(3) No, unable to plan ahead 
41. Do you feel you now know and can look forward to the kind of life 
you will have 10 years from now? 
(1) Yes 
(2) Depends 
(3) No 
(4) Don't know 
Satifaction with Husband's Work 
42. In general, how well satisfied are you with your husband's present 
job or work? 
(1) Completely satisfied 
(2) Very satisfied 
(3) Fairly satisfied 
(4) Dissatisfied 
43. More wives are more satisifed with somethings about their husband's 
job than they are with others. How satisfied are you, for example, 
with the steadiness of his work? 
(1) Completely satisfied 
(2) V~ry satisfied 
(3) Fairly satisfied 
(4) Dissatisfied 
44. How do you feel about his hours and working conditions? 
(1) Completely satisfied 
(2) Very satisfied 
(3) Fairly satisfied 
(4) Dissatisfied 
45. ·How do you feel about his chances to get ahead in his work? 
____ (1) Completely satisfied 
(2) Very satisfied 
(3) Fairly satisfied 
(4) Dissatisfied 
46. Finally, how satisfied are you with your husbandis income? 
(1) Completely satisfied 
(2) Very satisfied 
(3) Fairly satisfied 
(4) Dissatisfied 
. ' 
Feeling of Economic_Security 
47. All i11 all, what kind of breaks do you feel you and your husband 
are lwving f inancJall y? 
(1) Very good 
(2) Good 
(3) Fair 
(4) Not too good 
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48. Are there times whert you feel you have to deny yourself many of tile 
extras you want because of your income? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
49. Suppose you ran 
.your income and 
( 1) Yes 
(2) Depends 
(3) No 
into an unexpected heavy expense. Do you feel that 
savings are· enough to handle it? 
50. In general, how would you describe your present financial situation? 
(1) Very good 
(2) Good 
(3) Fair 
(4) Not too good 
51. Are you ever faced with the possibility of your husband getting a 
large cut in income or being out of work for several months? 
(1) Yes 
(2) Probably 
(3) No 
52. On the. whole, what would you say your financial future looks like'~ 
(1) Very good 
(2) Good 
(3) Fair 
(4) Not too good 
Drive to Get Ahead 
People feel differently about the importance of getting ahead in life. 
Some people would give up a· lot in order to get ahead, while other 
people would feel that other things are more important and would not b(· 
willing to give them up. Please try to answer each.of these questions 
either "yes 11 or 11no. 11 
53. For example, if 
strange part of 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
0) Don't 
getting ahead ~eant th~t you had to move to a 
the country, would you be willing to move? 
know 
] 74 
54. Would you be willing to entertain people because they were 
connected with your husband's work, even though you might not like 
them? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don 1 t know 
55. Would you be willing to leave your friends? 
(1) Yes 
·(2) No 
(3) Don' t know 
56. In order to get ahead, would you be willing to become more active 
in community organizations and clubs not of your own choice? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
57. Would you be willing to leave your close .relatives? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don' t know 
58. Would you be willing to postpone having another child? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
59. Would you be willing to keep quiet about your views in order to get 
ahead? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
60. Would you be willing to live temporarily in less desirable housing? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
61. If getting ahead meant that you would see less of your husband 
because he would spend more time at work, would you be willing to 
do this? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
62. Finally, if getting ahead meant you might have to send your chil-
dren to another school not quite as good, would you be willing? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don 't know 
Aspiration for Children's College Educati<ln 
63. Do you expect to r·wnd your C'hlhlren to colll•p,e'l 
(1) Yes 
(2) Depends on children 
(3) Hope to; like to 
(4) Expect or like to sons but not daughters 
(S) If can afford; depends on finances 
(6) Don't know; haven't thought about it 
(7) No 
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64. How do you expect this college education to be paid for? Specific 
steps already taken or in process (includes investment and educa-
tional annuity programs). 
(1) Specific steps planned but not yet taken 
(2) Specific.provision in existence but without explicit 
indication of educational purposes (includes savings, 
insurance, income) 
(3) Hopes; vague plans 
(4) Don't know; haven't thought about it 
65. Would you send a daughter of yours to college even if it meant 
serious financial hardship? 
(1) Yes 
(2) Depends or don't know 
(3) No 
66. Would you send a son of yours to college even if it meant serious 
financial hardship? 
(1) Yes 
(2) Depends or don't know 
(3) No 
Marital Adjustment 
67~ How often do you and your husband have different opinions about the 
best way to raise or handle the children? 
(1) Often 
(2) Sometimes 
(3) Once in a while 
(4) Hardly ever (never) 
68. In general, compared to most couples you know, how well do you and 
your husband get along with each other? 
(1) Much better 
(2) Somewhat better 
(3) About the same 
(4) Not as well as most 
69. Have you ever wished you were not married? 
(1) Fairly often 
(2) Occasionally 
(3) Once or twice 
(4) Never 
70. Everything considered, how happy is your marriage? 
(1) Extremely happy 
(2) Happier than average 
(3) Average 
(4) Not too happy 
Liking for Children 
71. Compared to other things you like to do that are not mainly con-
nected with children, how much do you like to read or talk to 
children? 
(1) Less than most 
(2) About the same as most 
(3) Somewhat more than most 
(4) Much more than most 
72.. Again, compared to other things you like to do, how much do you 
like looking at pictures of children in magazines or newspapers? 
(1) Less than most 
(2) About the same as most 
(3) Somewhat more than most 
(4) Much more than most 
73. How much do you like showing children new places to go and new 
things to do? 
(1) Less than most 
(2) About the same as most 
(3) Somewhat more than most 
(4) Much more than most 
74. How much do you like seeing movies or plays about children, or 
reading stories about them? 
(1) Less than most 
(2) About the same as most 
(3) Somewhat more than most 
{4) Much more than most 
75. Compared to other chores, like housekeeping work and things like 
that, how much do you mind straightening up after children? 
(1) Less ·than most 
(2) About the same as most 
(3) Somewhat more than most 
{4) Much more than most 
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76. All in all, in comparison to your other interests, how interested 
are you in spending time with children? 
{1) Less than most 
{2) About the same as most 
(3) Somewhat more than most 
(4) Much more than most 
Dominance ~atterns 
77. In some families the father makes the main decisions about the 
children, in others he leaves it to the mother. When it's about 
the children, who has the most say in your family, you or your 
husband? 
(1) I have most say 
(2) Both 50/50 
(3) Husband has most say 
(4) Don't know 
78. Which of you has the most say about other things not mainly con-
nected with the children? 
(1) I have most say 
(2) Both 50/50 
{3) Husband has most say 
(4) Don't know 
79. Who has the most say about friends you see most often? 
{1) I have most say 
(2) Both 50/50 
(3) Husband has most say 
(4) Don't know 
80. Who has the most say about what you do together for recreation? 
--
(1) I have most say 
(2) Both 50/50 
(3) Husband has most say 
(4) Don't know 
81. Which of you has the most say about how to spenq the family 
income? 
{1) I have most say 
(2) Both 50/50 
(3) Husband has most say 
(4) Don't know 
Patterns of Help Available to Wives 
82. How often can you count on someone to take care of the children? 
(1) Almost anytime 
(2) Usually 
(3) Only some of the time 
(4) Hardly ever 
83. How often can you count on your husband to take care of the 
children? 
(1) Almost anytime 
(2) Usually 
(3) Only some of the time 
(4) Hardly ever 
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84. How often can you count on someone other than your husband to help 
around the house? 
(1) Almost anytime 
(2) Usually 
(3) Only s·ome of the time 
(4) Hardly ever 
85. On the whole, do you feel satisfied with the amount of freedom you 
have away from the children? 
(1) Almost anytime 
(2) Usually 
(3) Only some of the ti.me 
(4) Hardly ever· 
Husbands' Interview Schedule 
Answers to these questions are kept confidential except for research 
purposes. 
1. Age: 
(1) Wife._-:-----
(2) Husband 
-----
2. Religion: 
Sect 
----------------------------
3. Nationality ___________ ~--------
4. Name of the area of residence 
---~-----------------
5. Number of brothers 
--------
6. Number of sisters 
~--------
7. What is your educational level? 
(1) No education 
(2) Read and write (no formal education) 
(3) Elementary and junior high.school 
Number of years completed 
(4) High school · -----
Number of years completed 
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--:-----:--..,-(5) Institute higher than high school but less than university 
Number of years completed 
-----(6) University 
Number of years completed 
-----(7) Higher education 
Diplomas _____ _ 
Masters 
-------Ph.D·~--------
8. What is your occupation? -------------------------------------
Husband's Level of Status Satisfaction 
9. I would be satisfied if a son of mine, when he reaches my age, is 
in the kind of work that I am now in. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
10. I would be satisfied if my children receive the same amount of 
education as I have .. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
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11. I am pretty well satisfied with the chances for getting ahead in my 
present work. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
12. I would be satisfied if my children, when they reach my age, have 
the same income and live the same way as I. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
Commitment to Work 
13. I would much rather realx around the house all day than go to work. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
14. My work is more satisfying to me than the time I spend around the 
house. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
---(3) Yes 
15. If. I inherited so much money that I didn't have to work, I would 
still work at the same thing I am doing now. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
16. More than almost anything else, it is work that makes life worth-
while. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
17. Some of my main interests and pleasures in life are connected with 
my work. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
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18. I have sometimes regretted going into the kind of work I am now in. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
19. The work I do is one of the most satisfying part of my life. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
20. I enjoy my spare-time activities much more than my work. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes· 
21. To my; my work is just a way of making money. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
{3) Yes 
Feelings of Economic Security 
22. I feel that my wife and I have had very good financial breaks since 
we have been married. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
23. It is extremely important to me to have a higher income. 
· {1) No 
---
{2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
24. I feel th.it my present financial situation is very good. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
25. On the whole, my financial future looks very good. 
{1) No 
(2) Perhaps 
(3) Yes 
26. There are times when I have to deny myself and my family things we 
would like because of our income. 
(1) No 
{2) Sometimes 
(3) Yes 
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27. I worry about the possibility of a large cut in income or being out 
of work for a while. 
(1) No 
(2) Sometimes 
(3) Yes 
28. In my present financial situation, I have to worry about bills or 
debts. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
Drive to Get Ahead 
Men feel differently about the importance of getting ahead in work and 
in life generally. Some men would give up a lot in order to get ahead 
while other men would feel that other things are.more important and would 
not be willing to give them up. 
29. For example, if getting ahead meant that you would have to go with-
out any vacation for several years, would you be willing to do 
this? 
(1) No 
(2) Perhaps 
(3) Yes 
30. Would you be willing to leave your friends in order to get ahead? 
(1) No. 
(2) Yes 
31. If getting ahead meant that you would have to live in an undesir-
able neighborhood temporarily, would you be willing? 
(1) No . 
(2) Yes 
32 .. Would you be willing to give up your leisure time in order to get 
ahead? 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
33. To get ahead, would you be willing to move your family to a strange 
part of the country? 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
34. Would you be willing to postpone having another child in order to 
get ahead? 
(1) No 
== (2) Yes 
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35. Would you be willing to do less interesting or less enjoyable work 
in order to get ahead? 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
36. If it meant not seeing your wife and children as much as you would 
like, would you be willing? 
(I) No 
== (2) Yes 
37. Would you be willing to take some risk to your h~alth in order to 
get ahead? 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
38. Would you be willing to take a chance on a job that you might be 
less certain of holding, if it had better opportunities? 
39. 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
If getting ahead meant.you might have to send your children to 
another school not quite as good, would you be willing? 
(I) No 
(2) Yes 
40. And finally, if getting ahead meant that you would have to keep 
quiet ~bout your religious views, would you be willing? 
(I) No 
(2) Yes 
Importance of Getting Ahead 
41. I feel that the most important thing about work is the chance it 
offers to get ahead. 
(I) No 
(2) Yes 
42. I spend a lot of time thinking about how to improve my chances for 
getting ahead. 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
43. Getting money and material things out of life is very important. 
(1) No 
== (2) Yes 
44. It is important to me to own material things, such as a home, car, 
or clothing, which are at least as good as those of my neighbors 
and friends. 
(1) No 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Yes 
45. I am very anxious to get much further ahead. 
(1) No ::= (2) Yes 
46. Getting ahead is one of the most important things in life to me. 
(!).No 
(2) Yes 
47. It is quite important to me that my children marry persons of at 
least equal social standing. 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
48. The ID(JSt important qualities of a real man are determination and 
ambition. 
(1) No 
(2) Yes 
APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES IN ARABIC 
185 
-.i..--.1 I • 
Wives' Interview Schedule 
-l-
..:.r--'--'----------- --.J I 
~ _;-JI 
.J ( l ) 
(J..rJI ( T) 
A.:. "...WI 
:..:.....JI 
u-S--JI Uh..:...... r-1 
..r-c--5 j._J I 
..) . 71__,.-.> }'I ..)~ 
...:.-L:.'il ..:-I~}' I .J..)..__J. 
-l 
-T 
-r 
-f 
-o 
-1 
Ly...-J I ....:......L:, J ~I t'-( ___,,.._.ul • ._.--'11 "4.____h. ...r'" _ y 
0 
0 
LJI...WI ..:-I~ .J..U X 0 
~~)I 
~i t _, 
. J ~ 
( l ) 
(T) 
(r) 
.I "t.,-i 
186 
..)..U + 0 
0 ~ 
~L. 0 
<U ' _;. L,. 1..5 _,.:. L:. ) J.---..A • ..r 
----------~1~1 
..lJI>W.......J 4.......4 ) .~Ls JA.•..r 
•.::.I.) II ...)~ + 
..::.L.~..) ) &.,-..is. ~ t___;....)...) 
(t) 
( 0) 
0 
( 1) 
(Y) 
~I _,_:--II ...)..).$ + (0 • I ..J_,::-S -o 
0 ..)...._...> .r- ~ ( l ) 
0 -s. r...J l_,J.... ( T) 
~~~ J..U + 0 .h.._,..:;......) ·u-! I ~I (r) 
., .. i '-1..)..01 
~1~1 J..U +0 .u I _,.:. l..,. 1..5 _,.:. L:. ) ..J...cb•..r (!) _,. 
0 'L.... 4 0-" J.-i i ..J 1..5 _,.:. L:. 0-'" ~ I ) ..J...cb•..r (o) 
..:-I _,_:-JI ...)..).$ ... 
0 ( t_.h ..lA.La.....) i..a...L>) ~w JA•..r ( ') 
---~---..::.1~1 ...)..).$ + 
( D •l..)_,..:..SJ D ·. ~L. D ..:..L._rl,.J) ........._u ..:.L>..)..l (Y) 
------ -=..I _,_:-JI J...U + 
0 
C1. 
( l ) 
( T) 
187 
188 
- r -
0 .____ ..l..:.J I .. ..) .l..,.,) (r) 
0 ...:...,j_, ~~ ::J u5-J.J '0.~ ( { ) 
0 J_,.:L:. ~~ ::J ~.J A.>~ (o) 
0 ( .dJ.Aj ~ o..r--0 .J ) ., .r ~ ( 1) 
••• 
I Lib{ ..) j.$. 
-'\ 
---- 0-~' (\) 
__ . __ ..:;,.L_~J ( T ) 
(~L..,. o..r--0 _, ) J.......-JI t..Y -\. 
~------------------------------
_ _;___ ..:;.. L.:..,. ------~ ~ J • . • It ~ 
----.,..- c L.:..,. -----~ 
------ ...::.,. L-:....,. -----
.. 
0 
-f-
tSJj u5- ~ (.)l..,...i) ·.;II ... ~ 6..1>_, (I) 
0 .h.._,..::.....-JI_, -.~_,~1 J>...UI 
0 .)l..,...i ~ JL.o...i..:..~l r L:. J..j..::...- JJ..) (r) 
D ~I 4..1...uL...o oJ~ ~ ~ ·.u..:. ( r) 
_,I ~ 6...i>.....L. _r..sl _,I ·o....;_,s 1.:>'-' uS- (f) 
0 ·;.JL........_,. 
0 ..~_,~, J>...UI tSJj uS- ( 0) 
0 .b...y....JI J>...Lll tSJj uS- ( "\ ) 
0 '-' L.:.> • ~ I _,I _,s..;...:.JI 0-" ..;:..._~ • ..>-" uS- ( y) 
( L....> r . _,i ~ ) _,.....:..JI 0-" ..:.:...,...., 1.:>'-' uS- (A) 
0 
0 
r s . s • u~ .).A -\ y 
......__,._.. r5 -\ A 
I !FI 
D 0~ 
-o-
0 6...,._rLII ~ (q 
0 0~ 0...:..,.,.~ ~ (T) 
iG..,. -l...o "yl..D _,i o__,.,..,..5 0...:..,.,.~ ~ (i) 
0 ~ (l) 
D Jl (T) 
<: 0 L-.5 ill L...Ab i -l ..u ,) "il..r" ...::... _r>-i jA> - TT 
0 ~ (l) 
D Jl (T) 
D 
0 
<; J......>,.JI c.:-J ~ ~ 1.5 I c...L...i jA> - T\" 
~ (l) 
Jl (T) 
____ <;~ t.::.Lo-' 
.Y' L.. 0......:....... • ..r ~ ~ ...::... _p..J L.....;..,..> -" i 
---------------~' ~J 
190 
_,_ 
<.!.! L..Jb J.---..rj J..c-:>-.-l I .~ • ~ 15 I ~ ~ ..::.. ..f5J ~ I ~I -'\' 1 
~.__g L.S ill L..-U:> I ..) ~ ,) '6.,.> L:. v--~ _r. I ..).:>. t 
D 
0 
~ (l) 
::) ( T) 
Lo _ t.::r--~..J ( ~ n t-'.; Jl • _,.....JI 4..,.~1 0 L.S 1 ~~ ) -i.Y 
0 
D 
~I ~ d:.:..J ;4 u-ll> 
~I \~ u- ..Y" Lo 
~\ I~ ~_., ~ Lo 
- ~.) ( ~ TA rJ..; Jl~l A.,..~\ uL.S I ~I) -rc\ 
("-"'..)~ 
--------( ) ) 1""'1....:..... JS 6...,. I_,.., ~ ..;..l 
(i) (T) 
(o) (f) 
(T) (1) 
(o)----(f} ----(i) 
( T) 
191 
- v-
( i) 
(f) 
( 0) 
r; ,- 't ·~ ·· I .:JL.. ·.;_.<It ill ~ .. ··t I ·,1 -"'• ·~...)~ 0 0.~ ...r' ~...;-- ..... 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
D 
D 
0 
0 
-~...) 
~...) ..)! 
.. ~~ a.____,.,. • .. . .:., -~ ()) 
.y 4...iJ (T) .. 
L....- .. 
.. ·...r'..J :; . ··..r' ( i) 
~ (l) 
j (1) 
<;' .· • -< ··. 'I I . . .. 1 ·,I '<" .. 
. l.:r-' ...:r- 0 0 .. 0 • .... ...... -1 1 
ji...)~ A..,...:.L.S ( ' ) 
y L..o..::.>. I ~L.S (1} 
I~ ii...:...,..x:..... ( ' ) 
J~ .... _,..::-...J I 0-0 pi ( 1) 
"----h...~ (i) 
.h.. _,..::-...J I ..:.ro J-j t (f) 
ii_.,.-!L,.. ~.X:.....~ ( 0) 
192 
( t-l' 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
0 
D 
0 
-A-
------ (' L..h.J I J-,..J 0..::. L..iJ I 
I~ _r.?S ( ' ) 
.h...~l 0-- pl ( T) 
.h-__,.::..... (r) 
J 
·' 
I o (f) 
o_,_...JL · ..) .b~ .~ ~JT. ~ ( 0) 
r----:- ( ' ) 
~ ( T) 
_p,.r:-1 ~ (r) 
l 
c;:J.) ,., , ...-..., JA -n 
D ~ J..>..l..,~ 0-n'..l..:-o (' l 
D Lr.:'~ ~ ~ 0..)'"" ..,::. (T) 
A...c...i •• l_r; ,., ' ..... ..., JA 
-rv 
D &...,...:...,....\ (') 
D L-..,J~I (T) 
D a..,.....J I..) ( r) 
D WL.,.> .. it s "- . L...)..; (f) 
0 l.,-.,..J.,.... ( 0) 
D IS..;> I tl;:.l ( i) 
193 
194 
- '\-
~...r-..J ~ ~~ 4~ ..;~ o~ ~~ L:..... J.S -'fA 
I .:.U, 0-" A..,...J I c..J..o..) ..) i ..::..-_:r...:- i L.. J I J-.L Lo..J ~...:...,...... u { 
•_;,.,..,._::-11 
0 I .l.?-~ ( ' ) 
0 ~ :.s (Y) 
0 J..,...li (r) 
D I ..}>- J..,...li (0 
D ·~ Jl ( 0) 
'\~~.r ~I ·.; L,.>..J I · ~ · L JL....::..>':/1 CY u · y:. L.. -n 
D ~~~ ( ' ) 
D ~ (r) 
0 J~ ( r) 
D ~~ (f) 
D w_r! Jl (o) 
, ~ L.,.> J _.·a·· . o I .b~~l ~ o_;...u.....JI ("i-,....U v- L:..J\ ~ -1• 
()-----:;' ~ ....i.,.5 • o ...J ...l-i..o..J I o ~ ('-"> ~ ~ J-1f J1 '-'" L:..J I ~..) 
':~I I ~ ~ 0-o-...J..)..L; JA 'i' o.!l.-..L ~ 
0 ..;..ul ~ ( ' ) 
D ~I ~ ..;..ul Jl (r) 
0 1..5~ ·.;~L-...o ~I -L:.:..> I 1.:.. (r) 
0 . dJj ~ ..)..wi ~ ( \) 
0 . ~~ ~ --'..l-ii Jl (T) 
D . JL,L.S • w--' ~\..) ( \ ) 
0 .h.... .. ~ • w--' (r) 
0 • 6__r-)L,- .. . I . t....,...D..) ~ (r) 
~,_,.)i l!.l_rL ~ • ~'i\ J:u>-:"-:' ..::..1_..;1..) ~ ..::..L.,.._,,r!l 0-" ~ -i'i 
""-------, ....a'\..) ~i J.t-J ~'..) ..r-i y..- 'il ~I 0~_, J..a-.jl ~ 
~ .~ .. ~ ~..).) y\y ~ )l..:....o 
D . JL,L.S • w--' ·~,..) ( \ ) 
0 . 1...\.?- ·~,..) {T) 
D • Lh... _,.::..... • w--' {I) 
D • e__r-Jt_, .. . I . t....,...D..) ~ ( i ) 
D · JL,LS • w--' ~~..J ( q 
0 1 ...\.?- ·~ 1 ..J (T) 
0 · Lh-_,.::...o •w--' (r) 
0 . <i_r-JL,. ~'..) ~ (f) 
195 
-\\-
': 6....L...<: ~ ~.).) 1",.0...::, ~ ..u..,.l..; Lo -io 
0 .)L.LS F L,c..) A.,..DI..; ( \ ) 
0 • I ...\..;>- ~I..; ('I') 
0 \..h...~ • Lb..; (T') 
0 ;; .,;-o--l Le 4........0\ .. .) ~ (0 
0 • .)L. LS F l..D..) .. ., ~..) ( \ ) 
0 .\ ~ A.,..DI..; (T) 
D . • L.h-_,.::..,.. F Lb..; (\") 
0 ;; .,;-o--l Le .. ., . ~..)~ (0 
': W.Lo.JI ~.J.) 'UL> ~ Lo -!V 
D . \...~..;>- ;;~ ( \ ) 
0 .;;~ (T) 
D 4 6 ~ (r) 
D • ;; .,;-o--l L,- 0~ ~ (!} 
F ~)! I ~ Lr" <!L.i.:. 0 Lo ...r-J ~...,.,...;· 0--' ~ ...:;, w .J I ~ J"r'! Jll> -f A 
'\ W.L...JI 'Ul..>.JI ~ 
D 
0 
a 
,.._...:.. ( \ ) 
~ ( T) 
Lo u _,..:. ( r) 
196 
-H-
, IL> ~ ~ d.::-1_;>~ ~ ~~~ 0 f ~~ J.A -f' 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
D 
0 
D 
tJ 
0 
D 
• A...lJ I ..) ...G .)! 'L...) 1 _,.h.o 1 _, ·~ .__; _,__,.6 ..!.. _, ...1.> 
~ ( \) 
Lo Lc_,...:.. (I) 
.)! ( \) 
( \ ) 
(\) 
( \) 
.. - IL.,. .. . 
O.,.r- . 0~ ~ ( ~ ) 
...;$•_,...., ( \ ) 
J~ (l) 
~·~ .)! ( \) 
~~.-......J\ ~ 'WL.o.JI r--s..::...J I_,. 
. ~~ 4~ ( \ ) 
. ;;~ (\) 
. 'iili.....~ ( \) 
• -~~L,- ;;~ ~ ( ~ ) 
~..)...u.:.:. ....i.,.S -or 
197 
-lr-
~ c~~.J l"...u.::...JI ·~t ~~ r-r=-~ ~t.rt...:..JI ~ 
, o L,..>-.J I ~ ._9 .l.y-S (' ...G..::....1J. ~ _,.....:..s..J L,. ~ 0-" \!.1 ~ • J...o--a.-11 
• ·o...,..:.....a..::. LSi ~ Lo l.!.ll...:Jt, ul.,. J'--~1 ~I ~ )I~~ 
0~ ~~ JL..i.::._:,~l ~ ~~ ~ c~I.J ('..u...::..J1 0 LS __,..J -.or 
<; ..J..L--1 L,. ~ _,::. ~ • "':-::' ~ 
0 
D 
D 
~ (l) 
,)1 ( 'I') 
J_r:i ,)1 (r) 
0 t.:5 I j I ~ .J_) ~ ~ L5 ~I t.r L.:,._] L,. J L.i.::..> ~I ~ _,::. ~ -o ~ 
0 
D 
D 
': o...:> G....:...J .w..D.::. ~ o...)J: ~I ~I i..5..:l 1 J-r! I~ 
~ ( \) 
,)1 ( T) 
J_r:l .)1 (r) 
LS ..:l • _y. I ~ u t.:5 I j I • I y . Jll I.!.L G-.o i 0-" ..u..,...J L,. ~ _,.::. ~ -o o 
~~I ~ o.,;,.~.J ~.J_j ('.D.::. u-h 41..lS l-o.J\ ~~ 
198 
0 
0 
0 
-l f-
~ ( l) 
.)1 ( " ) 
J__ri JJ (r) 
·.uiJ c-L.o.L..... ~ ~~ 0i_,. 0-· 1. ii··. J-o> • r~l ~ J..,..o..>JJ -o1 
~l.!lJ.j ~ d::...,....C..) r~ J>~ ~ ~ ~~~ c::JI..o' ..,r 
0 
D 
0 
~ ( l) 
.)1 (T) 
e-9_ri .)1 (i) 
·w w..J I o.!L I jJl, i ~I Jy _,.J.J ~ L,., __,..; i ~ _r...:; 0 i_,. ~ _r J-o> -0 V 
~~I ~I L..-.:-.l L,. 
0 
D 
D 
~ ( \) 
.)1 ( T) 
w_ri Jl (i) 
r...u...::..JI ~ ..±.. _,.:; ~ t..?-1 '-:-'~~~ u---4- • ..,..::- 0 i ~_r J-o> -oA 
~JI_,i ~I ~ 
0 
0 
0 
r--..:.. ( l ) 
.)1 ( T) 
J_r{ .)1 (1) 
I .jl l!l~ t,;ri '-:-'1~1 <.!l..,.iJ • I .l..,-\ 0-" e_L.:..::.....)IL.. ~_r jA -o'\ 
· J " • 11 ~ ..±.. ..).) I"~ ..:ro ~ c L.:....::..... ~ I I .:.U. 0 LS 
199 
0 
0 
D 
- \o-
~ (l) 
Jl ( ,. ) 
w_yi Jl (i) 
~ L.:.J• y ....JI_,.::--o 0-" Jji w5- ·~1 ~ ul.,. ~_r. ~ -1• 
~l!h.J..) ~ 
D 
0 
0 
~ (') 
Jl ( \') 
.._;_yi Jl (i) 
I~ I~ t...::....t_, ~L.i:U ~I 1.5Y y. l!h.J..) (~J ('~ 0 LS I .JI -1\ 
'i'dJ~ ~..r ~·~ 
D 
0 
0 
~ (') 
JJ (r) 
.._;_yi Jl (i) 
illLibi ~__,.::. 0 L,. 1.7"~ (~1_, ('~I I~ 0 LS I .JI -1'1' 
'i'dJ.i..,. ~_r ~ , ~1_,.::--o 0-" J-j{ "4-.,;..M ~I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
~ ( \) 
JJ (r) 
w_ri JJ (r) 
~ (\) 
200 
D 
0 
D 
0 
D 
- \i-
• .J"J_)JII ~ ~ I :.U. ( T) 
ill~ ~~ (r) 
• ..::..~1 ~_, ~~ J-.) 0 1 t-f~l (i) 
J.,.....JLA..o..JI ~~ ~ dJ~ ~ (o) 
dJ.j ~ _;s-;1 r--1 _,t J_yl Jl (i) 
Jl (V) 
u-o ~ _,_; LS_,.> i 4..,. G. I <.!.1 L:...l!. ...::.....:. L.S I j I (A) 
-----------------------------~ 
l5 .i..J I ..::.. I _,b--J I LS_,.$ j i -~ G-.1 I -.!1 .J Jl J I ._;_,..J L.S...::. ~ .J.:. J.,.,.5 - i ~ 
'i' i.,.> L:..J I 4 :.U. 0-" Lll> _,..::. ~ I 
D .J...L,. ..::.. I • I ...r.- I LSi ~ r-l ..?-1 J .h.,..AJ L,. L.:...b.h> ( \ ) 
D 
0 
0 
..._;,~ "h a !··:.._.,_]1 c.I....JL......:..::..-"JI 0-- L.:...:>.L_,l 0 1 t-f_,.::...:.. (T) 
~ 
~~~ !"'·· l ... II ~ 
~,_, ~ .b.h.> ~~ (r) 
.J...L,. d.J.j ~ pi r-!J J_r I J1 (f) 
I .i.ll> u L.S _,_J J ~ ~~\ ~I d:...,. I JL......)\ ~.?Jib 
'i'yL.....JI 6.J G-.1 I _,..-..::-
D ~ ( \ ) 
0 Jl (T) 
D J_rl Jl _,t ~ (r) 
-io 
201 
- \V-
u-f I .i..lb 0 LS _,_J ~ '6......... L;>-11 ~I d.:-,. I J l-..; L,.. ~ _r J.lb - '11 
0 
D 
D 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
0 
D 
0 
~ W, Lo.-1 I U u..J I ,.r--L.. 
~ (') 
Jl ( r) 
c..i_rl ~ __,1 J......:..>.... (r) 
I~ ( ' ) 
Jl,.-Li (I) 
l_;...lL:. (r) 
J..J.::..>....: Jl (i) 
(r.:'/~ I 0-" I~ ..:,r->1 ( ' ) 
..:.r-> I L:. L.,.> I (r) 
(r.:'/~' ~ ( r) 
(r.:'/~ I 0-" L.....a> u..::. J..i I (f) 
D l__,...,..:..s ( ') 
D L:. Lr.> I ( r) 
0 ~...)-"' .,t -o.r d.Jj u-t ..:..~ (r) 
0 o..ro-JL,.. '~ 1 ( 0 
202 
-lA-
D IJ.?- 6~ 
0 .h...._,..:.:...,-Jl .3__,-j 6~ 
0 6.b.-~ ".)..)LA.., 
D 6~L,; :;~~ 
D ~_,.>~I 0-" ~pi 
D ~_,.>~I . ~pi 0-" .. . 
D ~_,.>~I J.:...o 
0 _,.;.\ ..).>.i t.Si 0-" JJi 
J Lib i ..J· ....., II t:. · 'I · ·· ....L..S . i 
_, l..r' ...r--- ~ .. - lS_,> 
D ...,. Jll ~f 0-" ~pi 
0 ~_,.>:511 . ~pi 0-" .. . 
D ~_,.>Sll J.:...o 
0 ~_r)-~1 0-" J-t i 
(') 
(r) 
(r) 
( ~ ) 
(\) 
( r) 
(r) 
( ~ ) 
~ t...,......:. L,. 4..:....) u....._j L,; 
1..l.!.l...r. _,! ~.Jl.?.....o ~ 
( 1 ) 
(r) 
(r) 
(i) 
-vr 
•-L.-..l.> • ~i_, ;;-L.-..l.> u-$Loi ~~ dJL..ibi .i.>l ~ ..).>. ul ~~ -vr 
1l.A~ ~ 
D ~fil ..r~Pi (1) 
0 ..:r.:-_r>-'SII ..r J..,..-.Li-,. p i ( T ) 
203 
0 
0 
- \ '\ -
.::r.,._,.>Sit ·~ (f) 
Lr.:-_,.>Sit 0"' J.:i I ( i) 
Lf'-""_9 4~ l_.r-9 _,i ..::-I.· 1 _ _.· ,·~II_, rJLi" J)t 6-l.JbL:....o ~ -l> 15 1 ~I -Vf 
J L.i.i," J) I .y. 
0 Lr.:' _,.>Sit ..:ro~PI ( \ ) 
D ~_,.>Sit . J.,...l.i.,- _r..sl 0"" .. . ( T) 
D Lr.:' _,.>Sit ~ ( r) 
D Lr.:' _,.> 'J I ..r J.:i{ ( i ) 
D Lr.:' _,.>'J I ..r~ _r..si ( \ ) 
0 Lr.:' _,.>'lt ..r J.,._Li..,. _r..sl (T) 
D Lr.:' _,.> 'lt ~ (r) 
D Lr.:' _,.>'11 ..r J.:i{ (f) 
'i'dJUbl t:' ...:.:.-1-' • L..DJ..... ~..::..y..::. ..l> 1.5 I ~I -Vi 
0 ~_,.>'lt LT"" ~ J·· . pi ( \ ) 
D ~_,.>'11 0-" ~ _r..sl (T) 
0 Lr.:' _,.>'11 ~ (f) 
D Lr.:-_,>"Sf I ..r J..:i{ (i) 
204 
_,.._ 
JL.ib. ~~ ~_r ~ 6._.r.:->. ~~ d..o.J.S..JI o..J '-:"'5'1 ..::..)l!.L.....II ~ ~ -VV 
L...lS.JI o~ ~ • rSJI ~I -~_,..::.-ll '-:"'.~I ..:.!__,.::..... _r>"SJI ~IJ 
~ ~w ~ •,..rr.-->-~1 
0 
0 
D 
D 
""-=:'" _,_rll (') 
~~~~~ r~.rJI (T) 
r~.rl' ( T') 
..)..,.~ ~~ ~ (f) 
~J Lib. ' 11 .. . .• ~I • \.._,....:..~I . • I • 11 I ... 'I 
y A..,.._,. r ~ lSy u--9 ~~ ..) ...r-
D 
D 
tJ 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
0 
D 
""-=:'" .J.rll ( \) 
""-=:'".J.rl'.J r~.rl' (T) 
r.J.rl' (r) 
..\..\>...o ~ (f) 
~_,_rll (\) 
_rll 
""-=:'" ~_rll J (.J (T) 
r.J.rJI (Y') 
C"''.J ~ (n 
""-=:'" .J.rll ( ' ) 
""-=:'".J.rli.J r.J.rl' (T) 
o~ l.r" -VA 
205 
D 
0 
D 
0 
D 
0 
D 
D 
0 
0 
0 
tJ 
0 
D 
(J_)-ll ( r) 
r:-"IJ ~ (0 
~J..rJI ( ' ) 
~ _,_rll _, CJ..rJ I (,.) 
CJY 1 (i) 
r:-"IJ ~ (0 
I..;.) L.:.. ( ' ) 
l.JL.,.> • .))1 ~ ~ (T) 
;;.)~ (i) 
o.;;...J_, J.$ ~ I .... ~...r-- (f) 
1..; j L.:.. ( ' ) 
l.JL.,.> • .Jll ~ ~ (T) 
6..)~ ( i) 
c.J_, J.$ ~ '~_ri.:. (f) 
...::-GJI..cl ~ ~ J.) ~ _,> I ..P-i ~ 0-r.'~ ...).> 1.51 u-JI -A f. 
'I J_;,-:.-JI 
D 
206 
0 0 L,...> • J1 I Jua-.,. ~ (T) 
0 •..Jt..s (i) 
0 ...:...J_, J.S ~ l__.,...,. __,..i.:. (0 
4~ ~fo Lo..J...:..s A..,._r-IL..,. ~.!.!_,__,.....:. .:.r ....._ ... ,_, ..;;.....;.! ~ lSI ~~ -Ao 
~ J u.J:, • )I I .:_r 
0 I _,..JL-....:. ( ' ) 
0 0 L___,..> • J1 I Jua-.,. ~ (T) 
Q 6...}~ ( i) 
0 ..::.-9_, J.S ~ ~__,..i.:. (n 
207 
;;i 
I 
Husbands' Interview Schedule 
( ' ) 
J ~--------~ . ..) 
.Jil J..o ".. ·· .JI_, "L------, .. ...r- ii J I o ·· 'J I 6 ~ ...::.. L.:. \______,,.._,. 
"L.:> o I. II ..:...__~I u0l..;-'. Jl 
-\ 
~I ·o....:. ..WI 
-t 
:; 
. :--J I 
-T' 
uS--JI ii...ih.:..... r-' -~ 
J_,.s .:.W I ii _,.;.. )' I ..)..)..1:. 
-o 
~ L.:. 'J I ...::..I_,.>"JII ..)..)..1:. 
-1 
Ly..,.J I L::.._____L,..) ~ I ,. .. I • .. II iU.> ..r" - v 
D 
0 
~~ Jl (l) 
~i_, i~i (t) 
..:.:.-1_,_:..-.-.11 ..)..)..1:. + D ..h.._,.::...._, ~I ~I (i) 
---- ...::.. I _,_:.-J I ..)..)..1:. + D "-" I .Y L.,. l.S.Y ~ .j.ll> • y ( f ) 
._\ ..)..1:. + 0 ·.w,_, L:- 0-" J-5 i ..) l.5 y ~ 0-" ~ i .j.ll> • y ( 0 ) 
------- ..::..1_, II 
~uJ.lh•r (1) 
...::..1_, II 
208 
(T) 
D c-Lo_,....l,...l ) ~ c-4J..) (V) 
..)~ + ( D ~IJ_,.:.5..l D ~Lo 
c-I..J · II 
ab-'1 { -;.. -'1 -A 
·--,---........ ~ . .,:,.- ..J ~
rS .i.J I J_.,...,.J I d.:..... ~ ~ .. Y".) <.!J.j_J _, J..o...c _,.J L.,..D I J 0 _,5.-: ~ - '\ 
~ w' ~~ ...,. r__,:;..::. 
, ... lo> 1.5.i.JI 
0 
D 
0 
J..llll ~ ~ <.!.l..l.J)..Ji 
D 
D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
~ ( \ ) 
Lo \....&. ~ (T) 
~ (i) 
J...o.>._rl L..D I . _,5.-: ~ .. J I...J 
~ ~u-o 
~ ( \ ) 
L. \....&. ~ (T) 
~ (i) 
~ ( \) 
Lo \....&~ (T) 
)I ( i) 
a..,....ls 
-\. 
209 
-i-
l;r.h l!.L:.- ,J..:....o ~ ~ J 1.!.1 w.Jl _, i J i l.!.l..W J J...:..> _,.J t...,...D I _, 0fo J..lb - 1 T 
<.5~1 ~ ~ ~~ 0 i_, 0 • .J)I o..,....h ~ <.5.:.Wl J.>..WI u-i-:-
t; 
·0 jl ~ <.S.:.Wl 
0 ~ ( ' ) 
0 La L"~ (T) 
D j (I) 
J ..L:- i P 1 J_,.b i ~_j_j ~ 1 ~ w--6....:. 0 i I ~ J..D...i-::. J..lb - 1 I 
~ J_.,._,..J , 
0 ~ (1) 
O La u~ (T) 
0 j (I) 
l5 .:.w, ..::....:; _,..J, 0-" ys i l!.L,...D ....T""' ~ ~ ~ l5 .:.w, c.J _,.J, <.Sy J..lb -' f 
~~~~~ 
0 ~ (1) 
0 La u~ (T) 
0 j (I) 
0 
p 
210 
I 
-~-
.)J (i) 
w_:_ ~..)~ ~ o L,..:>--LJ ~ L5.i.J l • ~ l J-Ib J..c....aJ l ~ j.c. -\ 1 
'i' _,>"i • ~ 1.5 l 0-A _r.5 I 
0 
D 
D 
0 
0 
0 
~ { \ ) 
Lo u_,...:.. {'f) 
J) {i) 
~ ( \) 
Lo u_,...:.. (T) 
.)J ( i) 
J..o...-s..J 1 ~ I <.!.lJ, L>...::. I ~ I" ..L...J L,. 0 L,..> • J) I ...,.:......,.. u-i c..-> I J.c. -\ A 
D 
0 
0 
[j 
0 
0 
'i'..:,~l a..,. r~ 15.i.JI 
~ (l) 
Lo u_,...:.. (T) 
J) (i). 
~ (I) 
L.. u _,..:. ( T) 
.)J ( i) 
211 
(o) 
0-" _;--:.5 i t_ l yLl l c....3 _, ~ 4-J.-tl..::. ~ l ~ ~)11 1.!.1 _,.-.:. J-a> - t • 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
'i'J..o.....-ll 
~ ( \) 
L.o u_,_:, (T) 
)l (i) 
~ (l) 
L.o u_,_:, (T) 
)l (i) 
~ ( \) 
L.o u_,_:, (T) 
)l ( i) 
~ l . d......:.:, . -< . i . . . < L.o.Jz,.. i .{"...::. 1- _ .... 
. --<>-.L._ro '· ··_r-o 0~ 0 ~ 6~ ~__, \..)-"" II 
0 
0 
D 
~ ( \) 
L.o u_,_:, (T) 
)l ( i) 
212 
':I ..l.:?" 'ti 
D 
0 
0 
...l......> A-- 0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
( 1) 
L..o 
'yL....JI 
~ ( ' ) 
W: . 
..r (r) 
~ (\") 
d::...JL> . L ... JA U·~
~ ( ') 
La...-..; (I) 
~ ( \") 
~ (') 
L.:. L.t> t ( r) 
~ ( \") 
~ (l) 
L.:. L.t> l ( I) 
~ ( \") 
-To 
yL u..o ~ J-l.JJ ..;1~1 ('~ ..;:.S..:..::. ~ ~G-JI o,;;....j_,..ll ~ -'I'A 
': wr. ...WI J .b l-..9.)1 I 6_r.5 
0 
0 
D )J ( \"} 
213 
(V) 
~~ ~ c~l_, r.D..::.-JI ~~ ~ r-s".;~ ·~ JG._r-JI . • 1-~ 
..__;,. 11 I~ 'I -'- <I .. •<It_. . JG-It. Lo ''L..>..JI 
'4-' Lr' 0...r--"':'!\.:r""""""~·0~ . ..;-~' ~6 .. _, 
~I ~ 4L,p._.ll ~. LS_f-i • t_,...:i I.!JL.J!, 0 l.,. ~ ../>. ~~ ~1_, 
.·~, ~ ~ r...u...::...J'_, 
wl · G.i ~i..:. Jl · L ._c.~ ~I 1"..\..i.::...JI u· L.S I~~ ,J)..:.... 
.). U·v- "C· J -n 
0 
D 
D 
0 
D 
~ J-sU..::. J.r.j w I _,...:..- 6 ..u.J 
~ (') 
~.) (T) 
)I ( i) 
~ (') 
)I ( r) 
~ 1.!..11 _,.::.....-.a LJ-4. JJ i u.h:::...... ~ L.::.J • y uS-J' ~ J-i 1 _,..:. ~ ..:...n 
D 
0 
~ J_.,.....J ' t;r-f d... ..l....i.:. ._k....,-
~ ( \) 
.)J ( r) 
214 
~ 
(A) 
~ 
.J.....-s..J I ~ r~~ ~ ~d..~\ ...::.....J..,r-~ j.ll> -n 
0 ~ ( \ ) 
0 )) (i) 
(' ...u..:.:..J I ~ ~ ~I 0-"' ~~ ..:; LS..... uJ I d:..l!. u ~ j.ll> -ii 
!i'~t t;r-i 
D 
0 
~ ( \) 
)) ( \') 
~ r~' ~~ ~..)~ "ci..)L...J _,i JLAbi '-:--~' J>. • _,::- J.A> -n 
'i' .J.....-s..JI 
0 
D 
~ ( \) 
)) ( i) 
L.. J..) I y..) d._~ ~ I • L,.!. SJ I U.) I _j.-0 0-" J-l..ii-;;. ..:_,l,. i..:rD _r j.ll> - i o 
~ <.!.Ll..oJ: ~ r ..D.;:...J 1 J.,.,...,- ~ , " . :- .. JJ 
0 ~ ( \ ) 
0 :) (T) 
L:;._j • ..)-" <.!)..)Jl_, i ..) d.:..::-..).) lSf Jl ..:;l_,. _,....)II u-t:~l I ~I ~..:rD ..r- J.A> -n 
'i' ..:..Ll...s. ~ r..,U.;;....II J....-
D ~ (\) 
q Jl ( T) 
215 
·"l 
.., 
r: 
<i.. t 
·l J' 
"' t [., 
1 -
t_ .., ~ 
Cf, q, 
DO l DO r DO 
'f, ~ t t (..." -~ \. 
\. t; n 
.. t I 1. 
-
r "' ~l ""1 ~l [l ~l c-
-- - r -- --"'"'( -
-'1 - - -"( -
--
l. 
--): - C· ~( (;:_ 
1; t c 
I I 
H\ 
"" 
-
.
t \., 
1.' (.._ 
'v 
t. 1.. 
[:_ \:; 
(... 
(;- t -(.._ OD· [ t 
•"l q, l. 
b r { 
t t l 
t t. r. 
""1 .., ~l •"l f t ·l t ---'1 - "' . c.. 
-- k \_,. c ~ (;:_ 
Cf, f t; c \. 1; 
I I 
-t -t 
..s> > 
DO 
~ l 
--
-'1 -
--
\. 
.., 
t 
l 
\. 
\ 
. 
~ 
-
q, 
r 
-(..." 
r 
c.. 
\_,. 
i ~ 
I 
-t 
< 
I 
..s> 
I 
N 
1-' 
0\ 
( \ . ) 
~ r ..u.::..J.J o ~ ._,_;. ~ ~ )1..,. y, L::J-' ~ JA -t ,. 
~J...-.-.11 
~ d::, I...,.> ~ 
[] 
D 
. . 
lr" 
p 
0 
~~ ,_,A 
~ ( \) 
.)1 (r) 
0...,...)Lo...ll A..,.>L.:..JI 
.s..r JA -H' 
r--:- ( \ ) 
.)1 ( T) 
~ • L_,...:. i ~ u t d.J A..,.-:-J L.,. ' .l> f'"\.......J' V" .s..r J.A -£ f 
• 0.) L,- ~) d.:.' ~ _, d.,. u..... i tS ..l-1 tS.:.w' tS~' _, 0 j r.J' v-.A..:. 
D 
0 
0 
~ d.l.c.s ~ rt- . .)II ~~ 
0 
0 
~ d::, I...,.> ~ • .r 
0 
D 
( t-1' ...... ~.)I....·J..r--
r--:- ( \ ) 
L. u. ~ (T) 
.)1 (T') 
r~ ul ~ '~~./' ~t JA -~o 
r--:- ( \ ) 
.)1 ( T ) 
~~ _ya J......aJI ~ r.u.:..J' .s..r ,)A -n 
r--:- ( \ ) 
.)1 ( T) 
217 
D 
0 
0 
D 
-1\-
218 
~ ( l) 
~ (T) 
~ ( l) 
~ ( T) 
VITA 
Samraa Ahmed Anbar Moustafa 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: MEASURES OF KUWAITI WIVES' AND HUSBANDS' ATTITUDES ON 
FERTILITY 
Major Field: Sociology 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Egypt, August 14, 1946, the daughter of Mr. 
and Mrs. Ahmed Anbar. 
Education: Received Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology and 
Anthropology from Western Illinois University in 1973; 
received Master of Arts degree in Sociology from Western 
Illinois University in 1975; completed the requirements for 
the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Oklahoma State University 
in December, 1980. 
Professional Experience: Graduate Research Assistant in Sociology, 
Western Illinois University, 1974-1975; Instructor of 
Sociology and Contemporary Social Problems, Arabic Language, 
Western Illinois University, 1975-1976, 1977-1978; Instructor 
of Sociology, Contemporary Social Problems, night classes at 
Spoon River College, Canton, Illinois, 1977-1978. 
Graduate Teaching Assistantship in Sociology, Oklahoma State 
University, 1978-1979. 
